

PRRS-UPA-91-022
MAY 1991

Foreign
Broadcast
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A N N I V E R S A R Y
1941 - 1991

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

19991028 102

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SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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Soyuz Deputies Issue Letter on Separatism

*LD1104140591 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT
11 Apr 91*

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—Leaders of the Soyuz group of deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who stand for maintaining the integrity of the country, call for stemming national-separatism, which “evolved in Lithuania and spread to the territories of many republics of the Soviet Union.”

USSR People's Deputies Nikolay Petrushenko, Viktor Alksnis, Yevgeniy Kogan and Lithuanian People's Deputy Sergey Pirozhkov issued a letter, which is published in today's issue of GLASNOST, a socio-political weekly of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

“Given all the complexity of processes now occurring in the Baltic republics, their essence is simple—Soviet power, democracy and harmonic relations among nations are put at stake,” the letter points out.

The authors of the letter regard as “useless” any new calls to “the reason, honour and conscience of the national leaders who embarked on the course of disintegrating the Soviet Union”.

“The quest for consensus in the conflict between adventurers, conspirators and usurpers, on the one hand, and Soviet citizens of all nationalities in Lithuania, on the other, is naive only outwardly but in essence is immoral.”

“Bloody clashes similar to those which occurred in January are inevitable in conditions of Landsbergis' unlawful dictatorship, which tramples upon people's rights and moves towards provocations planned in advance. In these conditions the working people have the right to defence and self-defence, especially since there is a paralysis of central government,” the letter says.

As the new Lithuanian leadership is stubbornly reluctant to comply with the USSR law on the mechanism of the federation subjects' secession from the USSR, Lithuania, in their view, “should simply be excluded from the community of Soviet republics.”

However, “it should be excluded within its boundaries for the moment of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which Lithuanian law experts recognise as unlawful

from the moment it was signed just as they regard as unlawful all of its consequences. These consequences directly for Lithuania amounted to the city of Vilna and Vilna territory as well as the city of Memel (Klaipeda) and Memel territory being ceded to it.”

Liberal Democrat Leader Appeals for Patience

*LD1403121391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0640 GMT 14 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 14 Mar—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal - Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, is convinced that his party will gain supporters in Lithuania also, and that their votes will help it at the elections to the soviets in three years. He is currently holding a series of meetings in the republic on the eve of the Union referendum. Asked at a meeting with local journalists whether the Baltic republics will then remain a part of the Soviet Union, the Liberal - Democrat leader stated that “the popular fronts are in too much of a hurry, which is why they are moving away from the goal they themselves have set—to separate the three republics from the USSR.”

The Liberal-Democratic Party, set up in March 1990 and with a membership of 17,000, is striving to become the country's second political force after the CPSU. Its principles are a free economy, solution of all questions without violence, including strikes, rallies, and civil disobedience actions. “In times of trouble you must not urge embittered and hungry people to stage demonstrations calling for a general strike and rush headlong into the Kremlin demanding the president's and the government's resignation,” Zhirinovskiy told journalists. “You can proceed toward power only through elections, having proven that you are better than others. Otherwise you have bloodshed, shooting, and disaster. Is it really the case that Yeltsin, once in power, will be able to feed the miners tomorrow? No. Just six months later they will shout: Down with him!” he emphasized. According to Zhirinovskiy, people must learn to be patient and wait for the results of the Union referendum and the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. And in mid - April, in his view, people can expect new directions in the center's activities to stabilize the situation in the country. They will be aimed at stopping the “war of laws,” and inter-ethnic conflicts in the republics. Zhirinovskiy is convinced that the stage of accumulation of negative experience is coming to an end and that the center has enough strength to stop the destructive processes.

Baltics**Latvia's Parliament Debates Privatization Decree***91UN1267D Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 26 Mar 91 p 4*

[Article by A. Mazule under the rubric: "Parliamentary News:" "Return to Former Owners, Sell to New Owners"]

[Text] Judging by the slight shaking of the premier's head, which could be seen clearly from the journalist rows in the parliament hall, the chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers was noticeably nervous during the debates. Afterwards, he repeatedly had to come to speak both from the microphone and even from his seat, since his voice is resonant and carries. And when the last paragraph of the Supreme Soviet decree that was being considered, and which evoked the sharpest debates, was passed by a majority in one vote precisely in the version that I. Godmanis insisted upon, one of the deputies advised in a friendly way: "You can write that parliament gave the government a vote of confidence." Indeed, all of the contentious paragraphs of the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic concerning state property and the main principles for its conversion were adopted in the wording that the premier proposed.

The decree defines the basic principles for the conversion of state property, which includes the transfer of state enterprises to self-governing bodies; and for the denationalization and privatization of state property and the property of self-governing bodies. At the beginning of conversion, it was decreed not to recognize as operative those legislative acts or acts of state management on whose basis, starting in June 1940, nationalization and other unjustified expropriation of property was carried out. Decrees about the transfer of state property to USSR departments, public, and other organizations will also be subject to judicial review.

The decree reinforces the rights of former owners and their heirs (regardless of their present citizenship) to restoration of property lost after 1940. Moreover, what was lost is returned directly or by means of compensation with securities. At the categorical insistence of the premier, the addition was made to this paragraph: "excluding money." Privatization will be implemented "based on redemption." A number of deputies also proposed a free transfer of parts of property, but it did not pass.

"The principle of justice must be observed not only with respect to former owners. Not only they, but millions of people have a right to their share of property which for years was expropriated from them through salaries," A. Plotnieks said to his Supreme Soviet colleagues. "I call on you to support the purchase-sale principle that is the foundation of capitalism. Capitalism as a normal economic system. Do not get carried away by social slogans of the type 'We will give back everything to the workers for free!'" I. Godmanis proposed.

Judging by the decree, the price of objects being privatized will be formed according to conditions of a free market. For the privatization of a limited part of state property, permanent residents of Latvia will be granted a one-time allowance in the form of a certificate "in consonance with their contribution to the augmentation of the national property of the republic," as it is stated in the document.

The decree instructs the Council of Ministers to develop a mechanism to protect the interests of the Latvian Republic, limiting as much as possible "in the process of privatization, an influx of inconvertible USSR money from persons who are not permanent residents of the republic."

Power Struggle in Latvian Citizens Congress Unresolved*91UN1267C Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 27 Mar 91 p 3*

[BALTIYA-LETA report: "Power Struggle Inside Citizens Congress"]

[Text] The fifth session of the Latvian Citizens Congress that finished its second day did not bring any results. Not one problem facing the congress has been resolved.

During the session, a power struggle broke out between the current leadership and supporters of Chairman Aivars Jirgens and their opponents, who do not approve of unwarranted sharp words in politics and lack of constructiveness in relations with the Supreme Soviet. The Latvian committee was criticized for its treatment of the agreement between Latvia and Russia that was concluded on 13 January 1991, for its passive position and lack of specificity in assessing the "barricade days" in Riga, and for the policy of boycotting the all-Latvian poll of the population on 3 March, which was a failure and which even a large part of the regional citizens' committees rejected.

The elections to chairman of the Latvian committee ended without result, inasmuch as not one of the contenders won. Aivars Jirgens remains at this post.

Part of the delegates left the hall, and the work of the session was cut short.

USSR: People's Front Must Not Become Political Party*LD1004223891 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
0430 GMT 10 Apr 91*

[Text] The sitting of the Dome of the People's Front of Latvia has resolved to charge the People's Front faction in parliament, in collaboration with the Board of the People's Front, with forming a joint working group with the following tasks: The abolition of the Constitution of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic; the drafting and introduction of a draft plan for the defense of the Republic of Latvia; the reorganization of institutions of

local government; the formation of an independent banking and finance system; the restoration of work on the Satversme [original constitution of 1922] of the Republic of Latvia; the preparation of democratic elections to the Saeima. The dome expressed a rebuke to parliament, which in its economic legislation is alleged to have submitted to the influence of the government apparatus, not the program of the People's Front and the resolutions of the Third People's Front Congress. The dome believes that without a resolution of the question of state sovereignty, it is not possible to successfully realize economic reforms. The session of the dome also resolved that with the attainment of the independence of Latvia, the People's Front of Latvia will have to work as a popular movement and not transform itself into a political party.

Latvian People's Front Disclaims Defense of Premises

*LD0404173591 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
1730 GMT 3 Apr 91*

[Announcement by Board of Latvian People's Front]

[Text] The voluntary People's Guards who took an active part in the defense of the most important premises of the Republic of Latvia played a major role as the basis of the Latvian Army in formation. This work must be energetically continued in the structure of the government of the Republic of Latvia. The 4 May anniversary of the declaration of Latvian independence is approaching; nevertheless, institutions for the defense of the reformed nation are not in fact being formed. The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia on 26 January this year took over from the People's Front of Latvia the defense of the strategically important state premises. But to this day they have not been able to ensure it.

In protest against the (?inaction) of the Government of the Republic of Latvia will in future regard the participation by the people in the defense of the premises as pointless and declines all responsibility for the future fate of these premises.

Latvian CP's Rubiks Briefs Party Aktivists

*PM0804082191 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 28 Mar 91 p 1*

[Latvian Communist Party Central Committee press center report: "A.P. Rubiks Meets With Republic's Party Aktiv"]

[Text] A.P. Rubiks, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, met with the republic's party aktiv 27 March at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

The meeting was attended by rayon and city party committee secretaries, Communists from the "Equal

Rights" faction of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, representatives of the editorial collectives of Latvian Communist Party mass media, communist servicemen, and also officials of the apparatuses of the party's Central, rayon, and city committees.

A.P. Rubiks briefed those attending the meeting on the results of the latest session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo: with the assessment of the political situation that has developed in the country, with the conclusions regarding the manner in which the CPSU should organize its work with a view to reducing the extremely tense political confrontation in society, and with the conclusions reached as a result of the all-union referendum held 17 March. Particular attention was paid to the highly flattering assessment given at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session of the Latvian Communists' work during the preparation for and the holding of this referendum.

Concrete tasks arising out of the current political situation prevailing in the republic were set before the republic's party aktiv at the meeting.

A.P. Rubiks answered questions put by those attending the meeting.

Latvian Communist Minority Faction Leader Protests

*LD1204112591 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 0430 GMT 12 Apr 91*

[Text] The leader of the communist Equal Rights minority faction of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, Sergejs Dimanis, has in one of the newspapers of the Republic's Communist Party today published an open letter to electors. In this he describes the contents of many of the resolutions of the Supreme Council as incompetent and dangerous. He also describes on the whole as irrational the work of the Supreme Council. The parliamentary majority is based on myth, and not on political realities, and its political thinking is 70 years old.

In this way Dimanis is obviously drawing parallels with the unrealistic and violent policy of the Bolsheviks in Russia after the October Revolution. The majority in the Supreme Council—and also in its structures, in other words the Presidium—continues to restrict the rights of the minority. One example of such restrictions is the decision of the Presidium not to pay the Communists deputies' salaries for January and February. We remind you that for mostly formal considerations the minority faction did not participate in the work of the Supreme Council. Protesting against this, Dimanis also now continues to refuse his salary.

Latvian Interfront Council Appeals for Equal Treatment

*PM0803164191 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 8 Feb 91 p 1*

["Appeal to Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet"; undated]

[Text] In view of the dangerously explosive political situation developing in the republic, and deeming it necessary to facilitate the establishment of civic accord and mutual respect on the basis of a study of the reasons causing the tension, the Republic Council of the International Front of Latvian SSR Working People proposes that the Supreme Soviet adopt a declaration on the basic principles of interethnic relations in the Latvian Republic, proclaiming the following:

1. The Russian population and the Russian-speaking population participate in the creation of the republic's national wealth equally with the Latvian people, and its contribution is proportional to its numbers.

2. Latvia's Russian population, along with Poles, Germans, and Jews, is one of the ancient and traditional Latvian minorities. Over many centuries it has been making its contribution to the Latvian economy and enriching its culture and science.

The Russian minority, along with other minorities, is unequivocally recognized as a fully equal part of the Latvian Republic.

3. Russian historical and cultural monuments, and likewise other ethnic minorities' monuments, are the property of the whole Latvian people and under the protection of the state, and the necessary financial resources are provided for their restoration and preservation.

4. Radio and television are the property of all the republic's inhabitants, irrespective of their nationality or political views. The Supreme Soviet guarantees unhindered and fair access to radio and television for all the republic's social and political organizations and categorically condemns any censorship or distortion of information in the interests of any organization.

5. The government must provide the republic's population with official data about the importance of economic ties with the USSR and the consequences to the national economy should they be disrupted.

6. Any statements or actions insulting the Soviet Army must be condemned, and 9 May—the Day of Victory over fascism—is to be proclaimed a holiday.

7. Any discrimination against the republic's population on religious grounds is deemed impermissible. Taking account of the large number of Orthodox believers and practicing Jews among Latvian inhabitants, the Orthodox Christmas Day and the Jewish New Year are proclaimed holidays and nonworking days.

8. In connection with the fact that the republic government has failed to ensure fulfillment of the program to introduce the Law on Languages, a review of the timetable for bringing the law into force, based on a new government program, is deemed necessary.

9. Recognizing the equal contribution to the republic budget by the Latvian and Russian-speaking sections of the population, receipt of state-financed secondary and higher specialized education in both languages is to be guaranteed.

Republic Council of Interfront

Latvian Press Views Poland Talks, Postal Problems, Other Issues

*91UN1267B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 23 Mar 91 p 3*

[Unattributed LETA report: "Survey of Latvian Press"]

[Text] The newspaper DIENA reports on the visit to Poland of Andrejs Krastins, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. The main purpose of the trip is to resolve the question of opening a Latvian mission in Warsaw, and a Polish mission in Riga. The second important task was the achievement of an agreement with the Polish Republic on the exchange of high-level delegations. Also of great interest were the legislative acts adopted in Poland on privatization and denationalization, which are rather urgent for Latvia.

Analyzing the results of the USSR referendum in Latvia, a correspondent for RIGA BALSS writes: "Actually, this was a referendum principally of one generation of Russian-speaking residents of Latvia—mainly of those who are 50-60 years of age. Naturally, there were many veterans, and here and there youth also cropped up, but, still, the main mass was made up of those whose childhood was hit by the war, whose youth was turned feverish by Khrushchev's thaw, and whose maturity was reached in the Brezhnev stagnation."

According to press information, at the end of last year in Latvia, 6,400 cooperatives were registered, 5,400 of them are operating, and more than half are located in Riga. Last year, cooperatives sold commodities, provided services, and performed work for two million rubles, twice as much as in 1989. At the same time, cooperatives have large sums of cash on hand, which has a negative effect on the republic's commodity market.

It is reported that the Latvian People's Front and the Association of Latvians of America undertook to report data on control over international postal shipments from Latvia, and on cases of theft and unjustifiably long periods of transport. Acquired data will be submitted to appropriate establishments of the USSR and to the United States Senate for investigation, with the objective of putting an end to the disorder in postal communications with Latvia.

Commenting in the newspaper **BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA** on a draft law on public education, Peteris Lakis noted that "the draft law allows the opening of private and cooperative schools, but not at the expense of canceling free education, but as a supplement to it. In Germany and Sweden, for example, the state covers 80-90 percent of the expenditures for private schools. We are not able to handle such a figure now. It will be fortunate if we will be able to finance private schools for at least 50 percent from republic and local budgets."

Nonideological Faction Formed in Lithuanian Parliament

91UN1267A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 23 Mar 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "New Faction in Lithuanian Parliament"]

[Text] A group of deputies free of any ideology became the sixth deputy group in succession in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

Reading an announcement on its behalf, the famous Lithuanian dramatist Kazimeras Saja noted that the new faction is prepared to unite those on the right and on the left, and policy and ethics. It will be guided in its activity by values common to all mankind. The faction will fight for the creation of a society of free citizens, for a legislative system that will not permit the emergence of a dictatorship, and for equal protection of the rights of all citizens, the activity of parties, and public organizations.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's 19 Mar Proceedings Reported

PM0404133591 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 21 Mar 91 p 1

[ELTA report: "At the Republic's Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] The third session of the republic's Supreme Soviet continued its work 19 March. Jonas Simenas, chairman of the Environmental Protection Commission, submitted the draft Law on Payments for Natural Resources for discussion at the morning plenary sitting. It was noted that the purpose of introducing these taxes is to enhance the responsibility of those using natural resources for the effective and careful utilization of the national wealth, as well as to recoup state expenditures on prospecting for natural resources and on measures for their protection.

The law's adoption article by article began after the discussion.

The discussion of the draft Standing Orders of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet continued. Its articles were presented by Deputy Aurimas Taurantas. Lawmaking procedures were discussed.

At the evening sitting deputies were briefed on the draft Law of the Lithuanian Republic on Payments for Pollution of the Environment.

Republican Premier Gediminas Vagnorius presented for second reading a draft provisional Law of the Lithuanian Republic on Foreign Currency Resources and Settlements in Convertible Currency. Following the discussion, the law was adopted article by article.

Deputy Audrius Butkevicius, general director of the Territorial Protection Department, briefed the Supreme Soviet on his arrest by an OMON [special purpose militia detachment] subunit in Lithuania 18 March and his unlawful detention for 12 hours. Citizen Antanas Petrauskas, styling himself Lithuanian SSR prosecutor, also took part in that operation.

Audrius Butkevicius expressed protest because his freedoms and rights had been violated in breach of his parliamentary immunity status. The deputy declared that he would demand that criminal proceedings be instituted against the persons who committed this crime. Finally, the sitting discussed a draft resolution on the ratification of provisions for the conditions of work by deputies to the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet.

Kuris Appointed Lithuanian State Adviser

LD0504095191 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Text] A new office, the state adviser of the Republic of Lithuania, was endorsed yesterday at the Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium Sitting. Pranas Kuris was appointed state adviser for special diplomatic and legal missions.

Kuris was minister of justice for several years prior to the formation of the present cabinet. He is considered to be one of Lithuania's best experts in international law and is a member of the Lithuania delegation to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Danukas Arlauskas, meanwhile, has been relieved of his duties as deputy director general of the State Security Department. As we already reported, two weeks ago the department's director general was also replaced.

Arlauskas is among those who have joined the Security Department of the Lithuanian KGB division. His competence has often been criticized recently by anonymous KGB officials in Lithuanian newspapers.

Vilnius Orders Inventory of Nationalized Private Property

LD0404123191 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] By way of implementing the law on initial privatization of state property, the Lithuanian Government has issued instructions to ministries, departments, city and regional municipalities, to make an inventory of

private property nationalized in 1940. The inventory work must be completed by the end of this May, and the property to be reprivatized embraces land, woods, estate, and other property nationalized by the soviets or taken away in other ways without remuneration. The complete list of property will specify all objects which their former owners now intend to regain by filling out official applications.

Brazauskas Meets Vilnius Plant Collective 26 March

*PM0904125991 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Mar 91 p 1*

[A. Gasyunene report: "Tackling Acute Problems"]

[Text] Algirdas Brazauskas, republic Supreme Soviet deputy and chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDLP], had a meeting with the enterprise collective of Vilnius' "Plasta" Plant 26 March.

That was no ordinary day. It was on 26 March that we appeared to cross an invisible but perfectly tangible line, beginning life with new and quite high prices for almost all foodstuffs and most industrial goods. Add to this the conditions of shortages of everything and the uncertainty whether we will finally acquire the skill and potential to produce these actual foodstuffs and goods in adequate quantities. The government in which A. Brazauskas was vice premier was forced to resign some two and a half months ago because of an almost identical price hike.

The conversation began with the price rises. In the deputy's opinion, the tragic aspect of the situation lies not just in the rise itself, even though it may be sizeable (the main point is to keep prices at that level), but in the uncertainty and the lack of future prospects. How are families to be fed? How to acquire an apartment or build a home? There is no getting away from this reality and these daily worries. Therefore, when setting the goal of switching to a new system of political and economic relations and gaining real independence, it is necessary to show some concern for the way this should be done with the least losses being incurred by people.

Pondering aloud the sundry opinions and forecasts regarding relations with Moscow and President M. Gorbachev, the deputy cited the opinion of former U.S. President R. Nixon, with whom he conversed during his recent visit to Lithuania. One of Nixon's first questions was whether any outside help would be useful in preventing any deterioration in Lithuania's relations with Moscow.

A serious conversation ensued at the meeting, with numerous questions being asked about the activity of the LDLP itself in the current conditions. A. Brazauskas said that the last two years have been a period of serious trials and profound changes for the party. Having become an independent parliamentary party, the LDLP has elaborated its own strategy, it is seeking and finding contacts with the European social-democratic movement.

Many questions were asked about the future of party property. A. Brazauskas explained that, some time ago, many buildings belonging to the former Lithuanian Communist Party were handed over to various education establishments in Vilnius and Kaunas, and the relevant resolutions exist. But these buildings have now been occupied [zanyaty] by the military. And this is the most serious aspect of the general talks between the republic and the Soviet Union.

Speaking of the party's parliamentary activity, A. Brazauskas noted the rising activeness of the left-wing faction. But the majority in the Supreme Soviet, he said, stands on different positions and this is why the vote on many questions is predetermined in advance.

It was typical that the questions asked from the floor were exclusively political. Nobody mentioned the plant's affairs as such at the meeting. And yet, as I was told the day before, the situation at "Plasta" is complex: The production of plastic pipes has been halted and the output of polyethylene film has been cut back due to raw material shortages. The problems of getting hold of raw materials are getting worse. For the time being, however, past accumulations have been used to increase wages, make compensation payments in full, and reduce the cost of meals at the plant cafeteria.

"For the time being we are working and earning," plant Director A. Grishkyavichyus explained to me, weighing each word. "Hence the opportunity to somehow ease the pressure of the new prices. But things are shaky... This is the upsetting part of it..."

Lithuanian Supreme Council Findings on Simenas Incident

*PM0104160591 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
19 Mar 91 p 1*

["Communique of Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council" on investigation into disappearance of A. Simenas 13 January]

[Text] Three closed sessions of the Supreme Council were held 27-28 February and 14 March of this year. At these sessions the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council Commission for Studying the Circumstances of the Disappearance of A. Simenas, which was formed 13 January 1991 from deputies and representatives of various factions of Supreme Council deputies (chairman—K. Moteka; members—J. Bejnortas, V. Zemjalis, R. Paulauskas, V. Sadrejka, E. Jarasjunas), presented its findings.

The commission established that A. Simenas' actions 13 January were predetermined by the aggression perpetrated by USSR Armed Forces against the Lithuanian Republic and by the extremely complex political situation.

The commission does not possess evidence to refute A. Simenas' explanation that he interpreted the events of

the aforementioned day as a state coup against the lawful authority of the Lithuanian Republic, and undertook actions which, if the coup were to succeed, would allow him to remain a legitimate representative of that authority.

Assessing the material of the investigation, the commission established that A. Simenas took his decisions of 13 January 1991 of his own free will. The presence of direct outside pressure on him was not established. A. Simenas acted in consideration of the interests of the Lithuanian state.

At the 27 February closed session of the Supreme Council Deputy A. Simenas also made a report, giving detailed explanations and corroboration of his actions of 13 January this year.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council approved the commission's conclusions by a majority of votes at its session of 14 March, and resolved to publish this communique.

V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council

Vilnius, 14 March 1991

RSFSR

RSFSR's Stolyarov Views Political Situation

91UN1276A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Candidate of Philosophical Sciences N.S. Stolyarov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Communist Party of Russia Central Control Commission, by Lieutenant Colonel I. Sas, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Where the Logic of Confrontation Is Leading"]

[Text] The situation in the country, the situation in the party.... How is it viewed? How to change it for the better? These questions formed the basis of our correspondent's interview with Candidate of Philosophical Sciences N.S. Stolyarov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Communist Party of Russia Central Control Commission.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Sergeyevich, going by the editorial mail and the speeches at the First All-Army Party Conference, the Communists are worried by the situation in the country, and many of them, by the increasing threat of a change in the social system in the USSR. And some readers believe that it is time the party once again advanced the slogan: "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger!"

[Stolyarov] I might, perhaps, agree with this conclusion. Behind it lies affirmation of the situation that has taken shape in all spheres of social life. True, the party is being

accused of "deliberately inflaming passions." But in my opinion we have approached the point where even a housewife far removed from politics is capable of evaluating the situation in the country. But it is she, daily coming into contact with the bare store shelves, who feels most keenly the wrongness and miscalculations of policy. Every transitional period undoubtedly has its difficulties, but, I believe, the time has come to put the issue thus also: transitional period—from what to what? It has now been cleanly forgotten that perestroika envisaged fundamental transformations within the framework of the current system, by methods, what is more, precluding extremism, violence, and social upheavals. Upholding the people's interests, the CPSU is the principal barrier in the way of the destructive forces. And everything possible and impossible is being done to blow up this barrier.

Any slogan should be, generally, and I would like to emphasize this particularly, approached with the greatest caution. "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger!"—yes, but this by no means signifies that the Communists should immediately reach for their weapons virtually. Any attempt at an action by force would only play into the hands of our political opponents. It is thus that they are trying to portray us to the people—in military gear and with bayonets fixed against defenseless democracy. The Army card is being played most shamelessly here, incidentally, and the people are being intimidated with "military coups."

We must win by our policy—wise, consistent, and in keeping with the people's fundamental interests.

[Correspondent] A very great deal will depend on the choice Russia makes. Whence also the particular responsibility of the Communist Party of the RSFSR for the further development of events. Serious political struggle lies ahead. To speak of its strategy and tactics, what would you emphasize particularly?

[Stolyarov] I will permit myself to remind you that the pivotal question of any policy is that of power. It is with us the most painful question, perhaps, because it has not in practice been resolved even yet, and this is destabilizing the situation in all spheres. Alas, an unattractive part here has been played recently by certain political leaders of Russia who have with inexplicable airiness blessed the "parade of sovereignties." It is astonishing, but a fact: We are literally on the brink of the precipice, and instead of thinking about how to avoid the fatal step and how to bring people together and rouse people for work, we are engaged in what might be called a "clarification of relations." Any confrontation, any opposition, is today dangerous. I do not understand: Are power ambitions so strong that they are deadening the sense of alarm for the fate of the fatherland? Where, one wonders, is the logic of confrontation leading and where will it lead?

And since we began the discussion with slogans, let us recall one more: "All Power to the Soviets!" Guided by

good intentions, the CPSU removed itself from power functions. By which it went from one extreme to the other. We abandoned the party's omnipotence and are establishing the omnipotence of the soviets. The soviets, of course, are a model of administration approved by historical practice. But that same historical experience teaches that all power generally cannot be given to anyone. It should be consistently divided into legislative, executive, and judicial.

And the fault of the party lies also in the fact that the soviets of all levels have proven not to be on top of the situation, to put it mildly, and have at times displayed an incapacity for deciding even elementary everyday questions. It too airily transferred coordinating functions to the shoulders of immature soviets. Nor is it itself in the best position, come to that. After all, no political party is capable of pursuing its policy in circumvention of the organs of democracy. The new mechanism of interaction should, I believe, appear thus: The CPSU should neither distance itself from the soviets nor aspire to occupy a dominating position over them. Only constructive cooperation can help here. The soviets should be strengthened.

[Correspondent] But reader V. Popov from Novosibirsk and certain others disagree with you. They believe that the RSFSR CP Central Committee has made a mess of this work. Their main argument is that no one pays any heed to how the "Communists of Russia" parliamentary group votes.

[Stolyarov] I would advise them to read the press which is in opposition to the CPSU. It waxes very indignant at the assertiveness of the faction of Communists in the Russian parliament and is accusing the RSFSR CP Central Committee of gathering under its wing the communist deputies, briefing them, giving them instructions, suppressing their free expression and so forth.

Of course, no one is putting any pressure on the deputies. But assistance—theoretical and procedural—has been rendered and will continue to be rendered in the Central Committee. And there is nothing reprehensible in this. When a political party influences the solution of questions of vital importance to the state via its elect, this is a normal practice, accepted in all the world's democratic countries, incidentally.

I also see as a tactical, and very serious, miscalculation of the party the fact that it has removed itself from the country's economic life. Yet we are on the verge of economic collapse. And the situation can only be rescued, in my view, by the idea of a mobilization economy, which, it may be said, is already knocking at the door. I am by no means talking about general labor service and a structure of management of the country's economy of the model of the grim war years. I have already spoken of the essence of mobilization tactics in the sphere of the economy in some of my publications and speeches, specifically in PRAVDA of 2 and 4 April this year. This is primarily a strict mobilization of all material and

financial reserves of the state and their centralization. A complete halt to capital investments in "incompletes" and a strengthening of the tax and credit levers of influence on the economy. And, undoubtedly, strict control of economic processes top to bottom. Lack of control and lack of responsibility in our proportions are, perhaps, more terrifying enemies than any mafia.

[Correspondent] But, surely, this is once again a "tightening of the screw" and a return to command-administrative methods. But transition to the market requires great freedom.

[Stolyarov] Under today's conditions a civilized transition to the market can alone be secured by a system of management measures which is capable of realizing two conditions: halting the inflationary processes, first, and increasing responsibility on the job and labor discipline, second. Otherwise the whole strategic course of perestroika and democratization will be in jeopardy. Many people now understand this. We will not survive without the strictest austerity, without the immediate closure of all channels of the squandering of resources.

Further, it is extremely necessary that we also adjust our program policy guidelines to the economic situation. The need for the elaboration of a party strategy making it possible to consolidate the efforts of all healthy forces in support of democracy and social progress is perceived particularly acutely.

One further pressing problem is that of the Union treaty. I will not set forth the Communist Party of Russia's positions on this matter—they are widely known. I will express my personal opinion. Life itself is prompting us to change certain settled views of the concept of the Union. I will give you an example. The Bolshoy Ural corporation, which incorporates all oblasts and republics of the Urals, was created recently. Here you have the first swallow of spontaneous adjustments to the concept of the future arrangement of the Union. When F. Burlatskiy wrote about his view of the future of our state as a union of republics and territorial formations, that is, a form of government in the pattern of the American states, he observed that he ran the risk of being misunderstood. I do also, but I will say that it is this which is the most productive model of an international state with a strong center and, simultaneously, a vast independent territory. Now is not the time, perhaps, to assert this principle, but rejecting it out of hand would also be a mistake, I believe.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Sergeyevich, every day the editorial mail brings letters of people who have lost their faith in the party "upper strata," the so-called party apparatus, being able to purge itself of a train of sins which is trailing after it from the past. How is the situation in the party viewed from the office of chairman of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Control Commission, which some people still call the "Communist Party of Russia procuracy"?

[Stolyarov] It is a pity that time cannot be reclaimed and that nothing can be corrected in the past. Although many issues could have been settled long ago. I will permit myself to quote a letter from Communists of a party organization of Krasnokamsk received by the Central Control Commission. "We cannot reconcile ourselves," they write, "to the fact that such Communists as Medunov, Grishin, Romanov, and others carry party cards containing Lenin's words 'The party is the mind, honor, and conscience of our era'.... We insist that the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Control Commission make, finally, an evaluation of the figures who have compromised themselves. And not in words but by the adoption of the appropriate decision."

Such a political evaluation is undoubtedly necessary today. And since this is within the jurisdiction of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission, we have taken the corresponding proposals there.

In many cases justice can be restored, albeit belatedly. Particularly in the restoration of the good name of the people who have suffered while defending our all-party values. In my view, this is a most important area of work. A permanent commission for protection of the rights of Communists operates in the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Control Commission. It has examined many appeals and applications. Let us take a random example.

Here we have, for example, Zeynal Gamdullayevich Babayev from Dagestan. He was expelled from the party in 1978. The charges against him appear ridiculous today. On the eve of a trade union report and election meeting he canvassed his associates not to vote for the nomination approved by the gorkom. So tell me after this that perestroyka has changed nothing in the life of the party and that the cleansing process has not affected it.

Many people simply have no idea to what extent the directive components of the party have been replaced and what the influx of fresh people has been in recent years. Profoundly decent and honest people, I would emphasize, who take the needs of their country and their people to heart. It is difficult for them since the situation in the party is extremely serious, critical. The sores of the past are still being uncovered from time to time. Recently, for example, we examined questions of abuses on the part of the former first secretary of the Bashkir Obkom and violations of legality and the standards of party life by the communist leaders of the Mordva ASSR.

One further most serious mistake is today standing out increasingly clearly among the others: the party's personnel policy has largely been allowed to drift. Even the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum have now been forgotten by many people. This is a most acute problem for the whole party.

Nonetheless, we cannot sink into a will-paralyzing pessimism. The party has every reason to look to the future

with optimism. It has a wealth of experience, traditions, a sound organization, and tremendous intellectual and moral potential. And if all this is incorporated in social processes in full measure, life will stabilize.

Moscow's Prokofyev Defends Party's Role

91UN1221A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 13,
Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Yuri Anatolyevich Prokofyev, Moscow CPSU Gorkom first secretary and party Central Committee Politburo member, by Tatyana Sadkovskaya, special correspondent: "Yuri Prokofyev—Without Labels"; date and place not given]

[Text] *The Moscow CPSU Gorkom first secretary and party Central Committee Politburo member has enough labels, pasted on him from both the left and the right. Recent events proclaim that we should no longer listen to all these lofty "revolutionary" phrases and determine our political sympathies and antipathies according to characteristic labels. First-hand information always adds unexpected features to the portrait of this leader or that and allows us to better understand his essential position and political viewpoints. Perhaps the conversation our special correspondent Tatyana Sadkovskaya had with Yuri Anatolyevich Prokofyev will provide an opportunity for the readers to take another look at many things that, it would seem, are already well-known facts. One hopes that people of different political convictions will not pass up this opportunity.*

[Sadkovskaya] Yuri Anatolyevich, please allow me to first explain to the readers what led up to this interview: that the initiative began with you. And the reason, as I recall, was G. Kiselev's letter, "An Ordinary Communist Does Not Understand the Party Leader....," published in the weekly VETERAN (No 51, 1990). I will quote the leit-motiv of the letter: "In the eyes of many party veterans, the Moscow party leader appears to be an ineffective leader, one who is all talk." Is it not possible that such an accusation of inaction is particularly offensive, not so much because it concerns you personally, but because it is of late the most prevalent reproach of communism?

[Prokofyev] The Communist Party's position in society has changed. In the past it was not only a part of the political structure of society, but also the structure of state power. Having myself been the secretary responsible for industry, I have been occupied with construction, with all the ensuing consequences at the time: operational tactics, adjustment of production plans, siting of projects, and problems of their reconstruction... In short, there were no grounds for the accusation of inaction. But since the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution, party work methods naturally had to change. The accent was shifted to political methods, and this means above all explaining the party's policy to the public. Our opponents, who are bold, are going out to the working collectives, and have a great deal of access to the

mass information media. Unfortunately, at the present time it is they, and not the party, who are forming public opinion. Therefore, right now working with the people via the mass information media is a very important task. And that is exactly why we hold a monthly press conference at the gorkom, and why readers' letters to the editor provide the topics for my regular articles in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. From now on, every Friday, one of the gorkom secretaries will meet with television viewers on Moscow TV programs. However, at present our access to the mass information media is limited. In terms of newspapers, we have only MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET. In the more distant future lies the creation of an supplement to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, for the veterans who live in our city.

And yet another trait of the "talking secretary" is, that one has to know what to talk about, what to try to convince the people of. Here I agree with VETERAN: More than anything else, the party's lack of a clear-cut socio-economic program hurts its prestige more than anything. The party does have its own position on a number of political questions; they are well-known and are laid out in the party documents. But unfortunately, until the present time, except for some general words on the necessity to switch to a market mechanism for regulating commodity-monetary relationships, and on the expedience of a mixed economy, the party has no specific program. And after all, only a party that is capable of solving the socio-economic problems through its representatives in parliament will have a future.

[Sadkovskaya] No doubt those words of regret should logically be addressed to the million-member Moscow party organizations.

[Prokofyev] At the November party conference we adopted a program of actions aimed at stabilizing the city's economy, and supporting the socially-unprotected strata of the populace. In this we are actively cooperating with the Union of State Scientific and Production Organizations. And if one were to speak openly, under conditions of transition to the market we shall strive to support these structures in every way. It will also be necessary to engage in the improvement of the very economic affairs for which our opponents reproach us. The firmness and the personal example of the gorkom and the communists played a significant role in saving the harvest last year. The Moscow Soviet had no plans to enlist the populace to gather the harvest, and in September only one-tenth of the vegetables the city requires had been put by. Only the active intervention of the Communists forced the Moscow Soviet to get involved in the procurement campaign. S. Stankevich declared very frankly on television that he was against it, but that he would nevertheless go and dig potatoes.

[Sadkovskaya] You have already said that the party's basic form of work is now political, and you have cited several examples of working with the mass information media. But after all, that does not exhaust the possibilities of influencing the people's consciousness. We do not, thank God, have the typical politization and information methods. But you see, most of the people are confused, and their souls are in dismay: Where is our country going, and what will happen to all of us? Right now, the main arena for ideological struggle, as life demonstrates, is the street. Your opponents have become virtuoso performers in that arena. But the Communist Party's voice is almost inaudible amidst the socio-political polyglot in the streets...

[Prokofyev] The political meeting form is not the best method of forming public opinion. It is impossible to speak to a great mass of people with the language of reason. Our opponents try to influence the people's minds by emotion: appeals for confrontation, for the President to resign, for reprisals against communists... I cannot say that we have not mastered these methods of political struggle. In this there has been, I think, ample opportunity to be convinced. But scorn for the elementary ethical norms and rules of behavior in political dialogue is foreign to us. After all, one should not call upon people to go and threaten the Moscow Soviet, or to hang the members of the Interregional Group!

You noted optimistically the abolition of political classes and training in the working collectives. True, they are no longer necessary in the old dogmatic, stochastic form. But we are now setting a task to bring back a team of party agitators and propagandists.

[Sadkovskaya] And you have managed to create it with not only confirmed but also intellectual people? After all, your opponents assert that there is no intellectual nucleus among the Communists.

[Prokofyev] I do not agree with that. The party's problem is that it did not take advantage of the intellectual potential which it always had. Party organs, in their work, have always relied exclusively on the apparat, and the latter in turn would work only for the leadership.

[Sadkovskaya] In the recent past the capital party organization was headed by three secretaries: Grishin, Yeltsin and Zaykov. To what extent was your last assertion characteristic for each of them?

[Prokofyev] Working for the leader was in general the characteristic feature of the old party apparat. But in the work of the gorkom, it was most characteristic during the time of B.N. Yeltsin.

Ideally, the apparat should consist of independent groups of communist scholars, who work out recommendations and proposals. The gorkom has such groups at present. A forecasting and analysis center is in operation, which models the processes which might take place in Moscow. An experimental creative center has been set up. It, by the way, is not supported from party funds, and

is completely autonomous; although in the "Independent Newspaper" I was called its "godfather." This reaction must be explained: It was necessary to find a pretext for discrediting articles by the personnel at this center about the Lithuanian syndrome and the financial war, which opened the eyes of public opinion and liberated it from the stereotypes created by the "independent press."

[Sadkovskaya] The two main reasons for the exodus from the CPSU are the party's presently inadequate reaction to the situation in the country, and as many assert, its inaction, especially at the level of the primary party organizations. How is the city party organization changing, with respect to numbers? Are there instances of abolishment of the primary organizations in the labor collectives? Have primary organizations of other parties not taken their place?

[Prokofyev] In the last year about 200,000 people have left the party in Moscow; of them 47 percent are workers, 33 intelligentsia and 17 percent consist of veterans. Entering party ranks last year were 9,000 people, primarily representatives of the intelligentsia, aged up to 35 years.

Not a single party organization has yet been eliminated. Today, at the Moscow State University for Foreign Languages alone, party activities have been taken beyond the VUZ walls. Party organizations of other directions have begun to appear in the collectives, as a rule in the academic institutions. For example, cells of "Democratic Russia" have already begun to operate at the Moscow Power Engineering Institute. This trend is on the increase. Our political opponents have learned that they could not unceremoniously do away with the party. Having survived a certain shock, it has begun to intensify its influence on the political processes in society. In their speeches, G. Popov and B. Yeltsin are already speaking about the necessity to create a party in opposition to the CPSU. This was brought about by the fact that they are now dealing with a revitalized party: the apparat has been renewed, and most of the leaders have no direct connections with Stalinism, nor with the stagnation period, and the party is presently operating in accordance with Leninist organizational and political methods; therefore they have come to the following conclusion: We must establish our own structures, similar to the CPSU, no matter how anti-democratic that is. Thus, the ringing democratic slogans of leaving the party have been taken down. Having failed to get what they want with coming to power in the Soviets, the democrats are now creating primary political structures, in order to approach their goal from below. But the task is on the whole the same—replacing the socio-political system. At the present time, society is divided into two camps—those who stand for reformed socialism, and those who are for capitalization. There is no third force.

[Sadkovskaya] One can hardly speak of opposing an entire society. More likely, the gentlemen will pull out... After all, today most people cannot answer the question,

"Just what is reformed socialism?" Nor can one grasp what sort of capitalism we are coming to.

[Prokofyev] We have already spoken of the fact that if the party wishes to remain the political vanguard, it needs above all a convincing theoretical base, which explains what kind of society we plan to build.

What can one say? We have given our opponents an opportunity to play again in the extended period of overthrow and overt slander of the party and the entire Soviet system. Even certain dissidents, who in their time went abroad, have begun to speak out in defense of Soviet rule.

A year ago I was in Poland, and visited there recently as well. What is it that strikes your eye? The fact that stores are full of goods—from Singapore, Hong Kong, Germany. But Polish production has declined by 30 percent. As a result, there are 1,200,000 unemployed people in that small country, and the standard of living has fallen by 31 percent. In four days I witnessed two major demonstrations—by miners and agricultural workers. Thus far the Polish version of transition to a market economy has not brought the desired results to the populace. And full shelves bring no joy when one's purse is empty. Thus, the transition to a market economy is a question that is far from simple. It can be accomplished in different ways. One may return to the stage of initial accumulation of capital: when, according to the theory of certain of our academicians, the wealthy who live in a country of poor people will be forced to feed them for fear of an insurrection.

But other variants are possible as well. Just one example: Why, for example, when speaking of dismantling the state sector, do most economists have in mind privatization alone (This is, you see, simply the transfer of everything into private hands)? We have an enormous state sector; thus, why should we apportion it out if the facilities can be transferred to collective property, joint stock enterprises set up, and so on. Incidentally, Communists often ask the question: What can each of them do today, specifically? Rather than work for a Communist, hear everyone out at their enterprise as to what form of property would be most acceptable here, and convince their colleagues that they are right.

[Sadkovskaya] Are you sure that every Communist is up to such a task?

[Prokofyev] No, I am not sure. Either they often do not have enough knowledge, or there are varying degrees of conviction, even among the Communists. And at times their minds are clouded with the widespread propaganda that as soon as everything is transferred to private ownership, we will immediately live like they do in Switzerland. I met recently with a representative of the Swiss Labor Party. One of the greatest illusions which many Soviet people entertain at the present time, he believes, is the conviction that transition to a market economy, and to capitalism, will immediately solve all their problems.

Such ideas often penetrate the pages of most of our publications, do they not? Therefore, I must once again stress the necessity for the party to occupy itself with the formation of public opinion.

Well, one can also strive to realize one's ideas through social organizations. The party has no official authority, but the trade unions, for example, do. That means we must strive to ensure that sober-thinking Communists, who are capable of analyzing the situation, should go and work in the trade unions, and defend the interests of the workers through them, striving to ensure their social security. Women's councils, veterans councils too can exert influence on certain strata of the populace. And of course, the most important thing is the work the Communists do in Soviets at all levels. Without parliamentary activity, the party will not survive in the present system.

[Sadkovskaya] Please describe the work of the Communists in the Moscow Soviet.

[Prokofyev] Until last Fall, the Moscow Soviet refused to accept the Communists. They would whistle and clap during their speeches. But now the situation has changed. For two reasons. Many deputies have become convinced that the leaders of Democratic Russia are not capable of ensuring the normal operation of the Moscow Soviet. Entire sessions have been held without specific decisions or actions. The second reason is, that we did not come to confrontation right away, although there were proposals to do so; instead we took a constructive position in the Moscow Soviet and thereby increased our prestige. After Popov explained the program for Moscow's transition to a market economy, I made a speech. I was heard out attentively, after which a "round table" was organized. As a result, the program proposed by the gorispolkom was returned for revision. A representative of "Moskva," our deputy group, also spoke out on questions of privatization of housing. Incidentally, the deputies are already waiting for its position. Why? In the opinion of our colleagues, "Moskva's" proposals are the least politicized, and the most skilfully prepared.

At the present time the disposition of forces in the Moscow Soviet is as follows: 170 people are supporters of Democratic Russia; approximately the same number make up separate groups with their own leaders, who criticize both Popov and Prokofyev; a group of independent deputies and "Moskva," who basically hold the same views, consist of only 140 people. As you see, we do not have a majority in the Moscow Soviet. But if we form a bloc with someone else, we can achieve the desired result. It is not all that easy to increase the number of your supporters. And it is not merely a matter of ideological considerations here. Out of 472 deputies in the Moscow Soviet, 304 are so-called paid deputies: they receive wages of 450 rubles, plus 100 rubles in fringe benefits. This contingent now consists of the true apparatchiks, who want to hold on to their positions. The leadership of the Soviet has even come up with their own

forms of "work" with them: an assembly of paid deputies, bargain sales for paid deputies... It is not, of course, the most democratic method of winning votes, which in addition is hard on the pockets of the tax-payers. Previously the city budget for the apparat of the Moscow Soviet was 1,800,000 rubles; now our deputy corps "costs" over 10 million already. And that means it is necessary to put off the solution of a number of city problems. The new apparat will have to get the money it spends on itself somewhere else.

[Sadkovskaya] At the present time many state and party figures, including the President, are accused of "moving to the right." And the conclusion is, that the conservative forces are preparing to take their revenge. Yuriy Anatolyevich, on the basis of your latest speeches and this interview, have you not also "moved to the right"?

[Prokofyev] No. All the talk about the fact that perestroika has come to a halt, and that a retrograde movement is going on, are groundless.

[Sadkovskaya] The execution of democracy in Lithuania is yet another strong indication...

[Prokofyev] It is too early to make a conclusive analysis of these events. It was not for nothing that the well-argued, factual materials on the "Lithuanian Syndrome" (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 1 and 20 February 1991) caused so much commotion. What gives me the basis to believe that the Lithuanian events were a well-planned provocation? If it had been necessary to take power into our own hands—let's not be naive—all it would have taken was one division of paratroops. You will recall Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, as a result of these events, only one said gained—Landsbergis & Co. If until that fatal Sunday only 30 percent of the citizens of Lithuania supported him, now the figure is 80. No more than 5-6,000 people gathered at political meetings in Moscow, and Lithuania once again has stirred up the meeting element. The tragedies in the Persian Gulf, from my point of view, became a kind of smoke-screen for the well-known events: the societies of the world assiduously switched their attention from those great human tragedies to the alleged "execution of democracy in Lithuania." Bzhezinskiy's speech two weeks prior to that night in Vilnius has led me to this idea. He had said that the communists would probably attempt to seize power in the Baltic under the cover of the events in the Persian Gulf. As you can see, everything was thoroughly planned; they even made a preliminary strike. And on the whole this has long been the method of our opponents. That has already happened more than once. The party dons its spectacles, its ratings go up, and consolidation is noted in society. And then right away—the next flare-up. Just one example: The 4th Congress of USSR People's Deputies was going along constructively, and even such different forces represented by Alksnis and Popov had begun to speak each other's language. And

suddenly, Shevardnadze's announcement on his retirement, and on the threat of a dictatorship. Once again there was confrontation in society, and opposition in the corps of deputies.

I shall return to the fact that the rumors of the demise of perestroika are over-exaggerated. Just what things connected with perestroika have we renounced? In which state and party documents, and which speeches by Gorbachev and Pavlov does it say that we are refusing to carry out economic reforms, that we reject the switch to a market economy, and the necessity for mixed forms of property? What is more, the party has acknowledged that a monopoly in politics, as in the economy, leads to corruption. Who is now speaking out against a multi-party state? After all, the Congress of Democratic Forces has met in Kharkov. Plenums and convocations of various parties are taking place, although the speeches at them sound extremely ambiguous. Yet another direction of perestroika is that the party has transferred power and authority to the Soviets. Is the party trying to get them back, and once again begin to command the economy? At times, it is true, life compels us. And a Luzhkov or a Popov, it happens, appeals to the gorkom for assistance—but on the telephone, and not publicly, so that not everyone would know.

As you can see, all three directions of perestroika have been preserved. What we are talking about is something altogether different. The goal of our opponents is to change the socio-political system in the country—in the name of the struggle for democracy. Foreign well-wishers are urging us to do that as well. One should not naively think that everyone abroad is just sitting and waiting until the Union becomes a powerful economic state capable of competing with the USA and Japan. They need us for something else: as a market for the sale of shopworn goods, as a source of cheap manpower, and as a source of raw materials. That means the country has to be weakened, both economically and politically. But not completely destroyed, or engulfed in the flames of civil war. Like it or not—we are a nuclear power.

Here is a curious example: If one carefully examines the "500 Days" program, and the economic programs which the West is now proposing for Eastern Europe, one sees how much they all resemble the International Monetary Fund's plans for under-developed countries. Therefore, even professionals from the USA and Japan who are opposed to communism are saying that we must seek our own path to development... Mechanically transplanting western models to our soil is doomed to failure.

[Sadkovskaya] This opinion is not only held by western specialists. Well-known Soviet writers, for example, firmly insist on this.

[Prokofyev] Yes, even if they are not thoroughly versed in the fine points of economics, but are well-acquainted with the life and character of our people, and their mood. I have had to spend some time abroad, and I have looked with longing at the shop windows in France and Sweden.

But one should not forget that it took many decades for the western countries to acquire such abundance; that they have gone through crises, collapses and shocks... Why do our opponents think that after taking the western model as the basis for development, we will happily avoid the shocks that those countries have endured? Why should one fail to notice that the entire world is going somewhat in our direction? What is the European Economic Community anyway? It began with economic cooperation, then the customs barriers disappeared, the borders were opened, a Euro-parliament was established, and there are plans to go to a uniform currency. While the entire world is striving for socialization of the means of production, they are proposing that we begin with the primitive stage of initial accumulation of capital.

[Sadkovskaya] Yuri Anatolyevich, right now the political portrait is a very popular genre in the press. Well, what if you had to write a political self-portrait?

[Prokofyev] That is an even more difficult genre. KURANTY and STOLITSA call me a conservative, reactionary and partocrat. In the opinion of certain publications and the authors of letters, I am a revisionist, an opportunist, and so on. I would like to say just one thing: I sincerely understand the necessity for economic and political reforms in the country. But I am as opposed to the return to capitalism, as to the stage in the country's history that we have passed through. Our society had, imbedded in its ideals, enormous potential, which the politicians were unable to manage wisely. Our revolution, no matter what some people wish, will nevertheless enter the history of the planet as the principal event of the century, which has changed the lives of all people for the better.

[Sadkovskaya] And one final question: Your political forecast for the present year? What will it be like?

[Prokofyev] One word: hard. I am convinced that if we do not achieve consolidation, the stratification of society will have already occurred. Thus, the political and ideological struggle will continue. But we can and must receive the consent of the citizens. Otherwise, political conflict will be fraught with social upheavals, shocks, and finally civil war.

This year will proceed under the mark of the struggle for the nature of our Union. Will it be a unified, powerful state, or will it disintegrate into separate countries, which will fall completely under the influence of various international forces? Another and far from optimal variant is possible: the restoration of the Russian Empire on the pre-revolutionary model: Russia at the center, and the republics "attached" to it. Not only communists but all sensible people must band together today, and not fall apart over the idea of the Union, in order to preserve our state, our Fatherland.

In the course of economic reform, many of us will have to endure hardships. I understand that I am saying unpopular things. Everyone would like to come out of

the crisis without losses, at a minimum. But we are at best three years late in commencing radical actions, and this delay will result in more severe consequences.

I do not want to forecast a quick return from the crisis. No less than five years will be required, and this is the best-case scenario. Pessimists say that it will take a decade to come out of the crisis. It is possible that this is correct, if one does not take into consideration the potential of our people, which was able to restore in four years an economy that was destroyed by war. But neither forecasts, nor optimism, nor pessimism will come to pass, if the struggle for power does not cease. We should all be struggling together for the Fatherland, the state, and the people. And then, perhaps, the question of who will be the master of ceremonies at the celebration of our Pyrrhic victory, need not be asked.

Western Republics

1990 Belorussian Declaration on State Sovereignty

91UN1304A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 29 Jul 90 p 1

["Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic on the State Sovereignty of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,

- expressing the will of the people of the Belorussian SSR,
- being aware of its responsibility for the destiny of the Belorussian nation,
- affirming respect for the dignity and rights of the people of all nationalities residing in the Belorussian SSR,
- testifying to its respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples of the USSR and the world,
- considering the republic to be an independent member of the world community endowed with full rights,
- proceeding in compliance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other commonly recognized acts of international law,
- solemnly proclaims the full state sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR in the form of supremacy, independence, and absolute authority of the state power of the republic within the borders of its territory, the legal validity of its laws, and the independence of the republic in foreign relations, and proclaims its determination to create a rule-of-law state.

Article 1

The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic is a sovereign state which has asserted itself on the basis of the Belorussian nation exercising its inalienable right to self-determination, the statehood of the Belorussian language, and the supremacy of the people in deciding their own fate.

The inalienable rights of the Belorussian SSR as a sovereign state are exercised in keeping with the commonly recognized norms of international law. The Belorussian SSR guards and protects the national statehood of the Belorussian people.

The Belorussian SSR has its own emblem, flag, and anthem.

All acts of violence against the national statehood of the Belorussian SSR on the part of political parties, public associations, or individuals are punishable under the law.

Article 2

Citizens of the Belorussian SSR of all nationalities make up the Belorussian people who are the subject of sovereignty and the sole source of state power in the republic. Their sovereignty is exercised directly and through the representative organs of state power.

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet has the exclusive right to speak on behalf of the entire people of the republic.

Article 3

The state sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR is being asserted for the sake of the supreme objective—the free development, well-being, and dignified life of all citizens of the republic on the basis of upholding personal rights, pursuant to the Constitution of the Belorussian SSR and its international obligations.

Article 4

Belorussian SSR citizenship is an integral part of its sovereignty. The republic defends the honor, health, rights, and legitimate interests of its citizens and ensures their social protection. Its citizens remain under the protection of the Belorussian SSR when they are beyond its borders. The republic grants its citizenship and resolves the issues of renouncing citizenship.

Article 5

The land, its mineral wealth, other natural resources in the territory of the Belorussian SSR and its airspace are the property of the Belorussian people who have the exclusive right to own, use, and administer them.

Determining the legal status of all types of assets falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Belorussian SSR.

The Belorussian SSR is entitled to its share of all-Union assets commensurate with the contribution of the Belorussian people; as a founding republic of the Soviet Union, which was its legally competent [pravodeyc-tvennym] subject, it has a right to its share of the diamond and hard-currency funds and the gold reserves of the USSR.

The Belorussian SSR forms its National Bank which reports to the Supreme Soviet of the republic, sets up its own financial and credit system, confirms ownership rights to the specialized banks located in its territory as of the moment the present declaration is adopted, organizes its own tax and customs services, and has a right to create its own monetary system.

Article 6

The territory of the Belorussian SSR is indivisible and inviolable, and cannot be changed or used without the consent of the Belorussian SSR.

All border issues are resolved solely on the basis of a mutual consensus of the Belorussian SSR and adjacent sovereign states by way of signing appropriate treaties which are subject to ratification by the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR.

Article 7

The supremacy of the Belorussian SSR Constitution and Belorussian SSR laws is established on the territory of the Belorussian SSR.

All citizens and stateless persons, state organs, enterprises, offices, and organizations located or operating in the territory of the Belorussian SSR must comply with the legislation of the Belorussian SSR.

The delineation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers is the most significant principle of the existence of the Belorussian SSR as a rule-of-law state.

The general procurator of the Belorussian SSR, who is appointed by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, effects the supreme supervision of the exact and uniform execution of Belorussian SSR laws.

Article 8

The Belorussian SSR establishes procedures for organizing environmental protection and utilizing natural resources in the territory of the republic independently, and provides ecological security for the people of the republic.

The Belorussian SSR has a right to be reimbursed for the damage inflicted on it by the actions of Union organs, Union republics, and other states.

The Belorussian SSR demands that the USSR Government provide unconditional and urgent compensation for losses entailed in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

The Belorussian SSR will make use of its freedom and sovereignty primarily to save the people of the Belorussian SSR from the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

Article 9

The Belorussian SSR is independent in resolving issues of the cultural and spiritual development of the Belorussian nation and other national communities of the republic, and in creating its own system of information, education, and upbringing.

The Belorussian SSR ensures the operation of the Belorussian language in all spheres of public life, and the preservation of national traditions and national symbols.

National, cultural, and historic valuables in the territory of the Belorussian SSR are the exclusive property of the republic and its citizens.

Article 10

The Belorussian SSR has a right to its own Armed Forces, internal troops, and state and public security organs reporting to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Belorussian SSR has a sovereign right to determine procedures and conditions for service by its citizens in the Army and the organs of state and public security, and to resolve the issues of deploying troops and weaponry in its territory.

No military formations of other countries, their military bases, and installations may be located in the territory of the Belorussian SSR without the consent of its Supreme Soviet.

The Belorussian SSR sets the goal of making its territory a nuclear-free zone, and making the republic a neutral state.

Article 11

The Belorussian SSR exercises independently its right to voluntary unions with other states and to withdrawing from these unions freely.

The Belorussian SSR proposes to urgently embark on the development of the Treaty of the Union of Sovereign Socialist States.

Article 12

The provisions of the present declaration are carried out by the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR by way of adopting a new Constitution (Basic Law) of the Belorussian SSR and Belorussian SSR laws.

27 July 1990, City of Minsk

Latvian Observer on Belorussian People's Front Congress

91UN1271A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 27 Mar 91 p 3

[Report by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent Sergey Shapran: "All Come Along Under the Roof of the Belorussian People's Front!"]

[Text] Minsk—The Second Belorussian People's Front, Adradzhenne, Congress took place on 23 and 24 March in Minsk. A total of 443 delegates took part, including representatives from support groups in Moscow, Leningrad, and Vilnius. Priests from the three religious denominations in Belarus—the Evangelical, Orthodox, and Greek Catholic churches—gave their blessing to those present.

The congress was opened by Belarus writer and USSR People's Deputy Vasil Bykov. "The people spontaneously created the Belorussian People's Front," he said. "And one truth is being shown in an increasingly clear and categorical manner, namely, that we can save the people and the nation only through our combined efforts."

Zenon Poznyak, chairman of the Soyma of the Belorussian People's Front, presented the accountability report. Two years have elapsed since the creation of the Belorussian People's Front, Z. Poznyak said, and during that time an opposition movement to the regime has emerged, and the ideas of renewal are gaining strength. However, the main aspects of life in the republic have remained at their earlier level, and even worsened: We have not achieved independence and freedom, we have not effected major democratic reforms, and the monopoly of power remains with the CPSU-Belorussian Communist Party and the nomenklatura bureaucrats.

The leader of the Belorussian People's Front, who is a Belorussian SSR people's deputy, dealt in detail with the work of the Belorussian People's Front faction of deputies in the republic Supreme Soviet: The opposition, which comprises 10 percent of the corps of deputies, has in a short time prepared the drafts of about 20 pieces of legislation but not one has been passed by the aggressive-nomenklatura majority in the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. The communist regime is still not reforming itself, Z. Poznyak said, nor is the CPSU. It either exists or it does not exist.

Today not one public movement in the Belorussian Republic can become a mass movement, the Soyma chairman stated. In a society of national and cultural amorphousness and social passions there are no ideas that could unite it. In Belarus the situation is different from the situation in the Baltics. We have our own road to freedom, the Belorussian People's Front leader said, summing up.

Zenon Poznyak dealt with the question of the compatibility of membership in the CPSU and the Belorussian

People's Front: The party nomenklatura has specially increased the numerical strength of the CPSU so as to have adequate assets from obedient payers. Therefore the Belorussian People's Front does not equate the nature of the ideology with those who hold it, and they distinguish the personal responsibility of the member of the CPSU from collective responsibility.

The leader of the People's Front reported on the participation of the Belorussian People's Front in international politics: There have been talks with representatives of Sajudis and the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council; at the initiative of the Belorussian People's Front talks have been held in Minsk by representatives of the four republics on the subject of creating a Baltic-Black Sea community; a delegation from the Belorussian People's Front faction has held preliminary talks with deputies from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet and the Smolensk leadership on the fate of the Smolensk area and the ethnic territory of Belarus; there have been meetings with the leadership of the Latvian Supreme Soviet that resulted in an official apology from the Latvian side for a border incident (we refer to the events in August of last year on the border between the two republics in the area of Kraslava-Verkhnedvinsk).

Over the past two years the People's Front has traveled a road from hope of cooperation with the "best forces" to principled anticommunism, Z. Poznyak said, summing up. However, the priority question for the Belorussian People's Front should be the sovereignty of Belarus; anticommunism is secondary.

The leader of the Belorussian People's Front defined the status of the front today as a confederation of democratic parties and organizations that support the policy and tasks of the Belorussian People's Front and want to become part of the front.

In the past two years the Belorussian People's Front has matured sufficiently to take the burden of Belorussian renewal on its own shoulders. There are no other shoulders, Z. Poznyak concluded.

A new charter was adopted at the congress. Its main features are as follows: individual membership and membership dues have been introduced, and also regional organizations for the Belorussian People's Front, because up to now the movement has not been registered by the Supreme Soviet and they have the right to adopt their own charters. The word "perestroyka" has been removed from the name of the Belorussian People's Front for Perestroyka, Adradzhenne. This has already been achieved, Z. Poznyak explained.

Resolutions were passed, together with congratulations to the Belorussian people on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the creation of the Belorussian People's Republic.

Zenon Poznyak was re-elected as chairman of the Belorussian People's Front Soyma. His deputies are

Belorussian SSR people's deputy Vladimir Zablotskiy and Valentin Golubev, and Professor Yuras Khodyko. The congress elected 50 percent of the members of the Belorussian People's Front Soyma. It is proposed that the other half should include representatives of the political parties and public organizations that wish to unite under the front.

Belorussian CP Secretary on Relations Between Party, Opposition Groups

91UN1282A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 1 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Doctor of Jurisprudence V.G. Tikhinya, secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, Belorussian people's deputy, by correspondents from SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, ZVYAZDA, and BELORUSSKAYA NIVA: "Multiparty System: Dialog or Confrontation?"; place and date not given]

[Text] [Correspondent] What sociopolitical organizations and movements in Belorussia today are formally organized and operational?

[Tikhinya] Sociopolitical life in Belorussia has become more varied during the past few years; new political forces have emerged; they interact and counteract. A powerful competition between various groups for leadership is underway.

There are several political parties and movements in Belorussia today that lay claim to an all-republic status (the Belorussian People's Front, the National-Democratic Party of Belorussia, the Democratic Party, the United Democratic Party of Belorussia, and the Belorussian Peasant Party). The leaders of some of them claim their membership numbers in the tens of thousands. I think that it is impossible to ascertain the real number of members of these public associations. First, because the membership figures are registered, as a rule, on the basis of statements by the leaders of these organizations, and they, as practice shows, tend to overstate the number of their followers by at least a factor of 1.5 to two. Second, most of the emerging political parties do not keep precise records of their membership. And, finally, there are many cases of dual, or even triple, membership.

So far none of the political parties that have emerged in Belorussia in the past few years have registered their charters in the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Justice as the USSR Law "On Public Associations" requires.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Guryevich, in your opinion what should the position of the Belorussia Communist Party be in its relations with the sociopolitical organizations and movements under current conditions?

[Tikhinya] Today's realities are such that, with the great diversity of sociopolitical organizations and movements, it is hardly expedient to hope for their complete unity. However, ideas of civic peace and national consensus, as

well as other democratic goals and values, can become a foundation for bringing together diverse positions. The February (1991) joint plenum of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and Central Control Commission offered all political forces that operate in compliance with the Belorussian SSR Constitution to combine their efforts in the name of political stability; it has called on all Communists and all citizens of the republic to consolidate around the idea of the socialist choice, democracy, and humanism.

All political parties and movements whose actions are directed not at disruption, but at the renewal and development of socialist society, may become partners of the Belorussian Communist Party. Communists are ready to enter into constructive cooperation with them. Among the forms of such cooperation could be information meetings, exchange of opinions, consultations, public discussions, conferences, etc. Unfortunately, the road of dialog and compromise, offered by the Belorussian Communist Party, is today blocked by politicians of various ilk, for whom their personal goals are more important than the interests of the people. Today Communists are forced into a bitter political battle. We have no choice other but to accept this challenge...

[Correspondent] As is known, the founding congress of the Belorussian Peasant Party recently took place in Minsk. What can you say about it?

[Tikhinya] The Belorussian CP Central Committee Bureau stated its position on the issue of creating the Belorussian Peasant Party on 11 January 1991. We are not against the creation of any new sociopolitical organizations and movements. But we are against CPSU members who still hold membership engaging in activities directed at a party split. We see the participation of some Communists in the creation of a peasant party as an activity that is incompatible with the CPSU Rules. Any party has a duty to maintain the purity of its ranks, and it should oppose those who are trying to split it from within.

The Communist Party of Belorussia is in favor of cooperation with political parties and movements that operate in compliance with the Belorussian SSR Constitution. But why do our opponents not want to do the same? For instance, at the creation of the Belorussian Peasant Party—which was meant to provide a counterbalance to the Belorussian Communist Party—it was stated that its main goal was the restoration of private property on the land and the liquidation of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. One is tempted to ask: Do the organizers of this party take into account the realities existing in our republic? Or, for instance, the congress participants spoke in support of well-known anticonstitutional appeals by B. Yeltsin. The delegates of the founding congress of the Belorussian Peasant Party put on record their negative attitude towards the upcoming 17 March all-Union referendum. In short, from the very beginning they have shown a bent towards oppositionism and confrontation.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Guryevich, what are the main miscalculations in the activities of local party committees in the environment of multiple parties and political pluralism?

[Tikhinya] It is necessary to admit that many local party committees have not been able to adopt themselves quickly to work in the new environment. Some of them have displayed helplessness and an inability to enter a dialog and conduct a political struggle against their opponents. Quite often they have found themselves catching the tail of political events. As a result, some of the pre-election battles were completely lost, and the leading role of the Belorussian Communist Party in some soviets was lost.

The Belorussian CP Central Committee and its department for liaison with sociopolitical organizations and movements intend to provide informational and methodological help to the party committees in establishing a dialog with all political forces, and in strengthening cooperation with organizations of a socialist and humanitarian orientation. This year we are planning to conduct a scientific-practical conference called "The Communist Party of Belorussia in the Multiparty Environment of Political Pluralism."

[Correspondent] Please tell us whether, in your opinion, any changes have taken place in the democratic movement lately?

[Tikhinya] In my opinion, during the almost six years that have passed since the beginning of perestroika serious changes have taken place in the democratic movement. The political reality is such that it is currently dominated by the tendency to lean to the right. The democratic movement is becoming more and more antisocialist; its social orientation is changing substantially. You will no longer hear the slogan "Factory to the Workers!" virtually anywhere; the main slogan now is "Give Us Privatization!" The founding conference of the Democratic Congress that took place in Kharkov on 26-27 January 1991 was dominated by the theme of preventing the signing a new Union treaty.

Any sensible man can see that "friends of democracy" are using the current situation in our society to conduct purposeful work directed at the discreditation of socialist ideas; they push the population (first of all the youth) towards unlawful, extremist actions. They use the atmosphere of social tension and confrontation in their struggle for power. They act according to the formula: the worse the better. There is now a real threat that the democratic renewal of society is endangered. In this critical moment the communists should show their organizational unity and understanding of this complex situation. We should consolidate all healthy forces in our party and our society.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Guryevich, you have mentioned the founding conference of the Democratic Congress that took place in Kharkov. Could you provide more detailed information on this conference?

[Tikhinya] The conference was put together by the leaders of Democratic Russia, the Ukrainian movement Rukh, the Belorussian People's Front, and some other sociopolitical organizations that are in opposition to the CPSU. In the opinion of some specialists, this was already a sixth attempt to unite the so-called "democratic" forces. The conference adopted several documents of antisocialist nature. They elected a coordinating council and its chairman, A. Yemets (Ukrainian SSR). They formulated a task to conduct "republic—instead of all-Union—referendums." If the all-Union referendum does take place, then (the conference decided) all possible steps should be taken to make sure that the new Union treaty is rejected. The conference participants demanded the rejection of the "anticonstitutional decrees of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and his team," and the resignation of the country's leadership. They were using methods of political and moral terror, defamation of Communists, and calls to ignore the laws and for civil disobedience.

[Correspondent] How important for the party is parliamentary activity under the current circumstances?

[Tikhinya] It is hard to overestimate the role and importance of parliamentary activity in state and public life during the period of forming a rule-of-law state. It seems to me that as we overcome the rally syndrome, the center of political struggle will be shifting more and more into the soviets of people's deputies. Accordingly, this places a growing responsibility on communist deputies to implement the party line in soviets at all levels. The parliamentary function is of utmost importance for the Communist Party under current conditions, and members of our party should learn the forms and methods of parliamentary activity as quickly as possible. The issue of Communists' work in the soviets is scheduled for discussion at the next plenum of the Belorussian CP Central Committee.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Guryevich, would it be fair—based on what you just said—to conclude: "The Communist Party under current circumstances is becoming a parliamentary type party?"

[Tikhinya] I think there is no basis for such a conclusion. As I have already mentioned, the parliamentary function is very important, but it is not the main function of the Communist Party. Some would like to reduce it to the level of a parliamentary type political party or lock it into dealing with its own internal problems only. However, today, in the environment of a market economy, it is the development and implementation of effective measures for the social protection of the workers, peasants, and all working people that becomes the primary goal of the activities of the Belorussian Communist Party. For the Communist Party the interests of the people override the party's internal interests.

[Correspondent] The republic mass media has mentioned the creation of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Permanent Commission for Liaison with the

Soviets of People's Deputies and Sociopolitical Organizations, and Legal Issues. Valeriy Guryevich, as a head of this commission, what do you see as its main tasks?

[Tikhinya] In a few words, its task is to render assistance to the Belorussian CP Central Committee in the development and practical implementation of scientifically based strategy and tactics related to the communists' work in the soviets of people's deputies, on issues of party activity in the environment of multiple parties and political pluralism, etc. The commission is to study, summarize, and disseminate the experience accumulated by the party committees on matters relating to its competence. We intend to get noted scientists who specialize in political science, soviet development, and jurisprudence, as well as practitioners involved in the commission's work.

The commission members (we have 32 of them) and its advisers will participate in the analytical work and the coordination of party committee activity directed at cooperation with other political parties of socialist orientation; they will also assist humanitarian movements.

In conclusion, I want to note that the fast development and nonstandard shape of many sociopolitical processes that emerge today creates more questions than ready answers.

Kravchuk Calls on West Ukraine To Maintain Unity With Entire Republic

91UN1169A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 1

[Yu. Kril report on statements by L.M. Kravchuk, member of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, in Lvov; date not given; published under the rubric "Just In!": "We Need Unity and Stability"]

[Text] Lvov—L.M. Kravchuk's visit to Lvov evinced great interest.

Wherever he spoke during these days and whomever he met with, for the most part the conversation naturally concerned those problems that people are experiencing today. They are probably familiar to everyone: They are the relations between the center and the republics, the upcoming 17 March all-Union referendum, and, finally, the variously interpreted sociopolitical processes in the western region of the republic.

So as not to distort the essence of his responses to questions or interpret in my own fashion what I heard from L.M. Kravchuk, I believe it is better to use my dictaphone transcript:

"The times that we are presently living through are the so-called times of the 'war of laws.' That is not just an empty phrase but a reality. It will last until we have clearly defined the powers of the center and the Ukraine. After all, the president, who issues his own ukases,

sometimes forgets that we have our own Declaration on Independence and that we have started down the road of sovereignty. But when we on our part adopt some ruling, we are sometimes guided not by common sense but by emotions and ambitions, and we forget that no one has abolished the old laws yet. This is the cause, I believe, of the war of laws. Within the context of what I have said, it is natural to ask: What will our Ukraine be like in the future? It is not easy to answer this question unambiguously. It is very easy, of course, to say that it will be independent and sovereign for all of us, but one cannot help but take into consideration the situation we are presently in. It happens that our entire life is tied in a knot, and this has to be taken into account. For example, they ask me if we would be correct to rule at a session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet not to conduct the all-Union referendum within the republic. In an ideal situation we would, of course, be acting properly. But the situation is such that if we so much as discarded the idea of conducting the referendum, it would still take place in the majority of oblasts. So why adopt a ruling, one asks, that few are going to carry out? Would it not be better to reveal what kind of a Union our people wish? Let us be frank: The little that we have today is not enough to satisfy any of us. A large rich state is presently walking around with outstretched hand taking everything that it can get, even if it is on a second-hand basis. With this in mind, one can only welcome the fact that a joint session of the Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov, and Ternopol Oblast Soviets is being conducted in Lvov. After all, they are working on their own ways of ending the economic crisis in the region. I only wish to emphasize that it will nonetheless be difficult for the three oblasts to do this independently. In other words, we need unity and stability across the entire territory of our republic. As for the processes taking place in Lvov Oblast, one should not take a narrow view of them. Incidentally, I wish as many Ukrainian people's deputies as possible, especially those from the leadership, would visit here. Let them see themselves what is happening and how things are going here. I personally do not have any reasons to assess the work of the Lvov Oblast Soviet in gloomy tones. Especially because the people who have come to power here, although they are new, did so on a perfectly legal basis—the majority of the voters voted for them. It is another question to ask whether these new people have the right to ignore even the details of presently existing laws. After all, you are in the center of political life here, and your every step down the 'authoritative' road will quickly serve as an example for imitation. Therefore it is very important that it serve as an example of the democratic solution of all issues. It also seems to me that the time has come to halt the fighting among the parties at the governmental level. Particularly the fighting with the Communist Party. I am speaking about this not as a member of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo but as the chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Let the parties resolve their contradictions themselves, by civilized means of course."

Ukraine Issues Aired at Briefing

*LD0404174191 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian
2200 GMT 3 Apr 91*

[Excerpt] We have already reported that a press conference for foreign journalists took place in Kiev today. It was organized by the Narodnyy Rukh [People's Movement] of Ukraine and the Narodna Rada [People's Council]. Commentator Andriy Chyrva reports:

[begin recording] [Chyrva] Journalists of AP, the BBC, LE Figaro, LE MONDE and other world-known mass media have arrived in Kiev. They are providing coverage of the visit to the Ukraine of Cardinal Myroslav Ivan Lyubachivskyy, head of the Ukrainian Autonomous Greek Catholic Church. The first question asked by my colleagues was about the attitude of the Ukrainian People's Movement to the miners' strike, because a large group of miners from Chervonograd, Lvov Oblast, came half an hour before the press conference to the writers' union, where the conference was held. Here is what Oleskandr Lavrynovych, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian People's Movement, said:

[Lavrynovych] We entirely support all demands put forward by the miners of Donetsk, Donbass, and Chervonograd. But at the same time it should be mentioned that the strike in Ukraine at present also has its negative side. In the first place it should be noted that now our Supreme soviet has set course on gaining all institutions of statehood and an independent Ukraine and is following it so far. And it is extremely important today not to hinder this process with our own hands, to avoid depriving ourselves of the possibility to move on toward economic and political sovereignty. But in the present situation, one should certainly press for implementation of the demands that are put forward, without stopping work at the enterprises which are subordinate to the Ukraine and the Ukrainian government.

[Chyrva] Many questions concerned the results of the referendum and further steps of the Ukrainian People's Movement on the path of establishing real sovereignty of the republic. We turned to Oleksandr Lavrynovych again.

[Lavrynovych] I cannot say that some more powerful radical steps in the direction of gaining independence will be taken here. This is a difficult and complex process which started several years ago. The results of the referendum gave us an unambiguous answer to several questions. First, we have got support for the state sovereignty declaration of more than two-thirds of the population of the Ukraine which has the vote; and second, we have got a result which shows that it is still fairly easy to manipulate public consciousness and thought in the Ukraine by holding the power levers and mass media in one's hands. But one should [words indistinct] our Supreme Soviet. It is mainly guided by the fact that the people has approved the declaration.

[Chyrva] My foreign colleagues were interested in issues connected with shifting toward the market economy and the state of the Ukrainian economy. Stepan Volkovetsky, people's deputy of the republic, speaks:

[Volkovetsky] I should like to say that the draft law of the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic on privatization of state enterprises has already been prepared. It will soon be examined; in any case it will happen before summer for sure. The law on ownership has been adopted. These and other laws will create the basis on which free enterprise will develop and satisfy the free market.

[Chyrva] And this is what Volodymyr Mulyava, representative of Rukh, said:

[Mulyava] As we talked here about real sovereignty, the statehood of the Ukraine, and its independence it is certain that decrees alone will not be enough. It is also necessary to transfer enterprises from under the union authority to the republican jurisdiction. And in this connection it is necessary to think, and the economists should figure out a method to return that money which was virtually stolen from the Ukraine. [passage omitted]

Caucasus**Armenian Declaration of Independence**

*91US0447A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
25 Aug 90 p 1*

["Declaration of Independence of Armenia" dated 23 Aug 90]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR, expressing the unanimous will of the people of Armenia, being aware of its responsibility for the destiny of the Armenian people in the cause of realizing the hopes of all Armenians and restoring historical justice,

proceeding from the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the commonly recognized norms of international law,

exercising the right of nations to free self-determination,

proceeding from the joint resolution of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Nagorno-Karabakh National Council, dated 1 December 1989, "On the Unification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh,"

carrying forth the democratic traditions of the independent Republic of Armenia formed on 26 May 1918,

and with a view to creating a democratic, rule-of-law society,

Proclaims

the beginning of the process of asserting independent statehood.

1. The Armenian SSR is renamed the Republic of Armenia, the abbreviated form being Armenia.

The Republic of Armenia has its own flag, emblem, and anthem.

2. The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign state endowed with the supremacy of state power, independence, and full rights.

Only the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Armenia apply throughout the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

3. The people of the Republic of Armenia are the bearers of Armenian statehood; they exercise their power directly and through representative organs on the basis of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Armenia.

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia has the exclusive right to speak on behalf of the people of the Republic.

4. Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia is established for all citizens residing in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

Armenians residing outside the Republic of Armenia have a right to the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

Citizens of the Republic of Armenia enjoy its protection and support.

The Republic of Armenia ensures the free development and equal rights of its citizens regardless of nationality, race, and religion.

With a view to ensuring its security and the inviolability of its borders, the Republic of Armenia creates its own Armed Forces, internal troops, and organs of state and public security reporting to the Supreme Soviet.

The Republic of Armenia has a right to its share of USSR armaments.

The Republic of Armenia establishes independent procedures for military service by its citizens.

Military units of other countries and their military bases and installations may only be located in the territory of the Republic of Armenia with the consent of its Supreme Soviet.

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia may only be used by a decision of its Supreme Soviet.

6. [as published] As a subject of international law, the Republic of Armenia pursues an independent foreign policy, establishes direct relations with other states and national-state entities of the USSR, and participates in the operation of international organizations.

7. The national wealth of the Republic of Armenia—its land, mineral wealth, airspace, water, and other natural resources, and its economic, intellectual, and cultural

potential constitute the property of its people. Procedures for owning, using, and administering them are established by the laws of the Republic of Armenia.

The Republic of Armenia has the right to a segment of the national wealth of the USSR, including gold reserves and diamond and hard-currency funds.

8. Based on a variety of property types, the Republic of Armenia sets forth guidelines and procedures for its economic operations, introduces its own banknotes, a national bank, a financial and credit system, and tax and customs services.

9. The Republic of Armenia ensures in its territory:

freedom of speech, of the press, and of conscience;

the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers;

a multiparty system, equality of parties, and depolitization of the law-enforcement organs and the Armed Forces.

10. The Republic of Armenia ensures the use of the Armenian language as the state language in all spheres of life of the republic; it creates its own system of education, science, and culture.

11. The Republic of Armenia supports the cause of international recognition of Armenian genocide in 1915 in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.

12. The present declaration provides the basis for the development of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, the introduction of amendments and additions to the Constitution in effect, the operation of state organs, and the development of new legislation of the Republic.

[Signed] Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia L. Ter-Petrosyan

Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia A. Saakyan

23 August 1990, city of Yerevan

Armenia's Ter-Petrosyan on Independence, Referendum

*91US0417A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
8 Mar 91 pp 1-2*

[Text of address to Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet by its chairman, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, on 28 Feb 91: "Address of Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Chairman, Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet, at the Supreme Soviet Session of 28 February This Year"]

[Text] Honorable deputies, the Armenian Parliament has been discussing the matter of our attitude toward the Union Referendum and the Union Treaty for two days now.

I consider this political discussion an important event. However, I should like to introduce some necessary clarifications.

It is natural that the parties resort to extremes, categorical formulations, and strong emphases during a discussion, but this should not extend to oversimplification.

I consider certain descriptions of political and economic independence to be such oversimplification.

It is necessary to understand once and for all that independence does not mean isolation. These concepts must be clearly differentiated and never be turned into the subject of speculation, inasmuch as that is meaningless speculation. It is necessary, at last, to understand the simple truth that political independence, to the contrary, presupposes more extensive ties, closer contacts, and more multifaceted and diverse cooperation with the outside world than is possible in a dependent or semi-independent status.

The same also applies to economic independence, which in no way means isolation either. To be economically independent means to conduct an independent economic policy, and to enter into such economic ties and establish such relations as stem from the interests of one's state. The economic system that we have today has been imposed upon us, and gives us absolutely no chance to conduct an independent economic policy. Precisely for this reason, it is no longer acceptable to us because it impedes our natural development and undermines the republic's economic well-being.

This—as good-natured criticisms—so that such arguments will not be used henceforth in the course of the discussions and lead to a waste of time.

Now, about the problems properly under discussion, and first of all—about the Union Referendum.

In my deep conviction, the Union Referendum, which the central authorities and all of the conservative forces interested in retaining a totalitarian regime so greatly desire, is not a legal act, but a purely propagandistic measure. I think that even its organizers understand that a resolution passed through a referendum by just one-fourth of the people cannot have legal force. And this resolution will be binding in all of the country's territory regardless of the results obtained in the individual republics. Actually, this grossly violates the nations' right to self-determination because it is not the republic deciding its own fate, but the Union prescribing the republic's status.

Here the question may arise—does the Union center really not understand that this is a legal absurdity? It understands perfectly well, but it is acting in conformity with the still existing mechanism of cynical dictation from a position of strength in order to mislead Union and world public opinion. The proposed draft of the Union Treaty also is a manifestation of cynicism. The

cynicism, in this case, lies in the draft's not being in keeping with the republics' present status.

Any treaty, any political program, customarily is based on the status quo [nulevoy variant]. Today's reality in the disposition of political forces should have become the starting level [nulevoy uroven]. If the aforesaid draft had been proposed to the republics three to five years ago, it might possibly have been desirable and acceptable to them. So, wherein lies the disagreement? It lies in the proposed draft's demanding of the republics the rejection of what has been achieved by them. This is unthinkable; this is Utopia. Not one republic will reject what it has achieved during the last three years.

It is a fact that for seven months now, if not longer, Union laws have not been in effect here. Nor do those laws have force in a number of the other republics. The drafting of Armenians with a military obligation into the Soviet Army for service outside Armenian borders has been stopped, and it is the same in a number of the other republics. In Armenia and other republics, the native language has been proclaimed the state language, all state institutions and enterprises have been depoliticized, and the law enforcement agencies are being transferred to republic subordination.

How will Armenia or other republics reject these accomplishments? This can happen, not on a voluntary basis, but only through the use of force, which, in reality, contradicts the treaty's very concept.

If the Union center had been sincerely seeking implementation of this draft treaty, then, as point of departure, it should at least have accepted the present situation; that is, the fact of the sovereignty achieved by the republics. It should have accepted that which the republics have achieved, and only on the basis of this should it have proposed any treaty at all. Otherwise the center's aspiration becomes Utopia, inasmuch as neither Armenia nor the other sovereign republics will sign this treaty.

Thus, even in this case, the center apparently is not being guided by a sense of reality, but is again proceeding from a position of strength. If this is so, then everything is again being done with a propaganda purpose. Even so minor a circumstance as the Union-Treaty draft's discussion in working commissions is represented, for propaganda purposes, as the republics' consent to the center's initiative.

The propaganda purposes are dictated by demands of the power struggle which has developed.

For two days now, we have been listening to Gorbachev's speeches in Belorussia. However displeased we may be with these speeches, we must agree with him on one thing. A serious power struggle is indeed taking place in the country, a struggle between forces of progress and regression, between conservatives and the backers of reform. In the course of this struggle, both sides resort to all permissible and, at times, impermissible means. The

struggle is natural and understandable, but it is necessary to do everything, and in this I am also in agreement with Gorbachev, to see that it is conducted only within the frameworks of the constitution and the law, ruling out any attempt at the use of force or political provocation.

Thus I consider both of the center's initiatives—the Union Referendum and the Union-Treaty draft under discussion—as no more than measures conforming to the conservative forces' propaganda program.

And now, in more general terms, about the prospects for the country's and our republic's development. I think it more advisable to approach this matter, not just from the standpoints of today's political realities, but also in a purely philosophical vein, based on the general laws of societal development.

The existence of a multinational Union having a monolithic state structure is contrary to the laws of social development. All multinational empires have left the world scene. Regardless of our will, the Soviet Union also will disappear. We can only accelerate or slow the process. Such a state can be temporarily preserved only as a concentration camp through the use of force, as has occurred for 74 years. Such a state is torn by profound inner contradictions; realities found in it are mutually exclusive and undermine the foundation of such a state's natural existence.

These mutually exclusive and incompatible realities are—the Union, democracy, and economic well-being. World experience has proved once and for all that economic well-being is possible only under the conditions of a free economy, not a centralized one. The existence of a free economy presupposes, in turn, a corresponding level of democracy, which contradicts a monolithic union's essence. Expansion of democracy and economic freedom naturally leads to the economic independence of the republics and other formations and large administrative-territorial units, which inevitably becomes the foundation of their political independence.

Inasmuch as economic well-being, conditioned upon democracy, means the Soviet Union's inevitable fractionation, it is not ruled out that pro-empire authorities will try to preserve the Union by force, as has happened during past decades. In this case, however, a new, more terrible, and more precipitate danger arises—the social discontent of the popular masses, capable of subverting and destroying.

Two ways of preventing this discontent's explosion exist—the use of force and the plunderous squandering of the country's natural resources. Unfortunately for the pro-empire forces, however, these ways are temporary and criminal. The time will come when the Union concentration camp's existence will be perceived as a crime against humanity. Exhaustion of the country's natural resources also will be perceived as a crime. As

land is granted to the peasant for obtaining the maximum yield from it and furthering his family and nation's prosperity, so too has one-sixth of the globe been granted to the Soviet peoples by the will of God on the condition of furthering the well-being of the country and the world. Mankind can present a bill to the Soviet Union tomorrow, because its property, in the final analysis, is also the property of the whole world.

Therefore, the Soviet Union, because of its internal and external circumstances, is obliged to conform to the world community's developmental laws; that is, regardless of how events may develop and what temporary deviations may occur, the Union will break up sooner or later anyway. It is desirable and possible that this breakup occur in a natural, bloodless, and civilized form, and that the Union be turned into a harmonious cooperation; the kind, for example, that the cooperation of European countries is. Mankind has not yet created anything better. It is possible that this cooperation will be created in the future.

The Union's conversion into such a community also stems from the laws of societal development. Although it has been said that the Soviet Union must inevitably break up, nevertheless, because it is a historical reality formed during hundreds of years, it cannot disappear without a trace, even having broken up. Take, for example, the English and French colonial systems, which, although they have broken up politically, actually exist as close-knit political, economic, spiritual, and cultural communities of independent states.

The long-standing, concerted life-style of the Soviet nations has also created politico-economic and, particularly, spiritual relations and ties. In his speech yesterday, Deputy Ishkhanyan justly expressed protest regarding the multiplicity of monuments in Armenia to Russian cultural figures, although outstanding and worthy people, stressing the complete absence of monuments to representatives of world culture, especially European. This, of course, is mainly the result of political compulsion and national servility, but it is also natural and understandable in the spiritual and cultural aspects, because Armenian culture has been linked far more to Russian culture than to European in the recent and contemporary periods of history. Such has also been the lot of the other Soviet nations. Indeed, with the exception of certain nations (the Armenians, the Georgians, the Baltic nations, etc.), the others have been in touch with modern civilization only through Russian culture alone.

So, how can this spiritual heritage disappear tracelessly? I am confident that the Soviet nations, perhaps not in the same combination, will find a harmonious form of cooperation in the future regardless of political upheavals and zigzags. However, it is clear that there is still a long road to be traveled for the cooperation's achievement. Nevertheless, however distant it may be, this future should become the basis for our present-day political programs.

Thus we envision the future Soviet Union as follows:

A cooperation of independent states that are international law entities, in which the existence of a union government, a common constitution, and a single set of laws is excluded.

A Council of Member-State Presidents [Predsedateli] (the present Federation Council) exercises the highest coordinating authority in the cooperation.

A Council of Member-State Prime Ministers, with the appropriate working apparatus, implements the economic cooperation.

A parliament, constituted on the principle of equal representation for the member-states (the present Council of Nationalities), is the legislative organ which works out the cooperation's common policy.

Such is roughly the ideal toward which we should strive. It is quite obvious that there may also be some concluded agreements, both horizontal—between the Union and the republics—and vertical, in the alignment of these possible steps.

Proceeding on this basis, we should thoroughly examine our actions today. It seems to me that it is obvious from the foregoing that Armenia will not take part in the Union Referendum, and will not sign the Union Treaty. On the other hand, it is necessary to conduct a republic referendum to define the republic's legal status. And proceeding again on the principle of the necessity to observe legality, we cannot violate either the provisions of international law or Union or republic law, so that the referendum's results may have legal force for the Union and the world community.

Therefore, today the parliament must pass the following decree, which includes several points:

1. The Union Referendum is to be rejected;
2. A republic referendum is to be conducted;
3. The referendum's date and the question's formulation are to be determined in accordance with Union law.

The question's formulation will be discussed, of course, but the direct question, which is the only one, should not be avoided: "Do you agree that the Republic of Armenia should secede from the Soviet Union?"

And the date, as has been said, also must conform to Union law, according to which the referendum may be conducted six months after passage of the decree concerning it. This is essential, not only from the formal or legal point of view, but also in order that our people and public political organizations may get the opportunity to develop their propaganda activity, which will rule out any sort of happenstance. I am sure that, if we hurry, happenstances and our unpreparedness—the state's, the

public political organizations', and the people's—can significantly affect the referendum's results.

In outlining these views on the future and specifying our steps for today, however, we must not lapse into euphoria and lose our sense of reality. It is necessary to recognize soberly that everything does not depend on us; much depends on external circumstances, and we must be prepared to react to these in time. It is not even ruled out that Armenia will be forced to conclude the Union Treaty, however exploitative it may seem. Many nations in the world have been forced to conclude exploitative treaties. Let us recall, for example, the years 1918-1922 of our history. In all, during just five years, Armenia, by the hands of its patriotic authorities, concluded four exploitative treaties—the Batumi, the Aleksandropol [present-day Leninakan], the (Karsskiy), and the Union.

It is clear that, in a forced signing of the Union Treaty, all political levers and diplomatic potentials must be brought into play for the purpose of achieving maximally favorable terms.

I think, of course, that the Union Treaty may be signed only for the purpose of avoiding a far worse situation, or, in the Babrak Karmal version. Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that, regardless of temporary coercion and forced fallbacks, Armenia and the other Union republics sooner or later must attain complete independence anyway.

Armenian Supreme Soviet Debate on Secession Referendum Outlined

91US0427A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
27 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent L. Oganesyany under the rubric: "At Political Crossroads: Armenia Before the Elections"]

[Text] Republic of Armenia—The first session of the first convocation of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet began seven months ago with the adoption of a Declaration of Independence, and on the first day of spring of this year it concluded its legislative activities with the decision to conduct a republic-level referendum on secession from the USSR.

As we see, one cannot deny the logic and consistency of the actions of the parliament. However, in my view one powerful factor which is accorded tremendous significance all over the world was not taken into account when the parliament was adopting its laws. That factor is public opinion, the study of which has not been seriously undertaken in our republic.

In the meantime talk about the need for the creation of a center for social research has been underway since the first days of the session. But nothing has been done. The bridge between the parliament and the people has not been built. Many deputies have not been able to meet with their electorate because they are too busy, and consequently they have not been able to accumulate and

express their collective opinion. And it would be very useful to know what people specifically think on this or that issue.

But let us return to the last days of the session. In the course of free political discussion the deputies were supposed to express their attitudes toward the issues of the Union referendum and the signing of a Union treaty and give their opinion on the policies of the republic's authorities.

More than 30 deputies spoke on the first day. More questions were heard than answers. The indeterminateness of their position, an unwillingness to assume responsibility for the discussion of such important issues, and a superficial approach to problems were clearly in evidence.

For example, Deputy Kh. Safaryan said, "I do not know what awaits us if we sign the Union treaty and answer 'yes,' or what awaits us if we answer 'no.' All of this is vague to me."

"A referendum," said Deputy A. Manucharyan, "is not a means for achieving independence. We need a strong state and foreign ties... We need to do everything to ensure that our independence does not turn into a misfortune for us."

Deputy Kh. Artyunyan warned, "On the road to independence the most dangerous thing is political indeterminateness. We must know what we are and what opportunities we have..."

There were also radical opinions on the subject of independence. For example, the expression "it is time to jump out of the airplane" took on a different interpretation. There were also attempts to analyze the new draft of the Union treaty. It was criticized for infringing on the rights of the peoples.

The deputies agreed on one thing: "We are coming up on an election, and we do not have the right to make mistakes." The near future will show whether they succeeded in choosing the correct road or not. In the meantime it seems to me that if the parliament is to genuinely sense the flow of life and not make mistakes, especially in these six months before the autumn referendum, a center for the study of public opinion should be created together with a service for political prediction and a service to develop political programs. Sociological research in conjunction with the work of psychologists, political analysts, and economists would help to manage the situation and to avoid being led astray by chance incidents, subjective impressions, and ideological aims.

The most critical day of the session took place when the speech of B. Ararktsyan, first deputy chairman of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet, dispelled all doubts concerning the position of the leadership of the Supreme Soviet. In particular he noted, "Armenia will only be independent when it becomes a subject of

international law. And in this sense I interpret independence as a process. This process will require appropriate steps, and in these steps we will be more Catholic than the pope in Rome."

Almost all the subsequent speeches were based on the themes formulated by the leader of the Supreme Soviet. They consisted of a refusal to take part in the all-Union referendum, a repudiation of a Union treaty, even over the short term, the implementation of a republic-level referendum, and secession from the USSR.

Deputy A. Sarkisyan, second secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, expounded the position of the Armenian Communist Party. "The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee has worked out its own concept with regard to a Union treaty," he said. "We are in favor of a renewed union of sovereign republics. The interests of the people demand that we take an active part in the work on the Union republic. It is another question whether we sign it in such a form or not. But in principle we support the idea of signing it and believe that the Union treaty is a step toward independence."

Out of the 140 communist deputies who make up 70 percent of the members of the parliament, none supported the important speech of their leader. What is the explanation for this? Was it insincerity, the pressure of the opponents, or the desire to win the sympathies of the new authorities and pick up the latest influential positions? Most likely the communist faction, if such a thing exists in the Armenian parliament, was directly affected by a great number of illnesses depriving them of their presence and vote. In the meantime, the people did elect them on a specific political platform.

The results of the discussion were summed up by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet, who simultaneously expressed his own opinion of the issues being discussed and his own notion of political and economic independence. Independence, in his opinion, does not mean isolation but instead presupposes wider ties, closer contacts, and more versatile and multifaceted cooperation with the outside world than is possible under dependent and semi-independent status. Economic independence, in turn, means entering into such economic ties and establishing such relations as result from the interests of one's state. The presently existing system, believes the head of the parliament, is confining, does not present the opportunity to conduct independent economic policy, and is therefore unacceptable. It "slows down our natural development and undermines the economic welfare of the republic."

Talking about the future and clarifying what steps need to be taken, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet warned, "We should not fall into euphoria and lose our sense of reality. It is possible that Armenia will be compelled to conclude a Union treaty, no matter how one-sided it may be."

Nonetheless, the majority of the deputies voted to conduct a republic-level referendum on 21 September on secession from the USSR. The phrasing of the referendum question will be as follows: "Do you agree that Armenia is an independent democratic state that does not belong to the Union?" In the event of a sudden change in the situation in the country, the Supreme Soviet presidium has been granted the right to adopt a ruling to conduct the republic-level referendum before the assigned date.

Thus, the bets have been placed and concrete steps have been taken, as they believe here, toward independence. It is difficult to judge what the results will be. There is no clear understanding of this question even in the parliament itself.

Armenia Protests Azerbaijani Attacks to Pugo

NC2803110791 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 27 Mar 91

[Text] The press center of the Armenian Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry has reported that Ashot Manucharyan, acting minister of the internal affairs, has sent a protest note to Pugo, USSR minister of internal affairs, in connection with the sharp increase in tension in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Armenian regions bordering Azerbaijan resulting from the impudent and provocative attacks by the members of the Special Detachment of the Azerbaijani Internal Affairs Ministry.

The hostage taking, animal theft, shootings, and the numerous uses of armored vehicles was followed by the seizure of a helicopter which was then used to fire on the peaceful population.

The protest note specifically mentions that the munitions and arms with which the members of the Special Detachment kill the peaceful population are being obtained from the arsenals of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry. This is to the discredit of the union ministry.

Thus, on 26 March at around 1400, unidentified armed persons in two buses and a car used a machine gun and automatic weapons to fire on the Armenian-inhabited Yegtsaog and Medzhshen villages in Nagorno-Karabakh. These same villages were also fired on from the direction of Kanachtala village in Lachinskiy rayon of Azerbaijani republic, as well as from an unmarked helicopter which took off from Shusha city. The servicemen deployed at Kirov village turned down a request from the residents of Berdadzor village to defend them against the attackers.

The Armenian Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry resolutely protests these attacks and demands that effective measures be taken to prevent the subunits of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry and of the Defense Ministry from allowing such operations, which threaten the security, health and legal rights of the Armenian citizens in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Armenia's regions bordering Azerbaijan, and to speedily pull out the subunits of the

Special Detachment from Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and launch an investigation into their criminal acts, and return the stolen helicopter to the Armenian Republic.

Yerevan Refutes Report of Attacks Into Azerbaijan

NC0404121291 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] False news is being circulated that allegedly Armenian guerrillas have attacked Azerbaijani villages from Idzhevanskiy rayon of Armenia. The report also speaks about shootings by the aggressive extremists and gives details about the casualties and cites 15 killed.

Being familiar with the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry's behavior, about which the leadership of the Armenian Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry recently issued a statement, the correspondent of ARMENPRES decided to verify the news which was given to the press by INTERFAX's loose hands.

The correspondent contacted the Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry. The Ministry assured him that no such incident has been documented with the Ministry. Even Idzhevan [word indistinct] confirmed that there has been no attack into Azerbaijan from Armenia. Rather, they provided information which the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry preferred not to report to the INTERFAX correspondent. On 1 April a passenger bus bound for Kirovakan was fired on from Azerbaijan's Kazakhskiy rayon near the Armenian village of [name indistinct]. Other cars with Armenian license plates were also fired on. They were fired on with automatic weapons and with large caliber machine guns. Fortunately, there were no casualties.

One unwittingly thinks that the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry, which has a rich past experience of plots organized against the citizens, has not yet restructured itself despite all claims to the contrary. Its operations continue to be a reliable prop for the political interests of the center.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Interviews Gamsakhurdia

91US0437A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, conducted by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA special correspondent Andrey Karaulov in Tbilisi on 5 March, published under the general heading: "Civil War Is Flaring Up in Georgia: The President, Prime Minister, and Chairman of the Union Parliament Are Keeping Quiet About This, Which Is in Keeping With the Traditions of Soviet Foreign Policy: 'The Kremlin Is Giving Us Ultimatums'"]

[Text] [Karaulov] How much time do you have?

[Gamsakhurdia] About 15 minutes, I believe.

[Karaulov] There is a television in the Supreme Soviet Press Center. Before coming here, we—my Georgian colleagues and I—were watching a TSN [Novosti Television Service] program. It started with Ossetia, and TSN was not only describing but also showing—to the world—what is happening here. What do you think about when you see such things on the screen? What does the chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet feel at moments like these?

[Gamsakhurdia] The point is that a war is being fought against Georgia. In all respects. War in the direct sense. An unconcealed war, that is, armed attacks. Further, a war which has been declared on Georgia by the mass media. A real news blockade. Television, radio, and almost all newspapers published in Moscow are speaking about South Ossetia only as the Kremlin wishes. Energy is another blockade. We are short of food....

That is, do you see, the war is being fought by all means. And since it is war, how should we be surprised? The more so if we are being fought by such a barbaric empire.

The so-called South Ossetian conflict is a Moscow punitive operation. I told Gorbachev: We strongly feel that in Tskhinvali everything is developing according to the Baltic scenario, only in Georgia there is no Interfront, in Georgia Ossetian extremists are successfully substituting for it. Regular Soviet Army units are supplying them with weapons and helping them in every way they can. They are hiring machine gunners and snipers here, and they are being given rockets, the latest hardware, and any gear and equipment—what you will. It is they who are waging this war. What does Moscow want? Free elections have been held in Georgia, the communist system has collapsed, and there has been a change of power. This has been a most veritable revolution. It is against this that war is being waged. What is the aim of the center? Primarily detaching Samachablo from Georgia. First it was suggested to us that a state of emergency be imposed here—within three days—we believed that this was unacceptable, and there will now soon be, evidently, an ukase of the president, who will impose this state of emergency himself, as was the case in Karabakh, and isolate Samachablo from Georgia. That is, we have been presented with an ultimatum. It was presented to me by Gorbachev personally, verbally, it is true, but this was an ultimatum, nonetheless: Sign the Union treaty, or all that is happening in Ossetia will continue. Just like that. Short and to the point.

[Karaulov] And what did you reply?

[Gamsakhurdia] I said what I thought. What he wants will not happen, and this is the position of the Georgian people.

[Karaulov] But if things go on this way, there will be war.

[Gamsakhurdia] There will. Of course there will. As long as the empire exists, all people have been put in this position.

[Karaulov] What is the solution, Zviad Konstantinovich?

[Gamsakhurdia] Is there a solution for the world? For mankind? If there is, there is, consequently, one for us also. The sole solution is ridding ourselves of this empire. There is no other.

[Karaulov] Have you spoken with Landsbergis?

[Gamsakhurdia] I have. But how can he help? He himself is in the same position.

[Karaulov] And Yeltsin?

[Gamsakhurdia] He also is in a bad position. Also. We were to have met, but this fell through for some reason or other.

[Karaulov] You evaluate the situation as catastrophic, consequently?

[Gamsakhurdia] It is very grim. Very. A law on the transitional period has now been enacted in Georgia. Such a period is essential, but we will not, for all that, drag our feet. We will establish new political structures, appoint prefects to the rayons, implement reforms, and enact laws on citizenship of an independent Georgia, on property, on land, on the de-party-ization of the law enforcement authorities and on the national guard and many others. We will hold firmly to our positions and believe in them.

[Karaulov] The people support you?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes. And how could they do otherwise? Can people not see what is going on? Do they not see how Soviet Army forces are fighting against Georgia together with Ossetian extremists? They see everything, everything: how weapons are being transferred to them, how they are being given rockets....

[Karaulov] There is no lighting in Tskhinvali. The temperature in the municipal maternity home is six below. How can this be, Zviad Konstantinovich?

[Gamsakhurdia] Tskhinvali's power engineers are on strike. Why? Because in the city there are plants which are manufacturing weapons for the extremists. How can we prohibit them from striking? But were we to insist, were we able to turn on the power, the population of Tskhinvali would be so incensed that it would, all the same, turn it off itself. But as soon as the unconcealed gangsterism on the part of the Ossetian extremists ceases, life will quickly enter its normal channel, I assure you.

[Karaulov] All opportunities for dialogue with Moscow are exhausted, consequently?

[Gamsakhurdia] Of course they are. Gorbachev has a single ultimatum—sign the Union treaty. If you do not sign, things will go badly for you. These are the terms on which we associate.

[Karaulov] What do you think about Shevardnadze's resignation?

[Gamsakhurdia] This was a Kremlin step. As always, camouflaged and clever. In order to create for Shevardnadze the halo of martyr of democracy. For him, and for Gorbachev. He was forced into this step by reactionary forces, allegedly. Who thereby put together this image for them both. But in fact, in my opinion, the Kremlin needed all this on the one hand to pacify the military and reactionary forces and, on the other, to once again heap onto the minorities all the miscalculations and setbacks in foreign policy—it is a game which is being played here.

[Karaulov] Very well. But what do you think, will Shevardnadze ever return to Georgia?

[Gamsakhurdia] I think not.

[Karaulov] Is his influence perceived here in any way?

[Gamsakhurdia] None.

[Karaulov] What kind of situation is the Communist Party in?

[Gamsakhurdia] It is practically finished. The people do not support it. You could put it this way: It no longer exists.

[Karaulov] In this case, why does the party not give up its building? What do you think, do they understand sufficiently what has happened? Or are they still hoping for something or other?

[Gamsakhurdia] It is hard to say. They are most likely hoping. As for the building, this is Moscow, the CPSU. This matter has already come up, and repeatedly. The communists tell us: We would give it up, with pleasure, but the CPSU is threatening us, the CPSU considers this house its own. But it is necessary for the normal business of the Council of Ministers. You see what is happening: Moscow cannot, Moscow does not have the courage to acknowledge once for all that there is no longer a CPSU in Georgia, that this is a political corpse and that the communists are agents of the Kremlin on our land. I am not speaking about everyone, there are different people among the communists. There are scientists and academicians—what kind of communists are they? They are formally communists and joined this party because they were forced to.

[Karaulov] And what kind of relations do you have with the intelligentsia?

[Gamsakhurdia] With the normal intelligentsia, good relations. The normal intelligentsia is in parliament. It is the majority. But there are some intellectuals, failures in

the political field—they also would like to be in parliament, but the people have not allowed this. They are now embittered against us and are for this reason defending "Mkhedrioni." We have bad relations with them. We will show that these degenerate intellectuals are controlled by Moscow. "Mkhedrioni" gangs have been of direct assistance to the Kremlin here, in Georgia. The incident in Shavnaba was nothing other than the staging of an alleged armed uprising in Georgia. Its script was written in Moscow. And had we not arrested the "Mkhedrioni" leaders and that same Dzhaba Ioseliani, there might already be a state of emergency on Georgian territory. This is what the center is aimed at.

[Karaulov] You made it understood at your last news conference that you do not rule out either the likelihood of the arrest of Georgiy Chanturiya, a leader of the National Congress—the extraparliamentary opposition—which incorporates, as far as I know, almost 40 parties. It is being written in the West in response that with your victory a regime of personal power is taking shape in Georgia and that you are a latter-day dictator. Are you familiar with these publications?

[Gamsakhurdia] This is all Kremlin gossip. You could say this. And Kremlin propaganda. There are their agents also in Georgia.

[Karaulov] What is your attitude toward this?

[Gamsakhurdia] What could my attitude be? I regard them as hostile intrigues. The Kremlin has very many agents in Georgia. Very many. There are also Moscow Georgians who have fled from here, from Tbilisi, traitors of Georgia. This is their work also. And they are being assisted by Shevardnadze, Mgeladze, Popkhadze, and other party functionaries—past and present.

[Karaulov] Are you reconciled to these "agents"?

[Gamsakhurdia] Am I reconciled? No way. I expose them at every step.

[Karaulov] And there have been specific examples of these exposures?

[Gamsakhurdia] I believe that some people here could be put on trial for slander. Slander is not a political crime but a criminal offense. If I say that you have killed a man and print this in the newspapers, you can take me to court. So we will be taking some people to court. Because... they are printing that we killed a priest. But they are not giving his name. What priest have we killed? Should this not, in your opinion, be taken to court?

As far as Chanturiya is concerned, his actions are not the actions of a politician. And I have said this repeatedly, publicly. Chanturiya has linked up with the "Mkhedrioni" gangs, his party is armed to the teeth, and members of it have already been arrested for larceny, robbery, and auto theft. We can no longer call such people political leaders. How could we do otherwise? Criminals are using politics as camouflage here. We will show that the elections to their National Congress were falsified—and

we will prove it in documentary fashion and by referendum: We will conduct a public referendum and learn what percentage of the population voted for them at the elections. Then everyone will realize that this was quite a small proportion of the Georgian population. As far, however, as "Mkhedrioni" is concerned, no state could be reconciled to the activity of armed formations which do not submit to the government. There is no country where this is possible. Gangster groupings literally terrorizing the population even less. The arrest of Dzhaba Ioseliani was, of course, a forced step. He must answer for his crimes.

I myself am a former prisoner. I was in prison four times. It is not easy for me to arrest a person, I know what this means, I know what prison and repression mean. But the whole people had risen up, and I was forced, literally compelled to bring order to bear in Georgia. After all, it had reached the point where people were afraid to go out into the street after dark. They simply could not. They did not want to let their children go to school because they did not know whether their child would make it to school or not, whether he would be abducted or not. So the people demanded. We could no longer put up with such a situation.

[Karaulov] This is what I have been thinking, Zviad Konstantinovich. It seems to me for some reason or other that, together with the reviving national self-awareness, distortions could be happening in the other direction. Sturua does not put on "The Three Sisters" in Tbilisi, he goes to England....

[Gamsakhurdia] This is his eccentric whim. Sturua merely wants to be at the center of the Western public's attention. But there are all the conditions here. All. Both for Chekhov and for whoever you like. Who here is opposed to Russian culture or Russian literature? Against the Russian blockade here, yes. But not against Chekhov.

[Karaulov] Addressing Georgia on the question of the Meskhetian Turks, you said that "you will not allow the settlement in Georgia of a single ethnic Turk" and—even!—will fight for the repatriation of these people to Turkey. At this same time it is continually being emphasized from the parliamentary rostrum that ethnic hatred is alien to Georgia. Is this not a contradiction?

[Gamsakhurdia] No. In Georgia newcomers from Azerbaijan (and other minorities also) very often behave quite aggressively in respect of the indigenous Georgian population. There have also been direct attempts to encroach on the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia. Oppression on its own land of the indigenous Georgian population is by any international standards a crime. Can we tolerate Georgians' homes being illegally demolished in Georgia? How could we? In just the same way we are unwilling to admit to our territory unchecked many thousands of foreign citizens. No state would be. There is a law on citizenship in all democratic countries.

Georgia does not have such a law as yet. But non-Georgians are 35 percent of the population here. That is, these people are for us foreigners. At the same time, however, I am sure that as soon as the Kremlin's interference ceases, ethnic problems in Georgia will rapidly recede. Once again practically everything depends on the Kremlin. That is, on whether the Kremlin changes its mind or not about waging war on us. This is the main cause. And if it does not, then the West—I hope—will force Moscow to abandon its aggressive, reckless policy.

[Karaulov] Have you turned to the United Nations?

[Gamsakhurdia] Two days ago. We appealed to all governments and the United Nations.

[Karaulov] Are there politicians in Moscow you can count on? Without naming names, simply say yes or no.

[Gamsakhurdia] Politicians, hardly.... There are people. Some deputies, some other people, but not leading figures.

[Karaulov] Does Gorbachev call you often?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes.

[Karaulov] Is the conversation one between equals or does he call... as president?

[Gamsakhurdia] No. On the contrary, he tries all the while to be... tactful, but, you know, caustic phrases constantly creep in, if, he says, you do not sign the Union treaty, things will go badly not only in South Ossetia, things will be bad in Abkhazia also, and this will be bad for you....

[Karaulov] If so, this is indeed an ultimatum.

[Gamsakhurdia] An ultimatum, yes. But he presents it... half in jest.

[Karaulov] Not a bad joke....

[Gamsakhurdia] It's as though you don't quite catch the word, he does this... like... well, as though not entirely seriously. He does not command but puts it approximately thus: So you see what the situation is there, it will get worse and worse, you think it over, perhaps you will sign. It is even as though he sympathizes.

[Karaulov] He really wants to come here, to Georgia?

[Gamsakhurdia] He says he does.

[Karaulov] And how will the people greet him?

[Gamsakhurdia] Very badly, I fear.

[Karaulov] Exactly 15 minutes are up, Zviad Konstantinovich. But if there is time, I would like to continue.

[Gamsakhurdia] Very well.

[Karaulov] What do you think, does Gorbachev have a future?

[Gamsakhurdia] You know.... Perhaps he does. He is such a resourceful person that he could, in my opinion, wriggle out of this situation even. He is, for all that... very dexterous. A great diplomat.

[Karaulov] Did you really promise "to cross the threshold of the Kremlin only as a citizen of a free Georgia?"

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes. I will not cross it. It would make no sense. I could not be there on these terms: slave here, master here.

[Karaulov] But you will then be told that, having adopted such a position, that you yourself are breaking off the dialogue with Gorbachev.

[Gamsakhurdia] Good will is needed for dialogue. Not ultimatums. If Gorbachev reconsiders his domestic policy, there will then be dialogue.

[Karaulov] But perhaps Georgia will sign the Union treaty for all that?

[Gamsakhurdia] Our people will fight for independence. For the restoration of independence. We are now holding a referendum. With the sole question: Do you wish for restoration of an independent Georgian state based on Georgia's Act of Independence of 26 May 1918? We will ask everyone. Everyone! And our people will say precisely and clearly yes or no. What has the Union treaty to do with this? And what "Union"? We never joined any "Union." We were incorporated forcibly. How, then, can we consider ourselves a member of the Soviet Union?

[Karaulov] Georgia's State Act of Independence was signed on 26 May 1918. Georgia separated from Russia, and no one put Lenin to shame for this. Then, in 1921, a military coup occurred, and Georgia became—forcibly—"Soviet." Nonetheless, Georgia and the Union have been tightly bound these 70 years. Cutting this knot without detriment—to either party—is now impossible. I realize that Gorbachev, after 9 April and South Ossetia, has repelled the Georgian people. There is much that simply cannot be forgiven. But if there is such a person as Yeltsin, Georgia might not need so much to detach itself, perhaps? And Gorbachev also, he has to be given his due, is now continually saying: More sovereignty, more, even more....

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, in words. But as soon as we decided to create a national guard and our own internal forces, we were showered with threats from Moscow: Do not dare, and so forth. How about that. Now, after Gorbachev politely warned me: Prepare yourself, the same thing could happen in Abkhazia as in Ossetia, it transpires that 250 armed airborne forces have arrived in Abkhazia and settled themselves into the holiday hotel. What is this if not a provocation? And what should our attitude toward this be?

[Karaulov] That is, Moscow is simply forcing you to send the national guard to commence retaliatory action?

[Gamsakhurdia] I don't think so. The national guard does not exist as yet. We have no one with whom to fight. Only interior detachments and the militia.

[Karaulov] They are small?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, of course.

[Karaulov] Why are you not publishing the document mentioned at your news conference on 23 February? You declared at that time that Chochiyev and Kulumbegov, leaders of the Ossetian extremists, were employees of Moscow's state security and that "this is corroborated by a secret cipher telegram from Moscow, which was received by the interior forces and which directly orders the interior forces to release Kulumbegov by any means and take him to Moscow." Where is this cipher telegram? Why has it not been shown in the papers?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, this should be done. We will get hold of it.

[Karaulov] How, in any case, did Moscow allow you to be elected in Georgia?

[Gamsakhurdia] It was very much against it. Very much.... It did all it could. This is why there was Dzhaba and all these.... In Georgia they were a fifth column, and they were commissioned to thwart my election campaign. As is the case everywhere, generally. But they could not. They did everything, but they failed. The people prevented it. I am happy that my people supported me.

[Karaulov] And what did they do?

[Gamsakhurdia] What? Everything! They armed 12,000 persons in Georgia and were prepared to tear everyone to pieces. And they were supplied with weapons by the KGB and the military.

[Karaulov] And this also can be proved?

[Gamsakhurdia] It will be. Necessarily. Everything will be.

[Karaulov] You are not afraid that you will be killed?

[Gamsakhurdia] It is very possible. I am threatened every day. They promise to deal with me every which way. They write letters, call on the telephone—what you will.

[Karaulov] How can you live in such an atmosphere?

[Gamsakhurdia] I live normally. I am used to it.

[Karaulov] Normally?

[Gamsakhurdia] I have lived like this my whole life. My whole life.

[Karaulov] What would Konstantine Gamsakhurdia say today about Georgia's future? About your position? About the policy course which his son has proclaimed?

[Gamsakhurdia] My father was my spiritual mentor. And he always understood me. He was somewhat afraid for my life, naturally, and did not want me to be subjected to repressive measures, be deported to Siberia and so forth. After his death, when my father's body was not yet cold and still lay in the house, a prosecutor acquaintance of ours came to the house and warned us that I should take precautionary measures inasmuch as I would most likely be arrested before my father's funeral even. Whereas the former Central Committee secretaries Kakhiani, Mamuliya, Mgeladze and others fought Konstantine Gamsakhurdia openly, Shevardnadze fought him and our family secretly, and a multitude of documents and a multitude of witnesses are confirmation of this. What began to develop after my father's death is already well known. The 14-day search which was conducted in the home of Konstantine Gamsakhurdia on Shevardnadze's instructions by approximately 80 KGB employees was, rather, a pogrom cum upheaval, not a search, during which a multitude of unique manuscripts and books was destroyed and lost, and his pen, which my father had jokingly called "the general," inasmuch as it had written all his major works, was stolen by the KGB employees, and an employee of Shevardnadze's guard has it still. There's a story for you.

[Karaulov] How many languages do you know?

[Gamsakhurdia] How many? Three European languages. Classical Greek. I can read Latin. A little Spanish and Italian, but with a dictionary.

[Karaulov] And classical Greek—this is simply a fascination with the language itself?

[Gamsakhurdia] No. I am a philologist, after all. I have done some translation. I am proud that I am personally acquainted with Averintsev and that we even worked on some texts together.

[Karaulov] Really?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, of course, Old Slav texts. It is a great pity that various rumors are going the rounds of the Moscow intelligentsia currently.... many people are simply afraid to come here. They are being told that people are being killed, Russians, what is more, that there is appalling chaos and civil war. All this is being done deliberately. They—I am talking about the rumors—are coming from the KGB and TASS and the total news blockade in the press. We are protesting and sending letters, but they are not being published—so much for their conscience and their truth. Take a look at the central papers, if you will. You see a photograph? "Here was once a school." They do not write that this was a Georgian school, you understand? And some people will surely think: Since it is South Ossetia, it is consequently an Ossetian school. Only in reality it is all the other way about. Such are their methods. They write further: A deputy of ours attacked the MVD headquarters and, together with a group of thugs, smashed it up. The deputy is named. But there is no such deputy. No

such name either. Is this not slander? These are the methods with which they are fighting us.

[Karaulov] Consequently, you are prepared to see it through to the end? Or has the situation, for all that, proven more complex than you had thought, and do you have some inner hesitation?

[Gamsakhurdia] Ready. I am ready. But it is very difficult, of course. Moscow is unwilling to yield. And we will give way even less.

[Karaulov] How long are you working?

[Gamsakhurdia] Twelve hours at the very least. And up to 15.

[Karaulov] Do you write anything in the evenings?

[Gamsakhurdia] If I have time. I mainly proofread the books that are now coming out. There is a great deal of work here also. But it is not a question of art now. It is said that when the guns thunder, the muse is silent. Such is the situation.

[Karaulov] Are relations with the West taking shape for Georgia? What resulted from the visit of your deputy to the United States?

[Gamsakhurdia] A great deal. We are for an honest and candid dialogue with the West. We need it like the air we breathe. In America currently some senators are declaring: We will not allow the Kremlin to tear Georgia to pieces, we will not allow it. There are among them, I know, people who have sent Bush a letter demanding that we be defended and that a second Vilnius in Georgia not be permitted.

[Karaulov] And a further two questions. How do you evaluate Yeltsin's future? What will happen at this special Russian congress?

[Gamsakhurdia] I can see that there is a dramatic situation in the Russian parliament. I do not know who will prevail there. There are very disturbing signs.

[Karaulov] Why has Patiashvili not been arrested? For 9 April?

[Gamsakhurdia] Because ours are a tolerant people and forgive everyone everything. Georgians are not a rancorous people. You will note that there has been no hatred toward Russians in Tbilisi since this dreadful 9 April. There is generally none! Nor toward our nations either. Who today remembers Patiashvili, although he committed a crime and will be punished for this? But the people are not racing after this, you understand....

Gamsakhurdia Interviewed by OGONEK Correspondent*91US0405A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
14 Mar 91 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet, conducted by OGONEK correspondent Gevork Martirosyan: "We Will Not Follow the Path of Godlessness, Robbery and Terror"]

[Text] Today, when in the process of perestroyka we have enriched ourselves with a certain experience, including parliamentary experience, it has become clear how much we still do not know. We do not know how to listen to our fellow conversationalist without interrupting, or how to take the time to consider his position. We have not been taught to do so. And even to this day many refuse to learn this, cherishing the crystallized ability not to change an opponent's mind, but rather to shout him.

In Georgia the ability to argue has always been respected. With all the explosiveness of the national temperament, the culture of argument and the ability to respect one's fellow conversationalist have long been cultivated and guarded by tradition and the authority of great and all-knowing old men. One such generally acknowledged wise man who preserved and created the national spirit was the great writer Konstantin Gamsakhurdia. Many visited him in his hospitable Tbilisi home, where traditions were strictly observed and where in the remarkable courtyard with the swan tower—in the very center of Tbilisi—a half-wild deer grazed among the well-tended trees of the fruit-bearing orchard. Today the bronze statue of Konstantin Gamsakhurdia gazes down from a short pedestal on the agitated life of Tbilisi, where [Gamsakhurdia's] son Zviad, the chairman of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet, has become one of the main personages.

Let us listen to the Georgian chairman. We know that you will not entirely agree with him. We at OGONEK also do not all agree with him. And in the Georgian multinational society he is not unanimously acceptable. However, we should listen with respect to the publicly elected leader. Forgive us, but we listened to Alksnis and Petrusenko, whose directive peremptory nature is protected in a different way, and bears an entirely different property.

Gamsakhurdia is an individual, and we will be happy to continue our discussion with him on the level of responsibility for the national fate. Other levels are impossible today. He himself does not hide the extent of the problems in his republic: From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali through Tbilisi—we cannot name them all, and no one contends that Gamsakhurdia has the found the solution to this disturbing multiplicity. However, he is looking for it. He is starting at a crucial and very difficult time, and he needs attention and support. Even in spite of his often peremptory nature which, we would like to believe, will become softened by someone else's as well as his own

pain. Let us listen to him and remember that we must exchange opinions, that the ability to discuss is necessary for a country which intends to build a democratic society. Let us fear those among "us" who are right primarily when their arguments have firepower.

In presenting this interview, we are continuing the series of discussions with political leaders in the time of renewal, which is awakening the people of a pondering country.

The elections to the Georgian parliament, which for the first time in the years of Soviet rule have been conducted on a multiparty basis, have recently concluded, and the republic has not yet had time to cool off from the heated discussions. Of course some have been cast into despondency by the results of the elections, and for some they became a revelation... But for many they meant victory. A victory colored with the bright tones of hope.

The convincing success of the: "Roundtable—Free Georgia" political block, which won almost two-thirds of the parliament mandates—155 out of 250 seats, places on its representatives a huge responsibility for the democratic future of Georgia.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the "Roundtable—Free Georgia" block, was elected chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet. His first speech before the new parliament contained the following words:

"Let everyone know that we have fought and are fighting for the rebirth of the religious and national ideals of our forefathers, since the Almighty has placed upon Georgia a great mission. We are fighting against the eternal night of godlessness and injustice. The Almighty supports our righteous cause, and therefore we were victorious. The Georgian people will not follow the path of godlessness, robbery and terror. The path of the Georgian people is the path of mercy, the path of courage, the path of love, the path of Christ henceforth and forever...

God is with us! Amen!"

These are lofty words! Noble goals! And, of course, the people of Georgia are worthy of them.

But how difficult will the path toward "rebirth of the religious and national ideals" be? How will the new leadership emerge from the political, economic and moral crisis?... What will it use to pave the road toward the new temple? How will it be able to gather the different opinions of the opposition parties into a tight fist of national consensus?

Questions, questions, questions. Today they worry not only the citizens of this republic, but also its immediate neighbors—Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the peoples of the entire country.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia has only recently come to head up the Georgian parliament. However, many of our colleagues from the central publications are already well acquainted with his stubborn "no" to requests to grant

an interview. In this case, however, Zviad said "yes," and explained that he cannot refuse OGONEK, just as he cannot refuse an Armenian journalist. Yet at the same time he added tactfully that as yet he has not had any luck in an achieving objective presentation of his political views by the press..

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[Correspondent] Zviad Konstantinovich, the Georgian parliament is simply amazing in its work capacity: In just a few days it has ratified the memberships of permanent Supreme Soviet commissions and the new Cabinet of Ministers. It has adopted supplemental changes to the republic Constitution. These changes are also present in the criminal code, specifically rescinding the responsibility for dismissal in the ranks of the Soviet Army.

Georgia today has a new name—the Republic of Georgia, a new crest, a new state flag, and a new anthem... You have even had time to rescind the former official holidays, replacing them with the traditional Christian ones. At the same time, you have interrupted the parade of sovereignties of the republics. Georgia has not yet announced its declaration of independence. Why? Perhaps this document is still being prepared? And what other ideas do you have?

[Gamsakhurdia] Of course, there are some other ideas. We do not want to have independence simply on paper. We want to have it in real life. Moreover, we do not want to create a juridical tautology, because our independence was proclaimed many years ago—on 26 May 1918.

In 1921 there was forced sovietization of Georgia. However, even under the conditions of the harshest communist dictatorship, its government did not sign in capitulation. The republic was physically annexed, but legally it has retained its independence to this very day, and this represents the constitutional basis of the sovereign state.

Our parliament adopted a law on the transitional period, during which the necessary reforms on the path to true state sovereignty would be implemented in Georgia. In this period we intend to lay the foundation for economic independence, formulate new political structures, and adopt vital laws on citizenship of an independent Georgia, as well as laws on land and privatization. We intend to implement departization of the law enforcement organs and to create a national army, militia, etc. This is how I see Georgia's road to true independence.

[Correspondent] How long will this transitional period last?

[Gamsakhurdia] Of course, we would like to achieve what we have outlined in the shortest time possible. However, much will depend on external factors of the center's policies, the position of the Western countries, and stability in the USSR. And, of course, on the stabilization of the situation in Georgia itself and an effective new parliament... However, we will not dawdle.

[Correspondent] Will the supremacy of the USSR Basic Law be retained during the transitional period?

[Gamsakhurdia] No. We in fact have already stopped the effect of the union Constitution on Georgian territory. During the transitional period there will be a full replacement of the national constitution, which will define the legal mechanism for full restoration of Georgia's independent statehood.

[Correspondent] What is it that concerns you most of all today as the head of the Georgian parliament?

[Gamsakhurdia] We have had a peaceful democratic revolution, a bloodless change in leadership. In fact the order has changed, and the cadres have changed. However, only from afar does it seem that everything is going smoothly here. Alas, this is far from being so.

The opposition of the destructive forces makes itself known, forces which I would call a political mafia. The communist party is one of the guises of this mafia. We do not even consider it a party, but an agency of a foreign state on our land. It is simply that we have individual representatives of the CPSU in parliament, and we are forced to tolerate this, because we cannot do otherwise—we must exclude the antidemocratic manifestations. Yes, we must be tolerant, but we do not intend to recognize this party, and our goal is to abolish it.

[Correspondent] But you must agree that the role of the communists, especially in the rural rayons, is still great?

[Gamsakhurdia] They are already political corpses. The republic's rayons support a new democratic leadership, and are subordinate to us. In time we will secure ultimate victory of the national movement throughout all of Georgia. The municipal elections on a multiparty basis will help us in this, and, of course, the decisive struggle against anarchy and crime which have gripped the republic. The raging crime and lawlessness play into the hands of the enemies of the new authority. It is their trump card...

[Correspondent] That is a rather categorical answer. Allow me to clarify: Does your attitude toward the communist party extend in equal degree to its rank and file members as well as to its leaders?

[Gamsakhurdia] Well, the rank-and-file communists are dupes, part of whom entered the CPSU out of need. I was referring to the party functionaries, who even today continue their criminal activity.

[Correspondent] But, excuse me: The last Georgian Communist Party Congress adopted a number of radical resolutions which should have been close to a democratic society?

[Gamsakhurdia] I do not agree, because in fact it was all different. The resolutions adopted by the congress were merely declarations, I would say, a masking of true intentions. The communist party apparatus has still not given up the idea of restoring the former orders.

[Correspondent] Will you cooperate with the communist party?

[Gamsakhurdia] Well, you see, if we do not recognize the CPSU, then we do not intend to cooperate with it.

[Correspondent] And nevertheless the best road toward building a democratic society is the path of national accord.

[Gamsakhurdia] I have no reason to dispute this notion. However, it is still very far to national accord in Georgia. I have already spoken of the communist mafia which opposes us. But there is also the so-called National Congress—the masked part of the communist mafia. It acts under the guise of extra-parliamentary opposition. And at the same time the National Congress has illegal bandit-like armed formations. So what happens: If the ideas do not pass in the congress or are unpopular among the people, then the machine guns must speak? What can you say, that is a weighty conclusion!

[Correspondent] In the Supreme Soviet I met young men armed with machine guns. Do the head of the Georgian parliament and Supreme Soviet really need such protection?

[Gamsakhurdia] Of course. In Georgia today there are many armed groups operating which are hostile to the parliament. One may expect any kind of provocation from them.

[Correspondent] And what counter measures are you taking?

[Gamsakhurdia] For the present we are asking them to voluntarily give up their illegally stored weapons, disband all their armed groups, and return to honest labor. After all, these groups consist primarily of criminals, as well as people who have fallen entirely under their influence. And this is even more dangerous, you understand? In words they stand for democracy, for the transformation of Georgia, but in deed they rob and terrorize the population. It is such gangs that the so-called National Congress patronizes. All this causes great unrest in Georgia and hinders our policies. It keeps us from implementing new draft laws of the Supreme Soviet, and it hinders the stabilization of the situation in Georgia and the development of the national liberation process.

[Correspondent] Georgia is probably in first place in its number of social organizations and active parties—over 120! It is easy to get lost in this dense forest of different political views and conceptions dealing with the past, present and future of Georgia. But in this case we are most interested in those parties which are part of the "Roundtable—Free Georgia" block. It and the National Congress oppose each other, and unfortunately the party struggle at times exceeds the boundaries of what is permitted: In the press and in public speeches we hear entirely non-parliamentary comments, and political

opponents accuse each other of all mortal sins. At times the confrontation heats up to the limit...

The past elections have not brought the expected relaxation of tensions. Moreover, the relations between the Supreme Soviet and the congress have become so strained that it might have come to a direct confrontation between the proponents of these blocks.

During the days of the elections, Catholicos of All Georgia Ilya II announced that henceforth anyone who commits fratricide, regardless of the guilt of the victim, will be proclaimed by the church as an enemy of the Georgian people...

What is it that the political opponents could not agree upon?

The "Roundtable" accuses its opponents of falsifying the elections to the National Congress. It maintains that less than two percent of the republic's population participated in them, and therefore, emphasizes Gamsakhurdia, the "self-proclaimed congress does not represent any political power".

The "Roundtable" unites around 10 parties, including the Society of Saint Ilya the Righteous, a mass political organization with widely branched structure throughout all of Georgia, whose chairman is Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

The National Congress includes around 4/10 of the parties. Its leaders, Irakliy Tsereteli and Georgiy Chanturiya, represent the Party for Georgian National Independence and the National-Democratic Party, respectively.

It is clear that the republic's political climate will largely depend on the opposition of the ruling block and the National Congress, on Gamsakhurdia's wisdom, and on his opponents Chanturia and Tsereteli. It will depend on the political foresight of their fellow associates.

The democratic transformations which we have witnessed are fraught with acute confrontation of political opponents and, alas, spilt blood. Yet it is true that today we want to hear not about the "enemies of the people", but about the steps for rapprochement of views, about agreement and cooperation. I speak of this also because during my stay in Tbilisi I heard about the first, it is true as yet unofficial, meeting of representatives from the Supreme Soviet and the National Congress.

The recent announcement by Gamsakhurdia also instills optimism: "We are ready to cooperate with any power which will do at least some good for Georgia, and we welcome any initiative which is beneficial to Georgia and serves its interests, regardless of its origins".

Perhaps the ice has begun to move and a consensus is possible?

[Correspondent] Zviad Konstantinovich, in asking you about today's difficulties in Georgia, I admit that I expected to hear first of all about the problem of national minorities.

[Gamsakhurdia] I would say that this is not such a significant problem, because it is an artificial problem. It is mostly the center which makes noise about it in order to cause interethnic conflicts here.

At the same time, I am not discounting the difficulties in this question. Georgia is a multinational state, and the democratic changes which are taking place, naturally, are not being perceived the same everywhere.

For example, today everyone is talking about the conflict in the so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. This illegal territorial formation was created by the bolsheviks on native Georgian land in 1922. In the years of Soviet rule the ethnocracy of the non-Georgian population has been lost here. It has turned out that Georgians have become the national minority in their own land. Their rights are violated, they suffer discrimination and persecution which may even be compared with apartheid. And all this is taking place not somewhere far off, but in Georgia itself. Do you understand?

And the longer it goes, the worse it gets. Unconstitutional elections were held in the oblast, and the South Ossetian Soviet Republic was proclaimed. What will the next step be? Secession from Georgia?

All this so greatly contradicts the laws of our republic, as well as the USSR Constitution, that we cannot seriously speak of it. However, at the same time we cannot close our eyes to the danger which the steps of the separatists from the South Ossetian Society "Adamon Nykhas" conceal. They are consciously sowing interethnic strife, speaking out with instigating appeals, and guiding matters toward direct confrontation between the Ossetians and the native Georgian population...

At the end of last year a state of emergency was declared in South Ossetia—in the city of Tskhniwali and Dzhevski rayon. The interethnic conflict which flared up here placed Georgians and Ossetians on different sides of the barricades. The shots are resounding to this day. Blood is being spilled. People are dying. As always, they are fruitlessly trying to cure futile policy with weapons. The abyss of mistrust, enmity and hatred is growing with each passing day...

Oh, Righteous Lord! How much more grief do you hold in store for us?! Have there not been enough mothers' tears shed, enough orphaned children and deserted hearths?... Have we sunk so deeply in this cursed swamp of cruelty that there is no salvation for us?

There is! It is the great wisdom of the Caucasian peoples, it is the grey hair of the old men and the black shawls of

the mothers. It is the reason of the people, which must be used to build a new house, but to build it in such a way that your roof does not block out the structure of your neighbor...

There are almost 5.5 million people living in Georgia today. Of this, there are 3,787,000 Georgians, [illegible number] thousand Armenians, 341,000 Russians, 308,000 Azerbaijanis, 164,000 Ossetians, and 96,000 Abkhazians... There are also tens of other peoples and nationalities. Georgia has become their native home. It has warmed them with its sunshine, quenched their thirst with its water, and fed them with its bread. Can it be that this land, which has become the homeland for all the people living here, will become the land of strife, territorial disputes and legal civil unrest only because some do not like the law adopted by others, while others are capable of adopting a law which will infringe upon the rights of the former?

Yes, today the Georgian and the Ossetian share a contradiction. Yes, each of the sides has many arguments in its favor... Yet they must be resolved not by force of arms, not by the price of blood, but by a sober and gentle soul. The house built from the stones of a neighbor's destroyed house will never be strong...

[Correspondent] After your election as head of parliament, did you meet with the leaders of the autonomous formations?

[Gamsakhurdia] Only with the leadership of Adjara. The leaders of the other two autonomies, one might say, are avoiding this meeting. I might add that in Abkhazeti the situation has become relatively normalized. There is unrest only in South Ossetia.

[Correspondent] On the background of continuing discussions in the USSR Supreme Soviet regarding the need for expanding the rights and authority of the autonomous formation, your words to the effect that if the Ossetians and Abkhazs do not stop their pretensions they may lose their existing autonomies, have resounded as an acute dissonance. What is hidden behind these words?

[Gamsakhurdia] I was referring literally to the following: If some autonomous formation in Georgia suddenly proclaims itself an independent republic and tries to leave the make-up of Georgia, our parliament will simply revoke this autonomy. What else can we do? Any state would do the same.

[Correspondent] You are known as an active defender of the law and chairman of the Georgian Helsinki Union. In what you have said, are there no contradictions with basic human rights? Rights which you yourself have defended and for which you have fought all these years?

[Gamsakhurdia] Do not look for contradictions here. There are none, nor can there be. The references to the

supposedly existing or future possible human rights violations in Georgia are absolutely groundless.

Different ethnic groups have coexisted peacefully here for centuries. And if today we have occasion to speak about interethnic conflicts and increased nervousness in relations between various peoples, we must in this case necessarily add that the democratic transformations in the republic and the struggle for state independence are of no importance here.

The ethnic crisis which has gripped the USSR is the direct result of the totalitarian regime, a distorted national policy which was implemented for decades by the fathers of communist ideology.

Yet in our decisiveness to defend the rights of the Georgian population, especially in the so-called South Ossetia where Georgians comprise the minority and, as I have already noted, are discriminated against by the Ossetian nationalists, in our decisiveness not to allow division of the republic's integrity, we must see absolutely no infringement of human rights. Our policy on this question corresponds to all international legal standards.

Certain means of mass information give a rather willful interpretation of the processes taking place in Georgia. For this reason, I would like to stress once again: Our attitude toward the non-Georgian population has always been friendly. We do not intend to depart from this principle. And the future law on protection of the rights of national minorities, which our parliament will adopt, will become the best confirmation of this fact. The rumors which our enemies are spreading about oppression of the national minorities in Georgia—this is a clumsy effort to create negative public opinion about the political processes in the republic and its new Supreme Soviet, and to hinder the development of our independence.

[Correspondent] For several years, the Transcaucasus have been considered the hot spot of the country. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has already had many victims. However, the problem of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] has still not been resolved. Now the shots ring out in Georgia: Here the barometer of international relations indicates a storm. What is next? Confrontation or cooperation?

[Gamsakhurdia] Necessarily, cooperation! The centers of confrontation must be neutralized. Unfortunately, this is not easy to do, but we must strive toward this end. The people of the Transcaucasus must live in peace.

[Correspondent] The Georgian Greens Party speaks out for the creation of a Common Caucasian House. This idea finds support among the various ethnic groups inhabiting the region. What is your attitude toward this idea?

[Gamsakhurdia] This, you know, is demagoguery in its purest form. First we must have our own house, and then

we can think about a common one. When the peoples of the region become really free, when the republics attain true sovereignty, that is when we may seriously start thinking about the Caucasian house. Europe, for example, may allow itself such talk, because it unites independent states. We, however, still have far to go to reach this point. I believe that such talk is simply prattle.

[Correspondent] In the course of the pre-electoral struggle, certain parties spoke about the fact that the new parliament must return to Georgia a number of territories which it lost in 1921 as a result of annexation. According to their affirmations, these territories are at the present time within the make-up of the Transcaucasus republics and Russia. What is the attitude of Georgia's new leadership toward these demands?

[Gamsakhurdia] Such a question may be posed only by the parliament of an independent Georgia. However, since our Supreme Soviet is the highest organ of power during the transitional period and cannot be the subject of international law, this question will not be reviewed by parliament in the near future.

[Correspondent] There is every reason to affirm that since its very first steps, the Georgian parliament has entered into conflict with the center. I am referring to the Supreme Soviet's attitude toward the new Union Agreement, the appointment of new KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] leaders in Georgia, and the corresponding reaction of Moscow. Please comment on the Supreme Soviet's position on these questions.

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, in fact our parliament unanimously expressed itself about the Union Agreement at its very first session: Georgia will not sign it under any circumstances.

In my announcement to the USSR President, I noted that at the present time the Georgian Supreme Soviet refuses to review and sign the Union Agreement, since the republic at the present stage is only in the beginning of the transitional period on the path to full state independence. And this does not allow the current Supreme Soviet to assume any political-legal responsibilities.

Only after having attained full independence, only after having become the true masters of our fate in the political and other spheres of state life and the full-fledged subject of international law, will the Georgian people be able to empower the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet to sign any agreement with other countries, an agreement establishing a certain form of union of states.

As for the USSR President's reaction to the Georgian parliament's appointment of the first two leaders of the republic's MVD and KGB, and this reaction was negative, here too all is clear: Both of these departments have always been the main levers of the empire. Today they have become truly national and have emerged from subordination to the center. We responded to Gorbachev

by saying that what we are doing does not contradict either our or the union constitution, and therefore we do not share his viewpoint and will continue the struggle.

You may call this a conflict, if you like, but to me one thing is clear: The center cannot come to terms with our independent national policy and systematically reminds us of its dictate first by directives, and then by orders which we do not fulfill.

At any time, we must be ready to stage national disobedience throughout Georgia as a sign of nonsubordination to the center. Our authorities are in irreconcilable opposition in regard to the center. This is our path, and we will not depart from it.

[Correspondent] That means now the Georgian KGB is not subordinate to the USSR GKB?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, these ties have been broken. You might say that we have been divided.

[Correspondent] I would once again like to return to the Union Agreement. By not signing it, Georgia is after all breaking all ties with the USSR—political as well as economic?

[Gamsakhurdia] Not economic. Because economic ties are possible with all states. We will have equal partnership relations with Russia, and with Uzbekistan, and with Armenia, and with Azerbaijan, and—with everyone.

Georgia possesses rich natural resources, and we may trade profitably with interested parties. Georgia's unenviable economic position is the direct result of the republic's artificial isolation from the rest of the world, an isolation in which it found itself not by its own will. However, I am convinced that now the situation will change. We have attained that freedom which will allow Georgia to have an independent economy.

[Correspondent] Yes, the economic crisis which has gripped the country is clearly evident also in Georgia. I saw long lines of people waiting for dairy products, empty shelves in Tbilisi stores, and high prices in the market stalls... I must admit that this is so out of character for the always generous, abundant, and hospitable Tbilisi. It is no accident that I am speaking of this. Are you not afraid that with refusal to sign the Union Agreement the republic's economic position will become even more difficult?..

[Gamsakhurdia] There are some things which have taken a turn for the worse, of course. There are even signs of a blockade. On the part of Moscow. However, we are trying to take counter measures. In some things we succeed...

Today Georgia decisively rejects the Union Agreement. The republic's government is developing emergency

measures for supplying the population with food products, fuel, and basic necessities. Nothing can undermine the faith of the people in the new power more than an unstable economic position, interruptions in supply, and dairy, meat, and other food crises. They understand this here and are working at full force. But for the time being, as a necessitated measure—prices have practically doubled in Georgia on tobacco, tea, and brand-name cognacs... Evidently, this is not a complete list.

[Correspondent] What are the mutual relations of the new Georgian leadership with Soviet Armenia? Judging by the words of the commanding officer of the Transcaucasus Military District, Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, in his speech broadcast over Georgian television, the situation in your republic is one of contraposition between the army and the people.

[Gamsakhurdia] We are trying not to exacerbate mutual relations with the army. We are trying not to give them reason to declare a state of emergency.

[Correspondent] But is this possible without preliminary coordination with the republic parliament?

[Gamsakhurdia] The USSR President may declare a state of emergency in the republics without any coordination with the local leadership. However, for some reason I think that it will not come to that here.

[Correspondent] You want to have your own national army. Moreover, it will be financed from the Georgian budget, and the cadres will be trained by local and foreign specialists. That is what you said in your interview with one American journalist. But if Georgia leaves the make-up of the USSR, then sooner or later even the Soviet military specialists will become foreigners...

[Gamsakhurdia] They are foreigners even now.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, would you invite them to train your military cadres?

[Gamsakhurdia] And why not? We have made such an offer to them, and they are proud of it. But how this works out in practice, we will see.

[Correspondent] Can there be a civil war in Georgia?

[Gamsakhurdia] For now there are no indications. Later—I don't know, depending on how the center acts. But it is unlikely...

[Correspondent] Zviad Konstantinovich, is the rebirth of monarchism possible in Georgia?

[Gamsakhurdia] Constitutional monarchism, but not an absolute monarchy. Under a constitutional monarchy there is an active parliament, a cabinet of ministers, and so forth.

[Correspondent] And what about Stalinism?

[Gamsakhurdia] No.

[Correspondent] But there is a "Stalin" society in the republic?

[Gamsakhurdia] Well, so what? Georgia has fully experienced all the "delights" of the Stalinist regime, and there will be no return to totalitarianism. There are not as many followers of Stalin in the republic as the press would sometimes have us believe. The "Stalin" society which you mentioned did not even participate in the elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet. It was excluded from the list of parties allowed to participate in the struggle for the parliament mandates.

[Correspondent] Why is it, in your opinion, that many of the leaders of republics which have proclaimed their sovereignty, leaders of East European countries who have chosen a new orientation, are representatives of the humanitarian sciences?

[Gamsakhurdia] What an unexpected question! Perhaps I can explain this as follows: In the countries of the Soviet block, it is humanitarians who have been able to preserve moral values and adherence to all-human values. The people have more trust in them, and consider them to be the authority. The people are tired of people who have sold themselves to the state, people who have no individuality and who possess no moral strength. They want real defenders of their interests, and find them among the humanitarians. This may sound insulting to the technocrats, but it is so.

[Correspondent] Let us talk a little about yourself. Did you receive many telegrams after your election as chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, many.

[Correspondent] Did Shevardnadze congratulate you?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, he did. But I do not know how sincere his congratulations were.

[Correspondent] The experience of recent years shows that the opposition leaders, having come to power, are somewhat attenuating the radicalism expressed at their meetings. How will you act?

[Gamsakhurdia] I believe that I have no reason to change my policy. It will continue in the same spirit. And in some cases it will become even stricter.

[Correspondent] Are you not worried at all about your political image? Frankly speaking, I get the impression that in some of your interviews you seem to gain special fame for yourself as a harsh, irreconcilable politician?

[Gamsakhurdia] I simply remain true to the interests of my people. Forgive me for my inflated style... But harshness, and all the other characteristics ascribed to me which are at times rather unflattering, are of absolutely no importance to me.

[Correspondent] You are also criticized for excess harshness toward journalists.

[Gamsakhurdia] Well, not toward all of them... An incorrect interpretation of a politician's comments, especially in this day and age, may have unexpected and even catastrophic consequences. I too have encountered poor quality and unfair journalism. I do not want to take this risk any more.

[Correspondent] You have translated Shakespeare and T. S. Eliot into the Georgian language. Perhaps now you have long finished with this aspect of your activity?

[Gamsakhurdia] It is hard to say. We have difficult times now: I must work from early morning until 1:00 a.m.

I recently thought about the fact that the most difficult thing on the path toward independence and true sovereignty is, perhaps, not the development of new laws and not even the creation of our own army... The path to true independence, in my opinion, must begin with restoration of the national spirit, the national character, with the rebirth of the sense of national pride and national dignity which have in many ways been lost. This is perhaps more difficult than the resolution of numerous political and economic questions. I might also say the following: Without this we cannot solve even one major political or economic task.

[Correspondent] Zviad Konstantinovich, thank God, you have enough critics. Yet I know that the greatest authority for you has been and remains your father—Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, a great thinker and a great writer. Tell us frankly, would he have approved of your views and your struggle?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, he was my spiritual father. It seems to me that I have in no way diverged from my father's precepts and have in no way defamed his memory. He would have approved of my actions.

Gamsakhurdia Accuses Abkhazian Leader of Fomenting Discord

*AU2803130791 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian
0300 GMT 28 Mar 91*

[Message from Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, to Vladislav Ardzinba, chairman of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet—date not given]

[Text] In accordance with the Republic of Georgia law of 16 December 1990, local soviets of people's deputies have lost their legal rights and, on 29 January 1991, the system of local soviets was completely abolished.

According to the constitutions of the Republic of Georgia and the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic was obliged to align the Constitution of the Abkhazian

Autonomous Republic in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia. [words indistinct] For example:

On 12 March 1991, in Ochamchira Rayon, a session of the local soviet of people's deputies was convened at which Sergey [surname indistinct] was elected as its chairman. This event can be (?seen) as a disregard of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia. It cannot be discounted that similar incidents will be repeated on the territory of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic as [words indistinct] the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic is systematically ignoring the legislation of the Republic of Georgia and various officials in Abkhazia [words indistinct]

Such behavior on your part can be viewed as an abuse of one's position and this could have quite serious consequences. In this way, you are endangering the peaceful life of the population, stirring up national discord, arousing unjustified opposition between the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples, and flagrantly violating the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia. As an educated individual and as a scholar, at least, this is what (?we know) you to be, you must [word indistinct] that it is the duty of all individuals, and particularly the leader, to live in harmony with and have mutual respect for one another and according to high moral principles and not to follow one's personal ambitions and not to respond to incitement.

Today, we are responsible for the fate of the Abkhazian population of which more than 50 percent are Georgians. We have no right to make mistakes as, in the struggle between nations, there are no winners. Once again, I [word indistinct] that you take account of the lessons of history and that, as a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia, you participate in our work and, what is most important, that you align your policies in accordance with the constitution of the Republic of Georgia which [words indistinct]

Situation in South Ossetia 'Remains Extremely Tense'

*PM2802162591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2*

[Report by TASS correspondents V. Zenkovich and V. Shanayev: "On the Situation in South Ossetia"]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 26 Feb—The past 24 hours have seen further victims in South Ossetia. According to data supplied by the press center at the emergency committee under the North Ossetia Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet chairman, no one has been killed. But many people have been wounded.

The general situation in the region remains extremely tense. The fate of the inhabitants of remote Ossetian villages is still unknown. Despite the fact that South Ossetia is still encircled by an economic and power blockade, there are data to the effect that Tskhinvali has

started to receive electricity from the combined Georgian system, but the water supply is not functioning. The bakery is not operating because there is no flour.

Traffic is moving again along the Transcaucasian Highway. Foodstuffs Georgia requires are already being ferried along it from North Ossetia to Dzhava. However, pickets from Georgian armed formations are continuing to block the roads leading to Tskhinvali.

As has been reported, they captured a convoy of heavy trucks loaded with food, medicines, and fuel 25 February. The Georgian side claimed that the attack was made because the drivers were carrying weapons. A. Rostovtsev, chief of the temporary USSR Internal Affairs Press Center in Tskhinvali, told TASS correspondents that casualties were avoided only as a result of vigorous actions by the Georgian militia. According to him, it was the militia officers who prevented the militants from assaulting the drivers. Everyone, apart from six drivers, was released. Their fate is as yet unknown.

The North Ossetia leadership is continuing to take steps to accommodate refugees arriving in the republic. S. Khetagurov, chairman of the North Ossetia Council of Ministers, in conversation with TASS correspondents, voiced great concern about their future. He announced that since the number of refugees is steadily increasing (according to official data, there are now more than 8,000), it will create certain problems in the life of the republic's capital. The head of the North Ossetian government suggested that the refugees settle not in Vladikavkaz, but in parts of the republic where there are job vacancies at enterprises, and in kolchozes and sovkhozes.

Georgia Rejects Moscow Rulings on South Ossetia

*PM2802123391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Feb 91 Second Edition p 6*

[PRAVDA correspondent A. Grachev report under the "From the Scene" rubric: "Blockade of Tskhinvali Continues"]

[Text] Vladikavkaz—Neither the president's decree nor the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on normalizing the situation in South Ossetia have produced results. The Georgian parliament and its chairman, Z. Gamsakhurdia, are continuing to pursue the policy of suppressing the will of the South Ossetian people, who wish to remain within Russia. The economic and energy blockade of Tskhinvali has still not been lifted.

Yesterday 28 trucks of food, clothing, medicine, and other extremely essential commodities were sent to the city from North Ossetia. But Georgian guerillas stopped the convoy and took the drivers hostage, and the freight was not delivered to its destination.

I cannot understand the stance taken by the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops. Why were

they brought here if they are unable to even escort vehicles carrying freight for which hungry and sick people are waiting? In short, if they do not take control of the entire oblast, the help that is sent will fall into the bandits' hands.

The three days that the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution gave the Georgian parliament to withdraw all illegal formations from South Ossetia and end the blockade have come to an end. However, Z. Gamsakhurdia is not even thinking about carrying out the USSR government [as published] resolution. So, under the resolution, a state of emergency must be immediately introduced throughout South Ossetia. Only that can stop the fratricidal war here.

Central Asia

Chairmen Outline 'Kyrgyzstan' Democratic Movement Goals

91US0391A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 9 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with Kazat Akmatov and Topchubek Turgunaliyev, cochairmen of the Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement, by E. Taranova; place and date not given: "The DDK Declares Openly: There Is Enough Republic for Everybody"—first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA introduction]

[Text] A great deal is said about the Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement [DDK]. Some rebuke the movement for nationalism, others for orthodoxy. One way or the other, the movement is a truly substantive force on the political scene of the republic, and it would be absurd not to take note of it or skirt it in silence. In order to form a more complete picture of the activity orientation and views of DDK members, we invited two of the movement's cochairmen to engage in discussion.

Kazat Akmatov is secretary of the republic Writers Union and a member of the Presidential Council. Topchubek Turgunaliyev is a scholar and philosopher at an institute of higher education. Participation in the movement is their community activity, so to speak. How did this all begin?

[Akmatov] Prior to the day of our constituent assembly in May last year, there existed small-scale social organizations in the republic, primarily in Frunze—the association of young historians at the university, "Ashar," "Osoba"—an association of Frunze working youth, "Civic Initiative"—cultural workers and personnel at institutes of higher education in an association affiliated with the Women's Teachers College, "Ak-Keme"—a Leningrad student organization, and "Akyykat"—in Moscow.

I would like to emphasize straightaway that from the very beginning of our movement we did not wish to structure its policies along the "Sajudis" model or the

model of the Baltic People's Fronts. Our movement was to become an international one. It was not sentiments of separatism which predominated, but rather an entirely normal aspiration to achieve democratic transformations in the republic.

But then literally one week following our official birth, i.e., the day of our constituent assembly, the Osh events began. Suddenly people began accusing us quite forcefully of what had taken place. And so, wittingly or unwittingly, we became engaged in an active political struggle. We had to defend ourselves first of all, insofar as we were not in fact the instigators of this bloody conflict. Secondly, such was not at all our aim—resolving interethnic problems, not to mention land problems.

Here I should note we immediately sensed that the Communist Party did not wish to see any social organization whatsoever standing alongside it, much less a competing one. But when the youth demonstrations took place in Frunze on 6-7 June, the leadership of the Central Committee itself invited us, DDK activists, to participate in pacification measures. And we were able to find a common language with the young people on the square. Incidentally, it is Topchu Turgunaly who took it upon himself to manage the unruly crowd. I can say without exaggeration that this permitted us to avoid bloodshed.

Thirty-four organizations have joined our movement on an associative basis. And our first congress opens today in Frunze.

[Taranova] You stated that the chief mission of the movement is the democratization of society. How do you envision this?

[Turgunaliyev] It would seem there is no longer any dispute that the totalitarian imperial system abrogated all rights—both of the individual and of any of the peoples of our country. Not a single people is free. And this includes the Russian people. Not a single individual is free, including the highest ranking leaders who brought about this regime, because any individual or nation which encroaches or tramples upon the rights of others becomes itself a hostage of this regime. We see a change of the social system as the primary way of escaping this.

[Taranova] What do you think the new system should be called?

[Turgunaliyev] Obviously it should be a democratic society where unrestricted economic production exists.

[Taranova] In other words, a new method of economic activity lies at its foundation?

[Turgunaliyev] Absolutely correct. It—this method—will dictate its own superstructure. Right now we see the old economic system being destroyed, but obsolete superstructure elements are still holding out up above by virtue of the Army and the entire apparatus of state power. Yet an absolute majority of the people of our country recognize the destructive nature of the old

system which has held us in its clutches many long years. Additionally, we would like to see the return of that completely free form of ownership which was taken away from people.

[Taranova] Let me interrupt you—you are speaking now about a return to private ownership, but both of you, by the nature of your activity, are rather far removed from economic problems. Isn't the question of ownership, therefore, a purely theoretical one for you?

[Turgunaliyev] No, far from it. We have just now received yet another application—this will be the 35th member collective of the DDK—from a certain new association which has assets of 3 million. Also belonging to the movement is the scientific-production cultural association Manas, whose account has about 15 million. And so, when we talk about new forms of economic management, this is not a philosophical abstraction for us. For we wish to base our political activity on a realistic foundation. The ranks of the DDK presently include a great number of cooperatives and production associations of a new variety. True, they are stifled, pressured, closed down at times—the Uzgen cooperative Moloko for example, which we are now actively assisting in an effort to keep it afloat. This is a fine farm enterprise. Every milkmaid there receives pay in an amount they would not dream about in a kolkhoz [collective farm]. But the cooperative apparently upset someone, who saw it as a serious competitor to state enterprise.

[Taranova] Many people today assert that a definite movement away from the ideas of perestroika can be observed in the Center. Do you realize that, under conditions of dictatorship, the very existence of your organization is in question?

[Akmatov] Without a doubt, things will be far more difficult if events begin to unfold in that direction. But we do not intend to repudiate the path we have chosen. Following the recent events in Lithuania, we conducted a mass meeting at which we expressed our political point of view and sent a letter of solidarity to Lithuania.

[Taranova] But as far as I am aware, not very many people at all came to this mass meeting. Were your views not supported?

[Akmatov] No, it is not that. We spoke with authorities about the event and wanted to conduct it with precisely that number of people so as not to assemble a crowd, not to agitate residents of the capital, but simply to state our position openly. We achieved this. But the fact that in Lithuania clashes were provoked—this is a bad model and a bad sign of our times. We condemn the introduction of Army units although, as it is now being said, this was an action of the Vilnius garrison itself.

[Taranova] They are also saying that it was done at the behest of a portion of the Russian-speaking population whose rights were encroached upon. How do you see this?

[Akmatov] There probably are encroachments. But this is the dialectic of social development. If, let us say, one segment of the population is seeking to attain independence, autonomy, and sovereignty, another segment—and this is also natural—does not wish under such conditions to lose its own opportunities. We can understand both sides, just as—I am certain—both sides can and must look for accord along this path, must be able to reach agreement. But what is the Army doing here?

[Taranova] Well, let us return to our republic and its problems. You stated that your movement is an international one. I might argue with you on that account—your cochairmen and the members of the movement come 99 percent from the indigenous population.

[Akmatov] We do not establish any quota. We pursue an open policy. Whoever wants to joins us can do so. Whoever does not—honestly, we do not recruit them. Our contacts with all ethnic cultural centers of the republic are quite good. But we have not prescribed the aim of incorporating within ourselves all social movements. We can cooperate without doing so. Actuality itself indicates when it is necessary for us to act in concert.

[Taranova] But you aspire to a leading political role in the republic?

[Akmatov] If that is what happens—then for God's sake let it happen. But we have no intention of dictating conditions to anyone.

[Turgunaliyev] Let me add something. Our charter prescribes that any individual, regardless of ethnic origin, can join the DDK. For a democratic movement cannot consider itself such if a person is discriminated against by virtue of ethnicity or any other basis. A deep abyss lies between protection of a people's interests and nationalism. And those who do not know this, or who intentionally muddle these concepts, are accusing us of devotion to ethnocentric views. I assure you this is not the case.

[Taranova] And with regard to methods of achieving your aims, do all of you share the same view or is there a divergence?

[Turgunaliyev] We are united in the idea that it must be a nonviolent, parliamentary method of struggle. We are still at the very beginning of our journey and are not using all those many forms known to world politics. But there should be a single principle—apply those forms that are appropriate to the given situation. When we went out on a political hunger strike in October of last year, for example, I believe our movement chose the only correct decision, under circumstances of the emergency situation.

[Taranova] It did not trouble you that the health of young people who were following you was placed on the line?

[Akmatov] We thought about this. And for the first two or three days we prohibited students—not to mention girls—from standing alongside us. But after three days they joined the hunger strikers without asking anyone's permission. After all, this is a personal right, the right of the individual! No one can or should issue orders in this regard.

[Taranova] Do you happen to see in our youth the main force capable of turning the situation around in the direction you need?

[Akmatov] We had no intention of enlisting youth in our activity. But neither can you remove them from consideration—after all, young people today are seeking answers to the most critical questions. Not finding these in official structures, they have nowhere to turn except to unite with movements which afford a sober and honest view of today's world. They are laying claim to what they merit as citizens. We understand this, but we also understand that our young people must not be toyed with.

[Taranova] All the same it is student youth, as a rule, which finds itself at the epicenter of conflicts, as if someone were pushing it in that direction.

[Akmatov] Believe me, this is not being done at our hand. In addition, the strength of our movement lies precisely in the fact that it does not find its base of support in any one particular segment. It is other parties, totalitarian parties, which at first declare that they are doing everything for the people, and in actuality are serving only an elite group. Persons of any age group or social category can be in our movement. The single requirement is devotion to the ideals of democracy.

[Taranova] Can CPSU members be participants in the DDK?

[Turgunaliyev] Of course, and they are among us. Although we must emphasize that we have a special attitude towards the Communist Party. We consider ourselves an alternative political force. We intend to dispute and debate them, not agree with their line.

[Akmatov] But here we must state that our movement wholly and entirely supports the president's policies in the republic directed towards effecting truly radical changes.

[Turgunaliyev] Essentially, we have set out on a path of struggle not against the party itself but only against its elite segment, its highest echelon, which leans on dogmatic concepts of society and is essentially indifferent to the fate of an individual people or the country in general. But we are not rejecting CPSU participation in effecting transformation if its ranks can truly be restructured.

[Taranova] Is it not a strange phenomenon when people of various nationalities profess similar democratic views but cannot come to agreement among themselves?

[Turgunaliyev] The system has sown mistrust among peoples over a long period of time. And today all the danger lies in the fact that we have seen a substitution of interethnic strife for the true conflict—between democracy and totalitarianism, civilian interests and the military-industrial machine. In the Baltic region, for example, it is not simple Russian people who entered the conflict but chauvinist-oriented Army units protecting their own privileges, portraying these as the aspirations of the entire Russian-speaking population. Here I do not exclude the possibility that things may have gone too far on the other side as well. But we must stand up for the peaceful, political resolution of our problems, and not through the use of force.

[Akmatov] Or consider the Osh conflict. It would be a mistake to suppose that the Uzbeks there were living better than the Kirghiz, or that the Kirghiz enjoyed greater benefits. Both of these peoples were destitute and deprived of individuality to the same extent on their own land.

[Taranova] And the wound continues to bleed. What can be done now? What measures are proposed by the DDK?

[Turgunaliyev] Not too long ago we met with the left wing of "Birlik." There it was stated with alarm that people in the Fergana Valley were arming themselves. I personally proposed that a meeting of the leaders of political movements of all Central Asia and Kazakhstan be conducted, perhaps in the land of Osh. Invite the wise old men. And let this be a specific step in restoring confidence.

[Akmatov] It is necessary that everything be done so as to avoid providing any pretext for interethnic confrontation. The DDK states openly that there is enough of our republic for everyone, that each people here must achieve development and attain identical freedoms.

Turkmen Foreign Affairs Minister on External Policies

91US0430A Ashkhabad *TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA*
in Russian 14 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Avdy Kuliyeu, Turkmen SSR minister of foreign affairs and member of the Presidential Council, by I. Ivakhnenko; place and date not given: "I Love To Seek Out the Truth"]

[Text] It was very difficult speaking with this man. He did not simply sidestep any of the sharp or even "sensational" judgments and assessments, but was extremely careful in his choice of words and restrained in expressing his personal attitudes. In short, this kind of interviewee is difficult for a journalist. On the other hand these qualities are perhaps simply essential for a diplomat, Turkmen SSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the Presidential Council Avdy Kuliyeu.

[Ivakhnenko] Avdy Ovezovich, it has only recently become possible to talk about the activity of the republic

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From the moment that Turkmenistan proclaimed its sovereignty. How do you see the republic's foreign policy?

[Kuliyev] To start with, let us collate our terms. Sovereignty is that political status of a state in which its leadership is totally free in its choice and adoption of decisions. Whether this affects the domestic life of the area or its mutual relations with the other Union republics and with foreign states. So that this kind of understanding of sovereignty is fully inscribed in the concept of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union. For the very existence of our federation is a not unimportant factor in an independent foreign policy for Turkmenistan. I think that it is understandable that a sovereign state (republic) that is part of a powerful Union elicits more respect than one that acts in isolation.

We are firmly determined to "warm up" relations with neighboring states—Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan. They are countries on whose land hundreds of thousands of our brother Turkmens live. They are countries with which we are close historically in terms of culture, traditions, and way of life. And incidentally, establishing good relations with them will in turn be in line with the effective nature of the "eastern" and "southern" foreign policy of the entire Soviet Union. But whereas a common past may bring us significantly closer to these states, there are countries with which relations still lie in the future. What I have in mind is the group of highly developed Western powers. Without contacts with them we will be simply unable to achieve a "permanent passport" in the world house of the community of nations. And without this it is even more impossible to integrate ourselves into the international economic system and become a coparticipant in progress.

[Ivakhnenko] What role will your department play in all these processes?

[Kuliyev] We must make these goals realistic and carry the idea from the plane of office planning to life. The milestones on this road will be the Turkmen SSR missions at Soviet embassies in the countries I have named. Turkmenia's cultural trade centers that will soon appear abroad should also help. The staff of our ministry has been increased by 25 people put at the disposal of the president of the republic. This indicates a significant increase in the number of problems on which the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working. I admit that our colleagues abroad will be mainly oriented on establishing business contacts, looking for potential partners, and recruiting local businessmen for republic projects. The motive for selecting this model of foreign policy is to provide for the economic interests of the republic. Our goal is to ensure that the scheme—buying profitably and selling profitably—never misfires in foreign trade. This is by no means mercantilism. Under market conditions when it is necessary to count increasingly only on oneself, an effective foreign trade policy for us—in general a raw materials republic—becomes almost the only way to move ahead. In other words, the

task even becomes geopolitical in nature. And that is no exaggeration. We remember the example of Japan and other economic "giants" of the Far East—small states, sometimes diminutive—which, acting exclusively by economic methods, have achieved the kind of influence that even a victorious war rarely brings.

Returning to our own land, I note that even the rudimentary development of direct links with foreign state brings colossal benefit. How did Turkmenistan carry out trade with Iran? Goods were shipped to the center and were then forwarded to the addressee. The transport costs made this kind of trade almost prohibitive. Today we are managing without creating these difficulties, and this means that efforts can be directed not toward dealing with them but rather toward more meaningful goals. Perhaps this example is too simple, but it does convey quite accurately the state of affairs in their earlier form and in their altered form. An agreement of mutual understanding was recently signed between the Turkmenistan and Iranian ministries of foreign affairs. It was the first agreement of its kind to cover not only diplomatic contacts but also aspects of cultural, trade, and economic cooperation. Our links have been strengthened to the extent that agreement has been reached to hold consultations each quarter at ministerial level.

[Ivakhnenko] I have noticed your emphasis on Turkmenistan's foreign policy being at one with the Soviet Union's strategic activity in the world arena in general. Notwithstanding, the situation today is such that the positions of the republic and the center are sometimes in contradiction, as, for example, the conflicts with Russia, Moldova, and the Baltics. What do you think of these disputes, and to whose viewpoint are you closer?

[Kuliyev] The question is how incompatible are the market and the plan, and how incompatible is republic sovereignty with Union sovereignty? You must understand that the earlier economic links within the country have been severed, so that it turns out to be easier to establish new links abroad. This is the objective reality that will exist until the position in the country itself changes, not by command but actually. There is, however, another aspect of the problem. Yes, the viewpoint does exist that these frictions between the republic and center are the beginning of the end. But what if we look at it differently. A new state mechanism is being created in which the parts are rubbing one against the other and friction really is being created, and sometimes there are shortcomings and something "flies off," something is replaced and perfected on the run. But! this grinding-in is essential for the mechanism to be adjusted. I believe that it will be adjusted. There is simply no need to get nervous or go to extremes. The pendulum will be set and a common time will be set on the "clocks" in all the republics without having to divide them into those that are "running fast" and those that are "running slow."

[Ivakhnenko] It is people who make policy. To the point, what do you consider yourself to be, a hard man, a soft one, a radical...?

[Kuliyev] There is an old medical precept: do no harm. So I follow the principle of not worsening a situation. A person should make an in-depth study of a situation and weigh all the pros and cons before reaching a decision. And the decision that is reached should only improve the situation, or at least not make it worse. One of the guarantees of making a choice without mistakes is that the activity of a politician should pursue not his own interests but the state interests. Although if they do happen to coincide and move the state toward progress there is nothing wrong with individualism. Of course, it is the result that is important—the good of the country.

[Ivakhnenko] Could you possibly say a few words about your political views and partialities?

[Kuliyev] To put it briefly, I am a patriot. I do not think that the years since 1917 have been a void and a period of social stagnation for our country. There have been triumphs and progress and advance. Over the past decades our people, splintered into tribes, have grown stronger and shaped themselves, and acquired statehood. We have nothing of which to be ashamed in our history. So it sometimes pains me to hear our fellow countrymen vying with each other to disparage the country. If we spend our time venting our malice on the past we cannot give birth to anything good in the future.

[Ivakhnenko] You have mentioned the eternal general categories. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the best indication of a person's inner world is his human passions. What are your passions?

[Kuliyev] I love to learn languages and I try not to lose them, so I am constantly reading literature in Arabic and English. Until recently I used to read many writers—Turkmen, Russian, Soviet, foreign. But now I have stopped believing in some of them. It is very difficult, but I have become seriously disillusioned. I have said that it is painful for me when compatriots take it upon themselves to make general judgments and strike out entire epochs without looking at the essence of things. To affirm a truth without finding out what it is a major sin for writers, who are the teachers of humankind. So doubt took hold of me: Is it possible to trust works of fiction, even giving due allowance for subjectiveness?... Perhaps that is why I am now trying to read more scientific and historical studies. In other words, to dig through to the truth independently.

Nevertheless, there is one writer I still love—Hemingway.

[Ivakhnenko] What is it that you like in his work?

[Kuliyev] Finding the truth. I realize that this sounds vague, but I really like to do this. To extract information, to collect the necessary facts, to consider them and reach

some conclusions, to check them, and finally understand: This is the truth. I have found it. That is the only thing that brings satisfaction. In the grand scheme of things, the meaning of any work is the search for truth. Only this makes human life truly fulfilling.

[Ivakhnenko] So what do you not like about your work?

[Kuliyev] Being away from home, from those near and dear to me, this very painful separation from my motherland. For life is one thing, but we pay for it through our search for truth. No other price is acceptable for destiny. But today I am employed in what I like best, and I am in Turkmenistan. For me, this is happiness.

[Ivakhnenko] Your diplomatic career has been abroad. Perhaps you would reveal to TURMKENSKAYA ISKRA readers at least something of the intimacies of our diplomacy.

[Kuliyev] My work abroad has been in the Arab East. At first I dealt with matters pertaining to foreign ties in my country of sojourn, then later its domestic policy. This kind of move in diplomatic work is normal and enables the diplomat to gain a truly comprehensive vision of a country. The work is done both with sources of information and simply with people—citizens of the state from the most varied strata of society. A diplomat must know what forces are operating in the state, the mechanism used for decisionmaking, where the sympathies of the people lie. But I shall probably disappoint you when I tell you that I do not have any special professional secrets. I try to resolve any problem not by dreaming up some original method but in the way that life prompts me to do it. I always try to avoid cunning with the person with whom I am dealing. The results of tricks would be negative. In order to convince an opponent it is necessary to use not cunning but the arguments of reason.

Nevertheless, a main condition for achieving results in the work of a diplomat is also the abstract concept of love. Love for the country in which one lives, and for its people, and a desire to understand and find the "truth" of that country and bring it to one's own country.

[Ivakhnenko] During the period of stagnation your department was quite often accused of disinformation, that is, when the desired was stated as the reality. There were diplomats who did this. Did you?

[Kuliyev] No, never. I do not accept lies to the rescue, the more so since in the grand reckoning this has never saved anything. And unfortunately you are right: Workers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abroad are not always objective when providing information for the center. Putting it in the language normal for a Soviet person, they engage in "diplomatic account padding." The reason, of course, is not deliberate harm but a desire to see the country of sojourn following our policy.

I reached a clear-cut conclusion for myself. Our diplomacy has a serious defect compared to Western diplomacy. Their style is the businesslike approach. Foreign policy activity is defined by specific interests. And the ambassador himself is something like a company agent. If he provides incorrect information the company will sustain losses and contracts will be lost—the taxpayers' money will simply vanish. Who would tolerate a liar in these circumstances?

Our style, however, is romanticism. We want them to love our country and its ideology and values. And I must

admit that there have been no great changes on this plane during the years that we call the perestroyka years. "Diplomatic account padding" remains in our work.

President S.A. Niyazov attaches great importance to the republic's international policy and Turkmenistan's links abroad. This is as it should be, for a state's real independence is guaranteed both by pursuing a correct domestic policy and correct foreign policy activity. I am convinced that this attitude is now as irreversible as is the very sovereignty of our motherland.

Ethnic, Political Unrest Catalogued

PM0504153091

[Editorial Report] Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 11 of 17- 24 March 91 published on pages 8-9 a 3,000-word feature under the general headline of "A Map of Unrest in the USSR" cataloging areas of ethnic strife and conflicting territorial claims throughout the USSR. Separate articles identify and describe the main areas for such problems as the west—the Baltic republics, Belorussia, and the Ukraine—central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the Caucasus. The feature also includes four maps—one of the whole Soviet Union locating the main areas of unrest identified in the feature and more detailed maps of these. An accompanying list identifies seventy-six separate "territorial-ethnic claims and conflicts in the USSR." The feature is accompanied by an "MN Comment" by the "MN ethnic issues desk" with the rubric "How Shall We Win Through?" Its text is as follows:

This March 17 the issue of the future of the Soviet Union will be decided in a national referendum which, unfortunately, won't be able to decide the country's ethnic and territorial issues—demanding profound analysis and study—no matter which way the Soviet people vote in the coming referendum.

Among the strategies aimed at resolving ethnic issues, three demand special attention: renewal of the federation of Union Republics, dismantling of the USSR or creation of a confederation (in other words, delegating most of power to individual sovereign Republics, thus creating the Union power they actually need.

Despite apparent differences, the three alternatives have one common goal: territorial division of the USSR according to the ethnic principle. But they differ on the mode of interrelations between these components of the current Union. The principle of the ethno-territorial division of the country is taken for granted.

However, even a cursory glance at the map is enough to see that the majority of conflicts occur around ethno-territorial borders. Drawn up long ago and of practically no importance for a long time, these borders have now turned into battle lines for people of different ethnic origin. Even, perhaps, the framework of decomposition of the USSR.

But it would be impossible to put an end to the current interethnic strife by sealing regions within state borders or by changing these borders—practically all of them fail to coincide with actual ethnic distribution. It would be impossible to draw such ethnic boundaries, since no ethnic group is sufficiently compact.

Thus the USSR's ethno-territorial divisions only stimulate conflicts and hinder any kind of solution. A disintegration of the USSR along the existing borders between

the Union Republics cannot do away with the numerous territorial claims. Out of the 23 interrepublican borders, only three are not contested: Lithuanian-Latvian, Belorussian-Latvian, and Russian-Belorussian. The possibility of the USSR decomposing causes anxiety among the "non-aboriginals" who make up at least one-third of the population in any Union Republic.

On the other hand, many Union and Autonomous Republics now crave state sovereignty and can hardly be expected to agree to return to their former status.

Since decomposition of the Union is unacceptable, and preservation of the former Union structure no longer possible, there must be an urgent political move to try and reconcile common sense with the given reality of the situation—for the time being, at least.

The amended draft of the Union Treaty advanced by the Center is one such variant. Without giving a detailed analysis of this draft, I will point out its weakness: the draft stalls the development of the Republics at the current level, putting a stop to a process which has only started to evolve. I think this kills any political initiative.

An alternative solution of ethnic issues would be agreements between sovereign Republics. This process of concluding bilateral agreements, which started six months ago on the initiative of the Russian Federation, can become a feasible alternative to the Union Treaty promoted by the USSR federal authorities. The Republics' bilateral agreements (though they don't claim to offer a quick and final solution for the issues which have now accumulated) acknowledge the inviolability of the existing borders for at least several years, as well as the need to protect the interests of residents of one Republic who were born in another Republic.

This stipulation removes, to a certain extent, tensions caused by interethnic conflict and—which is the most important thing—leaves room for further improvement in relations and lays the foundation for a multipartite Union accord between individual Republics. Thus the implementation of Republics' aspirations to sovereignty would not be affected and sensitivity to any infringement of ethnic rights reduced.

A guarantee of complete national and cultural autonomy, indiscriminate private ownership of land—necessary conditions for the alleviation of ethno-territorial conflicts—are easily imaginable in such a Union.

The ethnic problem in the USSR is so poignant and involved that the search for a solution will demand immense effort and take some time. However, this process must be started now. In the quest for civilized coexistence we must make positive moves and be prepared to try other alternatives should the first steps prove to be in the wrong direction. Moscow News is open to suggestions.

KGB Failure To Explain Past Actions Decried

91UF0640A Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 8 Jan 91 p 7

[Open letter to the USSR Supreme Soviet, republic supreme soviets, local soviets, political parties, and all citizens from members of the Moscow and Leningrad public and political affairs clubs of scientists and cultural figures: "On the KGB and on Our Future"]

[Text] We see the Committee for State Security in its present form as one of the main obstacles to establishing a normal atmosphere in domestic political life. The unchangeability of its status begets uncertainty and even ambiguity in regard to democratic changes and the lack of confidence in their irreversibility. This organization still remains essentially uncontrollable and, most important, it still actually maintains its old position and views on the state of our society.

Official condemnation of the punitive activities of all organizations inevitably stops at the borderline of the Khrushchev epoch and never extends to the 1950's-1980's. It is specifically during that time, however, that the methods of the KGB and the party, the main meaning of which was to suppress by any means the democratic, nationalist, and religious movements and any freedom of thought, formed a total program that presents far more danger for society than that Stalinist-type terror which is unrealistic under today's conditions.

To this day none of the official documents and statements contain an acknowledgement that the very idea of police control over intellectual and public life, surveillance of dissidents, persecution for dissemination of one's beliefs, telephone taps, and all-out informing on others is a crime against human rights and society.

Moreover, even now the KGB still openly proclaims the position that was outlined in the 1970's and 1980's in the policy speeches of Andropov and the ideologues from his department, which maintains that any "dissent" is implanted by the Western special services with the purpose of weakening the country and society. It is very symptomatic that during the most recent times there have been increasing attempts by KGB personnel to justify their actions by saying that they acted in strict accordance with the law and in a style typical during those years for interpreting the situation, and that dissidents were judged by all legal canons. A secret service of any totalitarian society, including the Nazi regime, could have used the same excuse. But these excuses do not stand up to criticism of the substance, either! Indictments in cases of a political nature, put together by the KGB investigators, presented a knowingly false appraisal of journalistic work, works of science and fiction, diaries, and private correspondence that contained only the truth about the situation in the country and the criticism of the political system. Indisputable facts published in the extensive underground literature had been classified en masse as slander. The persecution of human rights movements, which acted strictly within

the framework of the Constitution, did not have any legal foundation and was by itself a crime. To this day, we are being told that psychiatry had not been used for political purposes, but there had been a few "individual excesses." As during Cheka [Extraordinary Commission] times, the KGB combined de facto both investigative and judicial functions, since the courts only rubber stamped the sentences prepared by the KGB and approved by the party apparatus.

We still have not heard a public condemnation of all these facts by the national leadership, the directorate of public prosecutions, or, least of all, the leadership of the KGB itself. Not a single time was there given a moral and legal assessment of the persecutions and insinuations, provocations and oppressions organized by the specially created KGB departments against our great compatriots—A.D. Sakharov and A.I. Solzhenitsin.

The bragging about meritorious services and successes in the field of fighting "anti-Soviet" activities, which is coming from the obscurantists among our political police and their stooges, looks especially disgusting today; nevertheless, we still hear these people on the radio, see them on television screens, and read about them in the newspapers. And it is an ultimate immorality when these people sit at soviet sessions—right next to their former victims—as newly elected people's deputies.

This kind of demonstration demoralizes people and brings up serious doubts in the sincerity of the national leadership.

The need for a highly professional service for combating organized crime and espionage does not justify the existence of the KGB in its present form either, since the burden of past crimes and the continuous ineptitude of the staff personnel deprive this organization of the last shadow of popular trust.

There are no guarantees that, should the political situation change, the Committee would not channel its activities along the old course. It does not depend in the least on the personal qualities of KGB personnel. By the very design of its creators, the Cheka-OGPU [Unified State Political Administration]-NKVD [Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs]-KGB cannot be anything other than a repressive and uncontrollable organization that is in a symbiotic relationship with the top party apparatus.

We are not calling for criminal prosecution of the KGB personnel; however, we believe that all facts of abuse and political persecutions must be made public, as well as the "leading" role of the party in organizing them. There should be a full exoneration of the victims of political repressions—all of them, up to current times. In doing that, we cannot rely solely on the information supplied by the general who belatedly saw the light; nor can we limit ourselves to amateurish discussions and inferences. Least of all should we trust the so-called "press service for public liaison" that has suddenly sprung from the bowels of the same KGB, or the activists from the same organization. The stubborn silence that lasted many

years and the lies about tragedies such as those that have taken place in Kuropaty, Katyn, and the Levashov wasteland are evidence that only desperate pressure by our own and the world's public forces the KGB to reveal somewhat its horrible secrets.

We believe that the national leadership should make principled decisions, the substance of which would be as follows:

1. The Committee for State Security in its present form, as an organization that has played a destructive role from its inception and throughout the decades of its existence, must be liquidated.
2. The goals and methods of KGB ideological departments and those related to them, should be branded as criminal by the USSR Supreme Soviet.
3. Any newly created organization of this kind should be devoid of a political or ideological role. Its activity should involve only a strictly limited number of tasks, established by the law and known to all citizens.
4. The Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-KGB archives, including dossiers collected by this organization on millions of Soviet people, should be declassified and made accessible to the public.

We consider this letter an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, supreme soviets of the republics, local soviets, political parties and movements, and all citizens.

[Signed] Members of the Leningradskaya Tribuna public and political affairs club of scientists and cultural figures: A.A. Anselm, doctor of physics and mathematical sciences; O.B. Bozhkov, sociologist; A.M. Vershik, doctor of physics and mathematical sciences; Ya.A. Gordin, writer; V.V. Kavtorin, writer; N.S. Katerli, writer; D.V. Lebedev, candidate of biological sciences; V.M. Paneyakh, doctor of historical sciences; D.I. Raskin, candidate of historical sciences; B.N. Strugatskiy, writer; V.M. Firsov, doctor of philosophy; V.V. Chubinskiy, doctor of historical sciences; M.M. Chulaki, writer.

Members of the Moskovskaya Tribuna public and political affairs club of scientists and cultural figures: C.I. Aleynikova-Volkenstein, bureau member, Moskovskaya Tribuna volunteer [obshchestvennyy] secretary; L.V. Altshuller, doctor of physics and mathematical sciences; Yu.N. Afanasyev, doctor of historical sciences; L.A. Akhedzhakova, distinguished artist of the RSFSR; L.M. Batkin, cultural historian; Ya.M. Berger, doctor of historical sciences; L.I. Bogoraz, member of the Helsinki Group; M.V. Volkenstein, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences; B.A. Zolotukhin, jurist; S.A. Kovalev, candidate of biological sciences; A.A. Nuykin, writer; V.D. Oskotskiy, writer; V.D. Polikarpov, doctor of historical sciences; A.I. Pristavkin, writer; V.I. Savitskiy, doctor of jurisprudence; I.A. Churikova, people's artist of the RSFSR; Yu.P. Shchekochikhin, writer; S.Yu. Yurskiy, people's artist of the USSR.

Latvian SSR Prosecutor Protests Noncooperation Order

PM1104105591 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 30 Mar 91 p 1

["To Strengthen Law and Order. Statement by the Latvian SSR Prosecutor's Office"—SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA headline]

[Text] By virtue of Order No. 268 dated 9 October 1990, Latvia's Minister of Internal Affairs A. Vaznis prohibited internal affairs organs and subdivisions from complying with procedural documents issued by organs of the USSR Prosecutor's Office unless they are ratified by the Latvian Republic's General Prosecutor or by prosecutors under his jurisdiction (Points 3, 4, and 5 of the Order). This was a gross violation of demands by the USSR Constitution, the USSR Law "On the USSR Prosecutor's Office", and the Fundamentals of Criminal Proceedings in the USSR and the union republics. For this reason, the Latvian SSR prosecutor appealed against the aforementioned order but, in view of Minister A. Vaznis' refusal to consider the appeal, a relevant application was filed with the USSR General Prosecutor.

Meanwhile, and in compliance with this order, many chiefs and other senior officials of rayon and city internal affairs departments refused to collaborate with the Latvian SSR Prosecutor's Office and even hindered it in its exercise of supervision of the compliance with laws by investigation and preliminary hearings organs, and hindered the incarceration of persons detained or arrested on legitimate grounds in remand centers or investigative detention centers.

At present the Latvian SSR Prosecutor's Office organs have a series of open criminal case files involving unsolved serious crimes. But their investigation is rendered extremely difficult due to the refusal by officials of internal affairs organs to perform the required operational work on these cases and to comply with other legitimate demands by the Latvian SSR Prosecutor's Office.

These anticonstitutional and illegal actions border on official crimes. They intensify tension in the sociopolitical situation in the republic, diminish the efficiency of the struggle against crime and render it more complex, and could lead to grave consequences. They cannot be justified by reference to the order by the Latvian minister of internal affairs which ignores the USSR Constitution and Union laws and is therefore unlawful. Therefore the Latvian SSR Prosecutor's Office is forced to issue a warning to a series of officials from internal affairs organs about the impermissibility of any breaches of the law by them, including V. Bugay, chief of Riga Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] Internal Affairs Administration.

The Latvian SSR Prosecutor's Office deems it necessary to bring to the notice of all officials of internal affairs organs and other law enforcement organs that on 15

March this year USSR Minister of Internal Affairs B. Pugo issued Order No. 87, which repealed Points 3, 4, and 5 of the Latvian Republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Order No. 268 dated 9 October 1990. At the same time, the attention of Minister of Internal Affairs A. Vaznis was drawn to the impermissibility of breaches of Union legislation.

The Latvian SSR Prosecutor's Office expresses confidence that the entire personnel of Latvia's MVD, and primarily its leader A. Vaznis, who has repeatedly called on his subordinates for strictest official discipline, will ensure unquestioning compliance with the demands of the order by the USSR minister of internal affairs. There are grounds for hope that all of Latvia's internal affairs organs and subdivisions will in the future cooperate closely with the other law enforcement organs, including the Latvian SSR Prosecutor's Office, in the struggle to strengthen legality and law and order in the republic.

[Signed] V. Daukshis, Latvian SSR prosecutor, state counselor of justice second class.

Vilnius Special Purpose Militia Claim To Serve People

LD0404182291 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] The Soviet Army occupying Vilnius television has aired a statement of the special purpose militia unit based in Vilnius. The so-called black berets adopted their statement in the last days of March and the unit itself was formed early in January at the initial stage of the partocracy putsch when a part of the special purpose police squad under the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs walked over, under the subordination of the Soviet Union's Interior Ministry. Since then, the black berets have been engaging regularly in extremely dangerous provocations in the Lithuanian capital.

The black berets assert in their statement that the Lithuanian mass media totally twist information on the activity of the special purpose militia unit which, as they put it, is to do their duty of protecting the honor and dignity of Soviet citizens. The black berets declare that no one will force them to give up the cause they have once chosen—to serve the country, Soviet Laws, and the Soviet people.

Growth in Trafficking, Drug Abuse Reported in Kazakhstan

91WD0616A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Militia Lieutenant Colonel V. Gorelkin, chief of the department for combating illegal narcotics trafficking of the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Administration for Criminal Investigations, and Militia Lieutenant Colonel V. Grigoryev, candidate of legal sciences: "Seventeen People Next to the Trunk of a Dead Man..."]

[Text] This is what official statistics say. The following number of individuals using drugs were registered in the republic: 1987—9,556, 1988—10,566, 1989—10,473, and as of the end of 1990—10,676. Out of this, minors accounted for: 1987—1,120, 1988—616, 1989—693, and 1990—696. The following numbers of drug-related criminal cases were instituted: 1987—3,394, 1988—2,442, 1989—3,576, and 1990—3,797. Out of these, the following were in conjunction with selling drugs: 1987—286, 1988—279, 1989—383, and 1990—333. The following amounts of drugs and raw materials for drugs were confiscated from the criminals by the militia employees of the republic: 1987—4,242 kilograms, 1988—4,608 kilograms, 1989—6,099 kilograms, and 1990—10,444 kilograms. All of the above are registered facts which are not in any doubt. Apparently, the number of hidden drug addicts and dope traffickers is greater by several orders of magnitude.

In our republic, hashish addiction prevails; about three-quarters of all registered consumers of narcotic substances are afflicted by it. Narcotics of opium, synthetic (homemade), and medicinal origin account for the remainder.

Who fights this evil? Mostly the militia, using in the process all methods and techniques allowed by law and executive legal norms. Other structures are in no hurry to take part in the struggle, despite belaboring the point that law-enforcement organs alone will not cope with drug addiction.

In our republic, there is one natural source of narcotic drugs. It is the Chu Valley. From there, dope creeps out not only to all of Kazakhstan, but all over the country. Correspondingly, it is there that the militia conduct the bulk of preventive measures. This is why a special unit for combating illicit narcotics trafficking has been created.

Patrols and inspection of transportation vehicles in the Chu Valley and some other locations where hemp grows extensively are stepped up during the warm season, between May and November. We have to change our tactics in the process. Previously, Operation Poppy was only conducted during the warm season, whereas by now it has become almost continuous. After all, judging from operational information, hashish lovers go to remove "treasures" from previously secreted caches in the winter.

Who are the drug dealers? Our analysis indicates that, as a rule, they have a record of various types of crime in the past. Frequently, we encounter people who want to live "the good life" doing virtually nothing. Here are several stories which are typical of this community.

O. Stepanova, S. Votnova, and N. Chupnovskaya resided in the city of Aramil, Sverdlovsk Oblast. However, they had an ingrained roaming the expanse of our country when the warm season set in. Last summer, this bunch of girls ended up in Kazakhstan. They supported themselves by fortune-telling and petty speculation...

However, it occurred to them that there was no reason for failing to succeed in the drug sale business. They expected to make a good profit. They went to neighboring Kyrgyzstan and bought wholesale several dozen kilograms of marijuana from V.M. Korzhova, resident of the village of Chaldovar. They did not pay a whole lot—about 1,500 rubles [R]. They returned to Kazakhstan and started selling. The militia caught up with them in the village of Merke. A substantial amount of money and 11.4 kilograms of marijuana were confiscated during a search. The girls are in prison for various terms...

A. Yakshin and G. Ryumin, who are still young, did not make any particular effort to get involved in socially useful labor. They changed jobs many times, but they did not stay anywhere for long periods of time. Yet, they were relentlessly driven by a desire to live affluently. They heard from a "buddy" that there was an opportunity to make a profit by selling hashish, the raw materials for which grow in abundance in the vicinity of their native Dzhambul. They picked hemp and manufactured what they wanted from it. However, they believed that selling it at their place of residence was a risky undertaking. They went to Leningrad, carrying 14 kilograms of "grass..." They immediately "blew it" and also went to prison.

Recently, I. Tochilin, a resident of the capital city, was apprehended by the criminal investigations employees of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Alma-Ata City Executive Committee. They found opium brew at his place during a search. Tochilin had to admit that he had bought the drug from K. Oteuov. They went there, and found a genuine drug den with a permanent clientele and established deliveries and sales. Citizen Oteuov will also go to prison, to be sure, after a trial. He will be tried under Article 214 of the Kazakh SSR Criminal Code for selling drugs, and under Article 215-1 of the same code for organizing and maintaining dens for the consumption of narcotic substances.

All of this spreads like a cancerous tumor. The problem has long since become social. However, they merely state the facts here. Our society coolly contemplates the situation. After all, the law-enforcement organs operate here only within the limits of their jurisdiction—they press criminal charges against drug pushers, individuals who engage in prompting the use of narcotics, and in other illegal acts associated with manufacturing, acquiring, storing, and so on. The law-enforcement organs detect and shut off the sources and channels of drug supply for illicit distribution. But there are problems even in this sphere. For example, the lack of coordination in time between searches and the filing of criminal charges is a big obstacle, as well as the absence of the so-called protocol format of the conduct of criminal cases under Article 214, Part 1 of the Kazakh SSR Criminal Code (illegal manufacturing, storage, transportation, or shipment of narcotics without intent to distribute). This format (at present, the use of it is authorized in the preliminary investigation of many types of crime) would make it possible to complete investigations of the cases of illegal narcotics trafficking rapidly and, at the same time, properly, and, correspondingly, to resolve the issue of punishing the guilty promptly.

What about those who use drugs—are they criminals or victims? Preventive treatment and education facilities ceased to exist not so long ago, pursuant to the findings of the Constitutional Oversight Committee dated 25 October 1990. What is there to replace them? After all, these unfortunates need to be cured. It is necessary to urgently expand facilities for in-patient treatment of drug addicts in the organization of the Ministry of Health, especially for the treatment of minors and women. Apparently, the issue of developing a long-range program for combating drug addiction is becoming urgent—a realistic program based on scientific calculations, on coordinating precisely the resources and funds tapped for solving this problem. This is particularly topical for the republics of Central Asia. In the absence of this, we will be sucked in by a quagmire, and in a while there will no longer be anyone to be saved.

New Broadcasting Company in Estonia

*LD2703190991 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
1800 GMT 14 Mar 91*

[Text] Opponents of the Republic of Estonia are strengthening their propaganda relations. Estonia will be given alternative television and broadcasting. Tomorrow, or the day after, test broadcasts of the (Richt) commercial studio will be on the air. Television programs are due to be broadcast in May. This is what an ETA correspondent was told by (Aleksandr Gusev), one of the founders of the (Richt) firm. (Aleksandr Gusev) emphasized that we are not talking here of the already infamous, so-called Kogan [Inter-movement] television nor of Nadezhda [pro-Soviet radio station] but of an independent and unattached advertising and information firm which has been set up on commercial principles, and is funded by enterprises. The firm is managed by a council of founders and its administration, headed by a director general, is subject this council. Radio programs will for the time being go on the air on Nadezhda wavelength, as the firm is ceasing the transmitter used by Nadezhda. Television programs will be seen on channel 40. An official permit was obtained from the All-union Gosteleradio Committee on 6 February. The (Richt) studio is located in Tallinn.

Details of Estonian TV, Radio Company Announced

*LD2803185891 Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
16 Mar 91 p1*

[Excerpts] Aleksandr Gusev said in an interview to the Baltic News Service [BSA] yesterday that the RIF [expansion unknown] television and radio company belongs to its three founders—the Communist Party of Estonia, the United Council of Work Collectives, and the Integral. According to Mr. Gusev, the founders allocated funds for the purchase of expensive and professional equipment from abroad and for building the studios.

As already announced the RIF is leasing air time from the inter-movement's Nadezhda radio station. The television station for channel 40 on the decimeter wavelength—"which is not located on the territory of any military unit"—will be used jointly by RIF and Nadezhda television stations.

Regular radio broadcasts will start from 2 April, with the television station becoming operational in May. [passage omitted: RIF not to be confused with Kogan's television]

According to Gusev, RIF does not set itself any tasks of political propaganda. Programs will be on the air in Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Russian, even though "we have big problems with finding required cadres."

The RIF television will show films and television programs bought in the West, and one will understandably have to pay for these. For this reason RIF plans to begin

coding its television signal after a few months' work. A subscriber will have to pay about 10 rubles a month.

RIF was registered as a means of mass communication by the USSR Gosteleradio Committee on 6 February. Estonian authorities, the press commission at the Supreme Soviet, and Tallinn City Council have refused to register RIF. Yet the new company will start paying taxes to the Estonian Ministry of Communications for the use of television and radio frequencies.

In a week's time a general meeting of the founders of the new firm will be called, which will appoint the company's leadership.

Riga Printing Office Resumes Work

*LD1204215191 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
1730 GMT 12 Apr 91*

[Summary] The printing office of the Preses Nams joint-stock company at Rencenu Street in Riga has begun operations. Today it printed the DIENA newspaper, and it is hoped that with one more Swedish printing line and Danish equipment soon to be installed, most of the usual publications will become available in the second half of the year.

USSR: Latvian CP To Develop Daugavpils Television

*LD1304120191 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 1930 GMT 12 Apr 91*

[Summary] The city of Daugavpils committee of the CP of Latvia has taken into its hands the development of Daugavpils television, making the enterprises and executive committee of the city fear that, for the means they have invested, they will receive information censored by CP functionaries.

Latvian Provincial TV Company Founded

*LD2003134891 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
0530 GMT 20 Mar 91*

[Text] A meeting of the council of the newly-established Latgale [province] Television Company was held in Rezekne today. The chairman of this company, (Gunars Klindzans), chairman of the Rezekne Rayon Executive Committee and deputy of the Supreme Council said that the company was established by 13 partners: the cities of Daugavpils and Rezekne, the rayons of Daugavpils, Balvi, Kraslava, Ludza, Madona, Preili, and Rezekne, the Latgale Cultural Center, the republic's television and radio broadcasting committee, a department of the Ministry of Communications, and the communications, highways, and television technical center. Initially the working capital will be 500,000 rubles [R]. Each partner's share is R25-40,000. Latvian Television has allocated the company one mobile television studio. Latgale Television anticipates a staff of 25 people. There will be two editors: for information and for cultural broadcasts.

(Gunars Klindzans) expressed hope that the first transmissions of the Latgale Television Company in the appointed rayons and towns will be seen in May.

Lithuanian President Seen Behind Media Chief's Ouster

*PM1903153391 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET
in Norwegian 16 Mar 91 p 16*

[Oyvind Johnsen report: "Landsbergis Sacks Critical Editor"]

[Excerpts] The Lithuanian Government is behind the dismissal of the independent chief editor, Rolandas Barysas, of the state-owned news agency ELTA. This was confirmed to ARBEIDERBLADET by Lithuanian parliament press spokesman Audrius Azubalis by telephone from Vilnius yesterday. Azubalis also confirmed that it was "leading politicians" who demanded that he be sacked. [passage omitted]

"The decision was actually made by Prime Minister Simenas on 27 February on the government's behalf. There had been complaints about Barysas from leading politicians. They took the view that he was not working appropriately," Azubalis told ARBEIDERBLADET.

[Johnsen] Which politicians complained about Barysas?

[Azubalis] I cannot comment on that.

[Johnsen] Barysas says that he was sacked because he engages in independent journalism, notably in relation to President Landsbergis and the government.

[Azubalis] That is his view, and I cannot comment on that either.

[Johnsen] Do you see a danger to freedom of speech in the fact of the government's dismissing the head of a news agency?

"It is natural for a government to replace ministers and other leaders," press spokesman Azubalis said.

The fact that it is the government which sacked Barysas means that President Landsbergis is behind it. Prime Minister Albertas Simenas, who took office on 10 January, has, as it were, undermined the significance of the office since his predecessor, Kazimiera Prunskiene, resigned in protest at the right-wing nationalism in the circles around Landsbergis.

It was NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA which yesterday reported the dismissal of Barysas and his deputy at ELTA, Vilius Karaliauskas. Karaliauskas is deputy chairman of the Lithuanian journalists union. Both received their letters of dismissal on 8 March and had clearly not been informed of the government decision of 27 February.

The reasons given for the dismissal are said to have been that Barysas was trained in Moscow and that his father was a communist, and that a Barysas interview with

former Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene upset the circle around Landsbergis. Barysas' independent journalism vis-a-vis the circle around Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis is also said to have been a contributory factor. [passage omitted]

"The dismissal came as a surprise, and I am very disappointed," Barysas told NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA on the telephone from Vilnius.

"Even though there have been strong reactions against my dismissal from press circles here, I do not think that the decision will be reversed. Those who made it are not in the habit on going back on what they have decided. As far as I know the decision was made at the highest level," Barysas said.

He thinks that the matter will make the already strained relations between the authorities and the majority of journalists in Lithuania worse.

Lithuania Survey of Media Popularity

LD0703181491

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuania at 0905 GMT on 7 March carries a five-minute recording of an interview conducted by reporter Antanas Kybartas, with Rasa Alisauskiene, head of the sociology department at Vilnius University. Alisauskiene says that the objective of the latest public opinion poll was to establish which sources of information people use, which of those sources they regard as most reliable, and where people receive information about Lithuania and foreign countries. She continues: "We established that Lithuanian Radio is the most popular source of information, since it is the most widely used: About 97 percent of the inhabitants of Lithuania listen to Lithuanian Radio."

On television Alisauskiene says that it too is popular, although Lithuanian TV cannot be seen on the entire territory of the republic. She says that "almost everyone in the republic watches programs from Kaunas TV studio, and Vilnius residents watch TV programs from the Lithuanian parliament studio."

She continues: Among foreign radio stations the Voice of America is the most popular because its programs include not only international news but also assessments of events in the Baltic states and the Soviet Union by Western politicians. Other popular foreign radio stations are Radio Free Europe in Lithuania and Radio Freedom Russian programmes.

The press published by the Lithuanian CPSU organisation is the least popular, she adds. Only three-four percent of the population listen to Radio Sovietskaya Litva programs broadcast from the occupied Lithuanian Radio and TV, since people regard these programs as unobjective. Special attention in the poll was given to areas of the republic where the majority of residents speak Russian or Polish.

During its regularly scheduled 1105 GMT press review, Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian reports the following figures on Lithuanians' use of media sources during the January unrest: For 91 percent of Lithuanians polled, the main news source was Radio of Independent Lithuania; for 86 percent it was the Lithuanian press and Kaunas Television; among Russians, 90 percent gave priority to the programs of central television, 60 percent to the Lithuanian press, and 53 percent to Soviet radio; and among Poles, 77 percent regard programs of Central Soviet television as most reliable; 66 percent favor Polish television, and 59 percent the Lithuanian press.

Sweden: Fired Newsman Sees Growing Curbs on Lithuanian Media

*PM0704182591 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 4 Apr 91 p 11*

[Report on undated Stockholm interview with former ELTA deputy chief Vilius Kavaliauskas by Ingvar Oja: "Censorship Threatens in Lithuania"]

[Text] The leadership of the state news agency is suddenly fired with the explanation that the "government's information bureau is working badly." A few weeks later a journalist on an independent newspaper is sentenced to one year in prison after using excessive language in accusing a member of parliament of plagiarism.

All this happened recently in Lithuania, a country struggling for to attain national freedom and break with the Soviet empire with the admiring support of the rest of the world.

"I am shocked by the sentence and worried by the new leaders' open campaign against free speech," said Vilius Kavaliauskas, the dismissed deputy chief of the ELTA news agency, who is also deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Journalists Association.

Kavaliauskas, who recently visited Sweden and DAGENS NYHETER to study in greater detail how free media work, has long experience of journalism in the party-controlled press. He has worked for a newspaper in Vilnius for over a decade. In the glasnost era he has also been a correspondent in New York for a liberal weekly in Moscow. He knows how a free press functions and that is why he views developments in his homeland with growing concern.

"There are even influential politicians who today are talking openly about introducing censorship. They take the view that the country finds itself in a state of war and that it is necessary therefore to limit the freedom of the press. If this becomes a reality the political leadership in the country will have begun to apply the old Bolshevik methods," Kavaliauskas said, adding after a short pause:

"The Lithuanian press really is under intense cross fire at the moment."

Kavaliauskas thinks that the one-year sentence (the prosecutor had only pressed for a fine of 200 rubles) is intended as a warning to other journalists "not to go too far." There is no longer any official censorship, but in many cases self-censorship can be more devastating for a free press than censorship directives from the authorities.

There has been strong criticism of the Lithuanian press from political circles for poking its nose all too intrusively into a new developing privilege system. For example, many journalists have revealed in their articles the bargaining for perks for the "new nomenklatura" at closed parliamentary sessions.

"Actually there are more important things to debate in parliament than the question of the distribution of cars and apartments to the members of parliament," Kavaliauskas said.

Political control over the broadcast media in Lithuania is considerable and it is becoming increasingly strict. According to Kavaliauskas, there is already a blacklist of media workers who are not allowed to appear on television. Thus a parliamentary committee controls not only the content of the news but also who is allowed to present the news.

The new political leadership also considers that the state news agency should function exclusively as an information agency for the government. One of the principal reasons why ELTA's top management was fired was precisely that the agency was trying to work as a news distributor independent of the state. A new chief, schooled in the old system and at the old party schools for journalism, has been appointed in their place. The chief who was fired was considered to be a journalist with integrity.

Kavaliauskas and the fired chief are going to start a completely new independent news agency. And they will have most of the most prominent journalists behind them.

"This is a tragedy for a news agency which was founded seven decades ago. It will be turned into a loss-making concern which simply distributes information from the government's offices. The newspapers which hitherto have subscribed to our services and made ELTA a profit-making concern will also abandon ELTA."

The media in Lithuania do not only have to defend themselves against political pressures. They also have to "start over" in the purely technical field. The Soviet military is still occupying all important media buildings. That is why Kavaliauskas has appealed in Stockholm and in Arhus in Denmark for material help from Nordic colleagues.

However, moral support is just as important. And Kavaliauskas said emphatically:

"A free press is one of the cornerstones of a democracy, and Nordic politicians should be constantly asking our

leaders what sort of national freedom they want in Lithuania. Nordic politicians must continually explain what normal political strife means and what relationship a free press has to those in power."

Profile of Vilniaus Varpas Private Radio Station

*LD1903232491 Vilnius International Service in English
2300 GMT 18 Mar 91*

[From the DX Program]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] [passage omitted] Last time I told you about one of the four existing non-governmental licensed radio stations in Lithuania, Radio Centras. Today I will present another one, Vilniaus Varpas, or The Bell of Vilnius. It is a private commercial radio station oriented towards cultural programs. I asked its owner, Mr (?Gestuzhas Sakalauskas) to tell me more about the early days of the station:

[Begin (?Sakalauskas) recording in Lithuanian with superimposed English translation] The idea of opening an independent radio station came at the beginning of last year when I was still working at the Lithuanian radio and tv. I found two more like-minded people also among employees of the Lithuanian Radio and Television. The work was very hard due to lack of corresponding laws in Lithuania. On the other hand we were waiting for the election of the new director general of the Lithuanian radio and television to have somebody to negotiate with because we intended to be part of the Lithuanian Radio and TV [LRT]. So the practical steps were undertaken in July only. We tried to obtain a portion of the air time at night and produced a program slot between 1 and 6 am local time, because there were quite a few LRT editors wishing to work at night without being paid. But we were told by the LRT management that the funds for the night service would be allocated in the future and that there was no problem with editors unwilling to work. So we decided upon another time then, namely the time on the second home service program between 10 am and 6 pm local time on working days when the Second Program was simply relaying the First Program. In September the Radio and TV Board of Lithuania gave its approval to this plan and on 7 September the Lithuanian Press Control Agency issued the licence. [end recording]

[Announcer] Vilniaus Varpas is a private enterprise owned by (?Gestuzhas Sakalauskas) so according to the Lithuanian laws its full name is (?Gestuzhas Sakalauskas) Radiofonos Vilniaus Varpas. The word radiofonos can be translated as a radio broadcasting station. It was used by the Lithuanian radio before World War Two and (?Gestuzhas Sakalauskas) says even if the station's name changes this old Lithuanian word will remain for ever. It took several months for the station to prepare for broadcasting. Vilniaus Varpas was scheduled to go on the air on 14 January using the studio and editorial room located at the main studio complex of the Lithuanian Radio at 49 Kanarskis Street, but the Soviet military action only a day before destroyed these plans. Much like

Radio Centras, Vilniaus Varpas found a small studio elsewhere in Vilnius and borrowed equipment. Although with a delay it started broadcasting on the frequencies of the second home service program on 29 January.

Its program are now on the air daily from 12 to 19 hours UTC on 1107 and 1134 kHz, plus four FM frequencies across the country. The total transmitter power on AM is 215 kw. Vilniaus Varpas begins its programs with the opening signal which includes the wailing of a wolf and some listeners have even nicknamed the station the voice of the wolf. The wolf and his wailing played an important role in the history of Vilnius. It was a huge iron wolf which, according to a legend, stood on a hill wailing and showing the place where Vilnius had to be built to the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas. This legend is very symbolic to Vilniaus Varpas because its programs are culture-oriented and by saying culture I mean not general cultural issues, but the heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the state that existed in the Middle Ages. You will hear more about the programming of the Vilniaus Varpas in the next edition of our DX program, but now I would like to spell the name of this station to those of you who want to write it down, BBC Monitoring Service, for example. It's V,i,l,n,i,a,u,s, V,a,r,p,a,s. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Pressmen Urge Resistance to Government Monopoly

*PM0504081791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Sergey Tsikora report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Way To Uphold Glasnost"]

[Text] The collectives of seven editorial offices have urged their colleagues to set up a Ukrainian democratic press association.

The published "statement of the seven" says that "conservative and edict-based bureaucratic structures have launched a resolute attack on the advocates of democratic changes." Today glasnost is above all suffering from "defamation, mass attack, and unprecedented hounding and censure from conservative forces." Blatant attempts are made to economically ruin publications that uphold pluralism of opinion and the principles of democracy. The monster government departments' monopoly on paper, printing, and the distribution and delivery of newspapers and magazines in practice makes editorial offices wholly dependent on the attitude and orientation of the leaders of those structures, the editorial collectives' statement goes on to say.

The journalists involved in creating a "voluntary non-governmental and nonparty organization with the right of legislative initiative—the Association of the Democratic Press of the Ukraine—want to cast off this yoke. The statement says that "concerting and coordinating the efforts of the creative collectives of editorial offices for the free, independent, and truthful expression of reality, putting into practice the ideas enshrined in the

declaration on the Ukraine's state sovereignty, the moral, material, financial, and social protection of publications and journalists belonging to the association, particularly during the formation of market relations, and providing assistance to journalists subject to politically motivated hounding and persecution" are the association's objectives. For this the association is establishing a special fund. It is intended that membership of the association be mainly collective, with the right to belong at the same time to creative unions and other public organizations.

Kazakh Commerical Television Association Formed

LD0904154391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1000 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] A commercial television and radio broadcasting association of Kazakhstan has been set up in Alma-Ata. About 40 of the republic's organizations make up its founders. The new association has two presidents: the well-known Kazakh and Soviet writer Anuar Alimzhanov and the republican Deputy Minister of Communications (Aldar Umguzhbayev).

Team in Chernobyl 'Sarcophagus' Continues Work*91WN0356A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 2*

[M. Yurchenko report: "The Stalkers of Chernobyl: A Unique Team Is Working in the Sarcophagus of the Damaged Nuclear Power Station"]

[Text] Kharkov—In all ages it has been considered sacrilege to disturb the calm of a sarcophagus. In this sarcophagus, we live, people come here everyday... But, you ask, why? The question is of concern not only for those who work there, but, let us admit it, for ourselves: Does this not mean that they are protecting us against some kind of threat?

Those traveling with me in the sleeping compartment were shy.

"So, lad, are you radioactive?"

Kobzar dissuaded him of this. But the bookkeeper hurriedly moved off to another compartment, and the officer spent the entire night smoking in the distant lobby. "Avoiding me like a leper." But there were no insults. "Chernobyl" is something cursed for people. Henceforth I decided not to be so frank.

In the morning the express train left from Kiev bound for Kharkov. For the past three-and-a-half years Yu. Kobzar has been traveling home from his work by train. For home leave. Each time he has brought with him a video cassette—a copy of the footage shot in the sarcophagus. Finally he showed his wife, Alesa, what his job was. She could also make no sense of why he was putting himself at risk.

And indeed, who does? Along with the Kobzar couple I watched the film and listened to the commentaries and the responses to my prejudiced questions. And all for just one purpose, namely, to find proof that the presence of people in the Chernobyl sarcophagus is at a minimum unnecessary.

The film does not impress the admirers of heart-piercing subjects. Nor can one find any artistic merit in it. It is purely technical footage. Data from a unique video reconnaissance, if you will.

...In the darkness of the sarcophagus there is uniform ruin. Fragments from a panorama of the chaos that has reigned since the explosion. People can sometimes be seen in silver protective suits and respirators, with their boots and helmets. They move about hurriedly. But only fast enough not to stumble and break their necks. Their entire route is a fight to get through the obstructions...

And it is boring to watch if you are not aware that the drama of the film lies in the fact that the investigators are operating in a zone of hard radiation.

"There, that is me—a 'fiver'—five roentgens per hour. Two steps away the level is 50. Below, where the light is shining, it is 400..."

There is a heap of fuel rods there—the heat-emitting elements of the destroyed reactor. They contain uranium dioxide. The position of the fuel rods must be recorded. And so Yuriy stopped taking the pictures.

"So perhaps your fellow travelers on the train had no cause for apprehension?"

"Of course not. Just look at a school physics textbook: gamma radiation—hard radiation—passes right through. But it does not 'settle' in the body. With the dust it is more complicated. God forbid it should be brought outside the sarcophagus, even less breathed. But the suits and respirators prevent that. They are like disposable syringes. You come back from a trek, take them off, and dump them with the radioactive waste. Then you take a shower. Along the road to the apartments in Chernobyl there is cascade of dosimeter monitors. So that by the time you get back 'home' you are 'clean.'"

"Always?"

"It does happen that we carry in 'contraband.' When this happens a dosimeter team goes through our quarters while we are at work. Once I returned home and there was a hole the size of a frying pan in the upholstery of the sofa. It was later explained that they had found a dust particle. Sometimes they have to throw out the furniture and clothing and footwear..."

"Yura, why do you go into the sarcophagus? They have covered the ruins, why not let them 'burn themselves out?'"

"Can we really talk about radiation safety without knowing where the sources of radiation are and what is happening to the residues of the construction structures? Our special comprehensive expedition from the Institute of Nuclear Physics imeni Kurchatov was set up in order to know this, and also in order to conduct scientific experiments in the sarcophagus."

The volcanic explosion hurled only four percent of the radioactive material out of the reactor. About 170 tons remain beneath the roof of the "cover" unit. That is what the sarcophagus is officially called.

Researchers are suggesting that these tons are mainly in the space beneath the reactor. In order to find them it is necessary to feel one's way through passageways and corridors and holes, and drill through the reinforced concrete walls of the containment section and the concrete poured into the premises...

"Yura, last summer there were rumors that there had been a radioactive excursion in the No. 4 unit."

"Crazy. Under present conditions a spontaneous chain reaction is impossible. True, there was an insignificant increase in the flow of particles but it was immediately 'suppressed' by a special damping compound... As always, the rumors made a mountain out of a molehill."

The structures used to build the sarcophagus are a subject of special concern for the watchers. They are being destroyed here particularly quickly by time, moisture, and radiation. The film showed numerous cracks in the load-bearing structures. In plain language, they are holding up the slabs of the ceiling and the rubble from them. One of the mysteries of the explosion is the slab beneath the reactor, the so-called "E" scheme. Here it has been named Elena. The "girl" weighs 3,000 tons. The explosion tossed it up in an inconceivable way, turning it vertical. However, it did not fall back; it froze in what is a totally unimaginable way for it, resting on its edges. It has nothing beneath it to support it. What is holding it? And how reliably? How long will it hang there? It still has not been possible to clarify this.

In addition, thousands of tons of sand thrown from helicopters when the fire was being extinguished, are pressing down on the structures. And around that are ground cement and concrete. If there is a collapse, the dust will rise in columns.

The sarcophagus is far from being hermetically sealed. The area of the walls and roof is hundreds of square meters, and the film recorded this many times. How much radioactive dust is being pushed out by drafts? In which direction, and what will be the wind velocity at the moment of a buildup of dust? And what will be the consequence?

Preventive measures? Special teams are pouring concrete beneath the sinking structures. Sometimes the men themselves place rocks or logs beneath them. A dust-suppression system has been installed in the sarcophagus. From time to time a binding agent is poured into the ruins. But this does not provide a 100-percent guarantee of safety. The "skin" soon becomes brittle and crumbles. In addition, the system is switched on by pushing a button. Will anyone be close by when it is needed?

It is also necessary to make provision for the improbable—an earthquake. Although, why improbable? Let me remind you of the latest jolt in Romania and the wave that rolled into the Ukraine. Can there be any doubt that even a small earthquake will lead to movement of the rubble? And will the sarcophagus withstand it?

In short, the sarcophagus must be closely watched by many eyes. And not just the ruins.

Within the ruins there are plutonium, uranium, cesium, strontium. Natural decay of the plutonium has produced americium-241. This is a very powerful carcinogen that is mobile and soluble, and so even five years after the explosion, extreme and unremitting attention must be paid to it.

There has been another discovery. Yellow crystals of unearthly beauty have been found—uranium carbon compounds. They dissolve readily (there is plenty of water in the sarcophagus) and migrate into the space beneath the reactor and accumulate there. And what will be the

consequences of the formation of these deposits? No exhaustive answers have yet been found for these questions.

Well, what about robots? There they are, in the film. Let them take on the function of observers. A mobile robot the size of large toy, something like the lunokhod vehicle, crawls along the passageway toward a wall and then uncovers a drill and starts to bore into the concrete wall...

"I hope the designers will not be annoyed," is Yu. Kobzar's comment. "But all of this is nothing more than odd things made by the young technicians club. They are unsuitable for serious work. A more or less flat area within the sarcophagus is required to start the robot operating, and there are not many such areas there. The machine cannot move around obstructions independently. And in fact, it never has been used. The most efficient all-terrain vehicle here is man, and the best tool is his hands."

Yes, without people, nothing would get done here. But another question arises: Will there be a change of shift? The researchers at Chernobyl work right there in the sarcophagus. Three to five years in that hell. There are not many of them.

About 200 people are allowed to enter the sarcophagus. However, the radioactive ruins are the main place of work only for the men from the laboratory where they are studying the fuel and making video observations. How much radiation they have "taken in the chest," as they say here, can only be guessed.

"But it is inadvisable to replace us," Yuriy explains. "We know by heart all the pathways and exits, how much each heap and obstruction and crack 'glows.' We have acquired the skill of hiding ourselves from the strong radiation. Sometimes the radiation reading on the dosimeters goes off the scale, but we can tell by the speed with which the needle is deflected the degree of danger, and have learned how to react. If new people are brought in they will 'accumulate' a maximum dose in the first days."

"But each of you has the right to leave this work, even demand that you be released, is this not so?"

"Of course. But we do not want to. It is both simple and complicated to explain why. The sarcophagus has a kind of attraction that is almost a sickness. I admit that I am a sober-thinking person; the word 'romantic' irritates me, so you must not take what I say as a display of emotion. The sarcophagus is a special planet inhabited by special people. There, even the air is different. In the chaos of its ruins it has its own law-governed patterns, its own fascination. We are doing work that is perhaps unique in the world, in history.

"In order to understand all this it is necessary to be inside our skins. I cannot imagine returning to my previous post at the physicochemical institute, carrying

paper around and wearing out the soles of my shoes walking about corridors. What will replace the feeling that I get when I have found a crystal that grows only under conditions of radiation? Do you remember how in the Disney cartoons a stream of water flowing from a faucet used to freeze? The only other place that can happen is perhaps in the sarcophagus: lava that had flowed out of the mouths of pipes that for some reason had not melted. There are secrets and mysteries here..."

"Forgive me, Yuriy, but is all this worth your health? Or is the pay so good that you don't give a damn for anything else in the world?"

"I do not know whether you could call pay of R1,000 a reason for us. We get the same as those who are working just 20 versts away from the sarcophagus—in Chernobyl. According to our yardstick, Chernobyl is a clean zone... The difference in recompense is only that on days when we work in the No. 4 unit, they give us coupons for free food up to the value of 75 kopeks..."

"Yuriy, I do not doubt that the radiation safety rules establish a maximum permissible norm for both total and one-time radiation doses. Do you manage to 'stay inside them?'"

"Not always. Sometimes we receive much more. During a recent sortie into the reactor shaft—the first—we 'took' about seven or eight times the annual norm."

"When you descended could you foresee that something like that might happen?"

"When we are working out a route we always try to move in such a way as to avoid excess doses. We are not crazy. However, it is impossible to foresee everything. Sometimes we deliberately stay in a field of strong radiation for a few extra seconds if we need to catch an important detail on film."

"And sometimes quite unexpected situations arise. We were drilling in a concrete wall in a place not yet well known. We were trying to retrieve the drill from the hole but it would not budge. We jerked it a little harder. A piece of a fuel element was dragged through along with the bit, right there at our feet. The needles on the dosimeters leapt to the right."

"A decision had to be made instantly. I stood in a circle of drillers and 'partisans' (that is what the old hands at the sarcophagus call the clean-up people enlisted by the military recruitment office). It would have been possible, of course, for everyone to form a chain and pass the fragment along, as if on a conveyor belt, and remove it to a distance. But the boys are not pledged to risk themselves, and I must not expose them to radiation. I did something else. I threw the fragment into a bucket, picked it up by the handle, and ran off to throw it into the pile of fuel elements. I 'took' a smaller dose than than all of us together may have 'taken'..."

How is it possible to make provision for that kind of event in the technical safety rules?

"That must have been terrible."

"It was, of course. But that is fear, not radiophobia. We do not suffer from that. Perhaps because we are 'restored' quite quickly. Three to five days, a week maximum, and we are back on form. In any event, we do not have fainting fits and weakness and things like that."

"How you feel is one thing, an objective medical examination is another. What do the analyses show?"

"The situation is almost comical. If you judge from the analyses of the blood of Georgiy Ibraimov (and he has walked around inside the sarcophagus and has been in the 'hottest' places probably more often than the others), he has received no more than 10 roentgens. Konstantin Checherov's dosimeter card shows zero. Our physician, doctor of biological sciences Nadezhda Alekseyevna Panchenko, says that she would be bold enough to make this diagnosis of each of us: healthy..."

"If we become too frightened the scientific research in which, without exaggeration, the whole world has an interest, will come to a halt... We ourselves, and I emphasize this, deliberately take the risk, but we are able to do so. Life is dear to us."

Somehow some American colleagues were visiting the "stalkers." They had taken part in the cleanup following the Three Mile Island accident. It is known from the press that the scale and consequences of that accident bear no comparison with those at Chernobyl. The Americans told us that detailed reports on each of them were presented on coast-to-coast television in the United States as if they were heroes. But who in the Union knows about our guys working in the darkness of the sarcophagus?

And so I consider it necessary to name them. They are: Muscovites Konstantin Checherov and Georgiy Ibraimov, Igor Mikhaylov, Aleksey Nenaglyadov, Sergey Dzhilovyan, Arsen Pavliashvili from Ordzhonikidze, Sergey Koshelev from Leningrad Oblast, and Yuriy Kobzar from Kharkov.

Theories About May 1990 White Sea Contamination Examined

91WN0325A Moscow *TEKHNICA - MOLODEZHI* in Russian No 12, Dec 90 pp 2-5

[Article by Larisa Mironova: "There Are No Guilty Parties, so the Matter Is Ended?"]

[Text] The behavior of animal life in Dvinskaya Guba leads one to think about mercury madness!

Black waters of the White Sea!

The magnitude of the ecological tragedy in Dvinskaya Guba is enormous!

Did the military drop mustard-gas containers into the sea?

There is an ecological battle in the White Sea!

Such headlines appeared in the press after the massive deaths of starfish in the White Sea in May of this year. For several days local residents were afraid to eat fish and spoke about infected water not only in Dvinskiy Zaliv but also in the Northern Dvina.

According to certain publications the number of dead starfish was several billion! (Let us note that this amount could form a 15- to 20- centimeter layer over a 30-kilometer strip of the shore.) Moreover, reports have appeared that, in addition to them, fish, birds, and mammals were dying....Simultaneously, the collection of stories about the causes of the ecological catastrophe is growing. The stories have given birth to rumors, and the rumors have become stories. Thus, at the end of July the newspaper PRAVDA SEVERA, in response to the previous reports about ecological damage, published a letter by I. Ladkin in which he said that he saw a secret map of one of Severodvinsk's fire departments. The sinister trefoil "Careful: Radiation!" was stamped on the water area of the White Sea. It was at the location of the Kandalakshskaya depression (not far from the Solovetskiy Archipelago). In the author's opinion this is a burial place for radioactive waste.

Early in August I went to visit a remote coastal hamlet. I asked the local women: Had they heard about dead starfish? Of course they had heard. What did they die of? Who knows....Perhaps from the fresh water, perhaps from chemicals. What chemicals? From the island where oilfield workers are drilling....But the fresh water? It happens in springtime, when the rivers are high and they dilute the seawater. The starfish dislike this very much. And so they die.

At Arkhangelsk I talked with Valentina Volykhina, a member of the oblast's Committee for Environmental Protection. But this body's staff worker, who logically should have the information at her disposal about who is guilty for the starfish deaths, told me no more than the hamlet's residents.

"If only we knew what to look for! Everything in the world has been looked into already! We will take any story into consideration. But at present there is nothing...."

Let us return, however, to the cases. On 10 May large amounts of dead invertebrates were washed up by the surf on a section of the Summer Shore (as they call the southern coast of Dvinskaya Guba): starfish, crabs, and mussels. One of the first inspections of it was made 18 May in the area between the Solza and Syuzma rivers, and two types of starfish were noted: red asterias (99 percent) and bloody starfish (one percent). The total number was about 4 million. Dead crabs also were found in the garlands of seaweed washed up.

Storms which occurred late in May and at the start of June threw up on the shore two more lots of dead animal life: about 2 million starfish and 10,000 each of crabs and mussels. Thus, fewer than 6 million dead specimens were found on 65 miles of shoreline.

Back on 12 May a special commission had been created under the chairman of the oblast's Environmental Protection Committee, Vasilii Sysoyev. It was unable to determine the causes of the occurrences—the committee had not only no special resources of any kind but not even elementary supplies and technical equipment. There were only some 10 workers prepared to rush into the area of a disaster. Therefore, they did the only thing possible—they sent collected samples out for analyses. (These were studied at Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.)

Only a month has passed since the interagency government commission of the Russian Federation began its work. A. Vlasov, the retired chairman of the republic's interagency government commission, signed the decision to create it. Why so late? The fact is that the Committee for Protection of the Environment is not empowered to establish a sufficiently representative commission. And without it, in turn, you will not attract the necessary experts to the NII's [scientific-research institutes'] work. At first the committee had to get to the heart of the matter with its own personnel, to report to higher authority, and to wait for an answer....

Upon starting work, the commission sent the newly acquired specimens to various institutes throughout the whole country. Zoologists, physiologists, geneticists, virusologists, microbiologists, epidemiologists, veterinarians, toxicologists and oceanologists set to work....An analysis of more than 10 stories started. What provoked such an abundance? Was it the striving of various institutions and enterprises to express their own point of view, in order to help to establish a cause for what had happened, or a desire to deflect suspicion from themselves? Who was prepared to guarantee that his enterprise does not cause open or concealed damage to the environment? Particular individuals also made their own small contribution to the number of stories. How is one to get to the heart of the matter, which of them actually saw something, and who falsified in order to glorify themselves....

According to the data of the staff workers of two biological stations located on the White Sea coast, no symptoms of any kind of further mass deaths of animal life were observed after 8 June, and even the isolated washing up of dead starfish had ceased. And at the end of June staff workers of the Leningrad Zoological Institute reported that the seabed that is adjacent to the Summer Shore had already been inhabited by young starfish at an average density of 50 specimens per square kilometer (usually there are up to 100 or more). That means that a new generation had appeared, or the killing affected primarily grown specimens.

We had just begun to feel relieved with regard to the starfish when suddenly dead seals were observed on the Mudyug shore. Immediately thereafter 10 dead white whales (large sea mammals of the dolphin family, up to six meters long and weighing up to 1.5 tons) appeared on the shoreline. And although the deaths of these and other creatures is observed every year, the instances here with

unexplained causes were put into the piggy bank of the starfish drama (not without the help of journalists).

When the interagency commission undertook a scrupulous examination of the stories, only six proved to be worthy of attention: 1. The springtime freshening of the water in Dvinskiy Zaliv. 2. The influence of industrial effluents from enterprises in coastal cities. 3. Increased radiation. 4. The effect of rocket-fuel components dumped during emergency situations. 5. Pollution by military war gases (OV's), particularly mustard gas and other highly toxic compounds. 6. Possible discharges of toxic substances of some kind from foreign ships.

Story 1. In May a storm wave can deposit many starfish at the mouth of the Northern Dvina, where they die. Then the river flow can carry them away, back to the sea, and the surf throws them up on the Summer Shore. Such a thing happens here, but the number of starfish that get into this predicament usually has not exceeded a few thousand.

As for the spring freshening of Dvinskaya Bay because of high water, according to Sevgidromet data, the water's surface salinity in the region of the Unskiy beacon (the closest point of observations to the site of the death of the animal life) had not been critical. In April it held at the 20-27 percent level, in May at the 18-25 percent level. Only in isolated places of the water area adjacent to Krasnaya Gora and the villages of Nenoksa and Severodvinsk was it noted at 10.7 percent, 10.9-12.3 percent, and 5.8-10.7 percent, respectively. In the sea portions of the Summer Shore, the salinity did not fall below 13 percent, the threshold for their survival.

The commission came to the conclusion that a natural process was not responsible for the death of the starfish.

Story 2. We note, before analyzing it—the White Sea's property of stable stratification. There is almost no mixing of the heavy, cold waters of the Barents Sea, with their high salinity, with the fresher waters of the White Sea proper.

Fresh water, polluted by effluents of industrial enterprises of Arkhangelsk and Severodvinsk, falls into Dvinskiy Zaliv. Already bottom sections with increased contents of phosphorus, sulfur, iron, and manganese—elements that reflect manmade pollution—have been isolated. The bacteriocidal properties of the sea water in these regions have been destroyed—in the soil, microflora not characteristic of it is flourishing.

In April 1990 unpurified water leaked into the Kudma River after an accident at the purification plant of one of Severodvinsk's enterprises. Were they not the cause of the starfish's death? No, it turned out—an analysis of the active silt on the path of the effluents did not record substantial toxic effects.

Meanwhile, the Azov NII for Fisheries reported the presence of polychloridephenyl (a byproduct in making pulp) in all the samples sent to it, in concentrations that

did not present a danger for starfish life. True, dioxin—a very toxic substance that breaks down slowly and is capable of causing the large-scale prolonged death of animal life—can be synthesized in that environment. However, the tragedy in May testifies to the short-term effects of toxins. The conclusion: the probability that the polychloridephenyl or dioxin killed the starfish is small.

According to the testimony of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Veterinary Laboratory, the samples also contained heavy metals and petroleum products, but again within the PDK—the maximum permissible concentration. (All-powerful agencies, in introducing one PDK or another, do not notify nature. Nature does not figure out that since yesterday such an amount of pollution is not harmful.)

Story 3. Here the commission coped with the matter rapidly. Data of the Arctic Fisheries Institute indicated that in all sections where starfish died the radioactive background did not exceed the norm (four-eleven microroentgens/hour).

Story 4. On 7 December 1989, about 100 kilometers northwest of Severodvinsk, a submarine, with the authorization of higher command, accidentally spilled one of the rocket-fuel components. It was hypothesized that organic nitrous compounds could have fallen into the sea along with nitric acid. But analyses of water samples and of marine soil conducted by the Zoological Institute of AN SSSR [USSR Academy of Sciences], and also by the State Institute for Applied Chemistry, did not establish the presence of these substances. And other rocket-fuel components were not observed.

True, the cases of the accidental dropping of two rockets into the White Sea water areas in April and June 1990 add to this story. One of the military units was testing flying equipment which, as they say in such instances, did not reach the prescribed points. The first rocket went to a depth of 215 meters with 166 kilograms of T-6 fuel, the second to a depth of 12 meters with 437 kilograms of fuel remaining. According to the assurances of the military unit's deputy commander, V. V. Kupriyanov, T-6 is a highly refined kerosene with antiwear and antioxidant (ionol) additives. The head of the laboratory of the Leningrad Institute for the National Economy, B. M. Laskin, confirmed that the additives are nontoxic.

Another unit suspected of poisoning the sea with petroleum products responded to an inquiry with the reply that it had not discharged into the sea in the first half of the year any petroleum products, rocket-fuel components, or other chemical substances.

Does not the simplicity of developing the story astonish one? One asks oneself the question—is there a guilty party? And of course the natural answer is recorded—there is not! And not a word about the commission's analysis of all the necessary documents of military units? And indeed, with our degree of secrecy, it is completely possible to give out black or white calmly, as one desires, and then simply to "liquidate" the compromising

papers. Such things occur—and not just in “secret” offices....But the commission “closed” this story.

Story 5. At first the Arkhangelsk Fishing Combine workers panicked: animal life had been poisoned by military OV's! It happened that right at the time of the death of the starfish, the fishing combine was conducting a civil defense exercise. It was decided that, for training purposes, it would inquire into the mustard-gas content of the fish and starfish caught at the Summer Shore. To the astonishment of those being trained, almost all of them gave a positive reaction to sulfur-containing mustard gas. Without any kind of additional checking, story No 5 “went on a spree” in the pages of the press.

In about a month, at the request of the fishing combine, professional analyses for mustard gas were made for four types of fish (smelt, herring, cod and flounder), starfish, mussels and laminaria which were collected at the Summer Shore from 23 May through 8 June. In eight of 15 specimens of the fish, in three out of four starfish specimens, and in the only specimens of laminaria and mussels, a reaction to mustard gas was confirmed. However, during a repeat analysis of such creatures which were caught on 28 June in the areas of the May deaths, and also in freshwater fish, no traces of mustard gas were observed! Where did it disappear to, if it actually was mustard gas? Was it dissolved? But of course it is still more interesting to know—where did it come from? A check of those suspected—military units again, of course—produced nothing suspicious.

Story 6. Six foreign transports called at the port of Arkhangelsk in May 1990. To suspect them of anything afterwards is improper.

The matter with our steamship line stands like this. Information about haulages are kept only for one calendar year. And that is why the commission has not received papers that confirm the absence of haulages (including even those for burial) throughout the White Sea of chemical, toxic or other dangerous substances in earlier periods.

The interagency commission, although it included representatives of the highest levels, did not get to “push” for further study....

In conversations with river-fleet staff workers I learned that our steamship lines retain documentation actually over the course of a year, but then they should not destroy it but should turn it over to the archives for another three years. If the papers contain especially important information, for example about dangerous or high-value haulages, the storage period is extended. This means that somewhere documents are lying on some shelves, still unclaimed by the commissions.

Now, then, we must talk about the results that have been summed up.

According to preliminary estimates, there are about 4 billion individual *asterias rubens* in the White Sea. No

more than 1 percent of them have died. If what happened in May is not repeated, then there will be no catastrophic consequences for the benthonic biocenoses.

The commission has for the present come to the conclusion: the death of the starfish and certain invertebrates, as well as seals, at the Summer Shore of Dvinskiy Zaliv occurred because of the short-term effect on them of a strong toxic substance (or substances) which possibly contained sulfur compounds (not excluding mustard gas). And where could this substance come from—until now it still is not clear. Even the persistent rumor about mustard gas that had seeped out of containers that ostensibly were buried in the White Sea at the end of the fifties does not nudge us toward an answer, because the presumed place of burial is too far from the area of the deaths of animal life. There is still one more opinion of the commission: there are for the present no foundations for considering that the whole water area of Dvinskaya Guba, and even more so the White Sea, has been affected by the poisoning.

The phrase “for the present,” which does not yield clarity and determinacy, was repeated several times in the preceding paragraph. So many people and so many resources have been expended, and all of them just to certify the death of animal life from a strong toxin!

Despite the fact that not one of the stories made the ends meet, the feeling remains that the cause of the damage could be each of the six variants. Thus, if in May we would have had daily ecological information about the state of the gulf, the sea, and the shores, then the true culprit for the death of the starfish could hardly slip away. But now the ends are in the water.

Society should have regularly updated objective data about the land, the water, and the air for our industrialized planet. Obviously, it is time for the various “green movements” to be united into an independent international organization which would be made up of well equipped ecological posts with the appropriate rights.

....Only a few months after the death of the starfish in the area of the Pinega River (again in the Russian North!) suddenly the coniferous forests yellowed....Why? Assemble a commission again which will propose stories?

From the Editorial Board. A noteworthy detail: Despite the fact that the commission did not single out one of the six variants as the most probable, the so-called “military” story, thanks greatly to the press, became the most persistent and most popular. Thus, because of the events described, the newspaper DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIYA (No 2, 1990) published a list compiled by Aleksandr Odintsov of accidents on our nuclear submarines. (The accuracy of the information and its sources are on the author's conscience.)

One of the first accidents occurred in 1959—a reactor core broke down. From 1962 through 1967 the same thing happened on several submarines. The failures, said

the author, were eliminated fairly easily—the compartment in the troubled state was cut out and hidden on the sea floor. Four similar power units were buried in the Kara Sea at a depth of about 200 meters. Then he recalled accidents in 1972, 1981, 1984 and 1986.

Aleksey Yablokov, Deputy Chairman of the Ecological Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who was familiarized with Larisa Mironova's article by the editor, also was categorical. He directly connected the harm with the military's activity:

"We do not know at all the amounts and composition of the pollution which comes from naval bases. According to available information there are two areas in the White Sea where poisonous substances have been buried. I add to the cases cited in Larisa Mironova's article the fact that recently we have been throwing away a large amount of dead fish here and there on the White Sea shore. Cases of catching fish with body sores have increased in frequency. We are observing unusual deaths of birds. But the death of sea mammals—seals and white whales—in July and August? Does this not point to the thought of a constant source of poisoning?"

"The rectangle plotted with a dotted line on a White Sea navigational chart does not give me peace of mind. 'Dumping of explosives' is written on it in black and white. 'Standing at anchor, the catching of fish by bottom-fishing equipment, underwater explosions, and operations for deepening the bottom are categorically prohibited.' Just what is there? (True, such 'rectangles' dot maps of the whole World Ocean. The practice of dumping military stores and other dangerous military playthings on the seabed has become an ordinary occurrence for many countries, especially since the second world war.—The editorial board.)

It would seem that the military themselves have caused this turn in public opinion. For it is almost impossible to make one's way into their archives and to examine even those documents which under modern circumstances are not secrets. Thus there also arises on the part of society excessive suspicion and bias against the army and the military-industrial complex.

Both "the imagination gives birth to monsters" and the ban on information lead to rumors and conjectures which have nothing in common with reality.

Of course the military and the industry that operates on the basis of it have introduced their contribution to the pollution of nature. But indeed, only they are sinful? And always do those who criticize the military proceed from unselfish love of the Motherland? And perhaps the presence of the army in certain regions simply disturbs someone? For example, to develop the richest diamond fields in Arkhangelsk Oblast jointly with foreign corporations. Or to create free economic zones... And so someone inflates the "military" stories in the hope of kicking defense facilities out of the coveted territory. It would seem that the contradiction of interests must be

removed by reasonable compromises and mutual trust. What good is mutual disparagement.

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Plans for Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site

91US0446A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 91
Union Edition p 3

[Interview with Yevgeniy Chaykovskiy, mayor of Kurchatov, by IZVESTIYA special correspondent A. Illesh: "'Chain Reaction' at the Nuclear Test Facility—When Conversion Problems are Aggravated by the Military Itself"; place and date not given; first three paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Kurchatov-Moscow—It was a strange morning. Our vehicle sped into Semipalatinsk from out of nowhere along an ideal, straight highway just like an airport runway. The flat surrounding steppe was powdered with snow. Ahead one could already make out the smoke of the oblast center, and behind—the City of Kurchatov, just yesterday a secret city that did not even exist on the maps. Also known as Semipalatinsk-21. Also known as the end-of-the-line railroad station with the symbolic name "End of the Road"...

So extremely strange—the matching proximity of super secret, underground, entirely unique reactors, which today often stand idle but are capable when loaded not only of resolving complicated nuclear energy problems, but of bringing in currency as well (foreign-requisitioned research may be conducted here), and flocks of sheep and herds of horses grazing not far from the barbed wire—something out of the cattle-breeding past of the local steppe... Rusted rails thrust deep into tunnel shafts where explosions recently rang out, and a dispirited queue waiting for ordinary pastry... The test facility. A world turned inside out, in which the same conditions are not set up for the specialists from nuclear "factories" creating weapons of the 21st century and the indigenous population, suddenly discovering that these very weapons were tested not just on their land, but at the expense of their well-being as well...

We discuss the fate of the city, and the problems of the test facility and the highly qualified specialists living there, with Kurchatov Mayor Yevgeniy Chaykovskiy.

[Illesh] First of all—how do you manage to be working there, an engineer, a civilian, in a zone which is under the complete influence of the military?

[Chaykovskiy] Indeed, it used to be that the ispolkom [executive committee] here, in a zone closed to outsiders, had neither power nor authority. There was a party gorkom [city committee]. As for the soviets, they were like a "subsection" of the gorkom. Today we have two mutually exclusive authorities, soviet power and military power. One is a command authority, the other a democratic one. The relations we have developed with the military are complex. There is a mass of problems... I am

convinced that at all levels we must pose the question of sovietization of the test facility, or else the city, its offspring, will simply perish. And it will not perish all that quietly: the tragedies faced by people here may resound in an unforeseen echo.

[Illesh] Living for decades in a state of well-being behind the barbed wire, under the wing of the all-powerful USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building, how have you now come to find yourself on the edge of bankruptcy, in the circle of social, and even ethnic problems? Isn't your "master" still rich and all-powerful?

[Chaykovskiy] It is not quite that way. In order to understand the situation today, we must take an excursion into history. First of all, the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons testing, I am convinced, is the privilege of a state with a highly organized and stable economic and political structure. Presently we have neither. With a more than sufficient arsenal for containment at our disposal, we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into an interminable, exhaustive race around the circle of nuclear rearmament.

Reorientation of the nuclear industry is a tremendous problem. This is the destiny of several hundred thousand people. Distorted development of the economy and defense branches of industry have brought the situation to an impasse. The bomb has been developed and perfected, the nature of testing has changed, the population has increased in areas adjacent to the test facility... Everything has changed! The only thing which hasn't changed is the narrow departmental approaches to relations with the surrounding world.

[Illesh] For 22 years, from 1949 through 1962, there were air and ground nuclear bursts. The damage inflicted to people's health and to the ecology of the region has been vast, as I understand it. What is the situation today?

[Chaykovskiy] Indeed, the region was always considered a zone of economic risk. Development of industry, of the villages, was restrained... But life goes on. The population grew. Grew and became poor. There was no compensation for people's health, weakened under the influence of the effects of nuclear on-site testing, no balanced or specially developed nutrition regimen. To this day no special treatment facility has been built—not in Semipalatinsk, nor Pavlodar, nor Karaganda. One unhealthy generation has given birth to another. And that, to a third. It's like a snowball! There exists today an entire people requiring special charitable attention. A people that became hostage to the nuclear parity which terminated in a "victorious conclusion."

[Illesh] As a result, the facility, as a site of nuclear testing, will not be accepted either by the republic or the local population. What is the position of the soviets?

[Chaykovskiy] The new soviet of people's deputies formed in January of last year is compelled to seek another future for the test facility—after all, it has long ceased to be a simple "field" where holes are bored for

weapons testing. Over 40 years of existence it has grown into a developed scientific research complex, including a facility of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, with well equipped laboratories, highly qualified scientific and production personnel, and the original functioning reactors...

And now the ispolkom and prominent specialists have charted the main avenues for accomplishing conversion of these enterprises. We have proposed a reorientation of the facility's activity—to convert it to a science and technology center for research in the sphere of atomic energy, basic and applied nuclear physics, and the utilization of nuclear technology in the peace-oriented sectors of the economy. Based on the test facility's research laboratories, a university would be established with orientation on physics and power engineering. We have proposed the development of a substantiation for building a nuclear power station here (an idea which has found support, I would add—60 percent of those polled in a population survey advocated construction of a nuclear power facility)... We would begin the extraction and processing of coal, deposits which are located on the territory of the test facility, and would exploit the production of crushed granite...form a modern agricultural firm...

[Illesh] An agricultural firm?! Aren't you forgetting about the specific terrain we have here, and an ecology which has suffered great damage from explosions?

[Chaykovskiy] No. This too has been taken into account. Furthermore, we intend to study the possibility of using the holes and tunnel shafts bored by the military as burial sites for radioactive waste. And the main thing is to build a center based on the Semipalatinsk medical institute, the test facility's radiological laboratories, and the health clinic here, for studying the effects of nuclear testing and developing a methodology for treatment. I talked over all the aspects of such a center with Nobel Prize laureate Bernard Laun (who ardently supported it!). We met with him recently at a United Nations conference, and the scientist confirmed his participation in financing such a center and providing instrumentation and equipment.

[Illesh] What is the final concept for transformation of the test facility?

[Chaykovskiy] To put it briefly—to humanize the facility, build a scientific and cultural center here. And it would be a contemporary, civilized center which in the final analysis would work for the benefit of peoples in the region.

[Illesh] Where's the snag? You are continually saying "We would like," "We intend"...

[Chaykovskiy] From the very outset, the military command structure of the test facility and its leadership in the USSR Ministry of Defense expressed firm opposition to our ideas. Using the adverse psychological and economic situation at Semipalatinsk-21 to its advantage—a

city of test personnel whose families' well-being depends on the conduct of the tests themselves—test facility command and personnel are encouraging people to oppose any new ideas. The generals state that conversion of the facility will bring unemployment to the military and civilian specialists. But they hide the fact that the proposed peace-oriented production and implementation of parallel defense programs (without nuclear weapons explosions) will not just entail reductions, but will require an additional contingent of specialists as well. A serious and competent conversion will enable Kurchatov itself to be extricated from its status as a "temporary military settlement," with its weakly developed social and community services, inadequate schools and child care facilities, primitive medical care, and wretched housing—and to be transformed into a full-fledged city.

[Illesh] Tell us briefly what Semipalatinsk-21 is today.

[Chaykovskiy] It is a city ruled by a military command leadership. Basic support—trade, the state portion of the services sphere, construction—are relegated to the military. However, let me repeat that two-thirds of the population are civilians, and they come to the ispolkom for solutions to their worldly problems. The times of no shortages, times of all-powerful departments of the defense establishment—are gone and will not return. We have introduced coupons for 16 varieties of food products. Commercial goods have long since switched over to coupons. Stocks are such that to buy a pair of ladies boots, a city resident must wait nine years; to get a sewing machine—a hundred or so (!)... Using the discontent of city residents to their advantage, the military can easily transfer responsibility for their own insolvency to the ispolkom. Here we see all assets used. Consider this—of 45 deputies in the soviet, 26 are military. Therefore you can even "change" chairmen every session...

[Illesh] Perhaps the military has its own ideas for the future which would enable the city and professionals living there to be saved?

[Chaykovskiy] Alas, the military command does not have a program of its own. That is, of course, if you disregard the calls for a return to "the good old days." Those in charge of the test facility and their leadership are proposing unpopular—to put it mildly—measures: to continue testing until 1993. Moreover, they are demanding that this decision be taken by the president of the country, thereby (consciously or not) driving a wedge between the center and the republic...

[Illesh] All the same, the main question again is—how long will the test facility remain inactive?

[Chaykovskiy] An extremely sore subject. The Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on banning nuclear weapons testing. And I believe the test facility has gone silent for good. But there is another aspect. Cessation of the testing and development of new generation nuclear weapons is the final goal. But there are two ways of resolving this: the "classical"

way, using state diplomacy; and the people's diplomacy, a categorical one—stop the testing today! Classical diplomacy has its own laws, the system of inter-state negotiations. And the chief factor in negotiations for a general and total ban on nuclear weapons is the presence of reliable national means of monitoring tests that are conducted. The development of such means has been underway for some time. Specialists from the United States arrived two years ago for the first time at the Semipalatinsk facility with this aim. We did the same thing in Nevada. To complete this extremely important work, two additional nuclear experiments must be conducted here at the testing facility. These experiments are not tests. Tests presuppose a check of either new systems, or old systems taken out of storage. Here we are talking about something different. And these two experiments will involve the use of devices manufactured using well-established technologies and rigidly defined yields—20 kilotons.

[Illesh] A paradox develops—two new explosions are necessary to see to it that there are absolutely no more explosions on this earth?

[Chaykovskiy] Right. These experiments will be conducted under international control (if they are conducted at all) and in the presence of observers from the community. These efforts do not involve any technical or medical problems. But there is a sociopolitical problem—in developing nuclear weapons, the republic fulfilled its duty to the country at the price of tremendous damage and deprivation. Today people are justly posing the question of compensation payments for the purpose of organizing a normal life...

[Illesh] What do you specifically have in mind when you speak of compensation?

[Chaykovskiy] The test facility is situated in the territory of three oblasts—Pavlodar, Karaganda, and Semipalatinsk. All three are demanding compensation. Karaganda miners are talking about this as well. We have in mind the payment of 1,500 rubles [R] to every person in the territory of the three oblasts born prior to the last explosion. All told this amounts to R3 billion. It has been suggested that these payments be made over the course of three years. And the eternal question—where will we get the money? But this question never arises when funds must be found for conducting test explosions! And so this is the first, one-time, form of compensation intended for residents of the three oblasts.

Compensation to the residents of rayons immediately adjacent to the test facility should be in the form of continuous monthly payments to each worker and retired individual (not exceeding R300). In addition to monetary payments, the program envisages accelerated development of rayons surrounding the test facility. No one has put money into these rayons, including the Ministry of Defense. But people are born there, live there—all under inhumane conditions! We must begin to implement these measures without delay. In short, the

problems of the test facility are emergency problems. And therefore I am convinced they must be reflected in the emergency budget. If the state does not voluntarily move toward compromise, it may witness an explosion—and this time it will be one of people.

[Illesh] How does the military relate to these plans?

[Chaykovskiy] They see them negatively. The military-industrial complex leadership believes that payments should be made only for the explosions themselves—if there was an explosion today, all right, we pay you... And then we wait until the next one... Fifteen, twenty years ago, such a practice might have been possible. But not today. Certainly there is also an understanding in the

military—especially among those not burdened with large gold stars on their epaulets, that the situation is complicated and that now we need new approaches in resolving chronic problems.

The aim of the final explosions is a noble one. It is the path toward achieving a general ban on nuclear testing. Twenty-kiloton bursts will not add any additional harm to the tremendous damage which has already been inflicted. But I say again—it will only be possible to convince people of the need to endure the final nuclear experiments if compensation is awarded (guaranteed!) for damages received over 40 years of testing—to these people and this land.

Belorussian Hospital Patients Stage Hunger Strike for Improved Conditions*91US0426A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
27 Mar 91 p 2*

[Article by Andrey Maksimov under the rubric: "Conflict Situation: When It Gets Warmer, I Will Make Myself Scarce!"]

[Text] Grodno Oblast—They run away from this hospital; they are returned here, and they run away again. But, how can one run away from himself?

And yet, what did this letter to the editorial office, hand-carried by a courier, amount to? Was it indeed the last hope of these people, or just one more attempt to get back at their offenders? I believe that we should familiarize our readers with the letter in more detail. As its authors maintain, the letter expresses the very essence of their trials and tribulations (there are 35 signatures under it).

"We, the patients of the republic's Girdovka Psycho-Neurological Hospital for tuberculosis sufferers in Grodno Oblast, submitted a petition to the chief physician requesting that our humiliation and brutal treatment by medical personnel be brought to an end. The ward chief openly calls us beasts, and the head nurse simply does not condescend to answering questions put to her. A search was conducted here in the course of which all warm clothing and footwear were confiscated from us. Unfortunately, our hospital is laid out in such a way that we have to walk outdoors all the time (to the baths, to the cafeteria, to the treatment rooms, and to the X-ray clinic). We demanded that the management do the following: return to us the padded jackets, warm footwear, and socks; install night lights; fix the inhalator; outfit a visiting room; and renew the library to which, it appears, no new books have been added in 30 years. Our X-ray clinic is worse than one in a drunk tank. There is no doctor on duty at night. The chief physician hardly ever visits the ward, and many patients have never seen him. The chief physician ostentatiously threw our letter into the wastebasket in the presence of the patients. All of us, without exception, will be on a hunger strike, and will refuse to take medication and be treated until our justified demands are met (our conditions for existence are in no way different from those in a concentration camp). May a correspondent see for himself what tyranny and boundless arbitrariness prevail here..."

A newspaper photographer and I came to Girdovka on the fifth day of the strike. We saw narrow paths freshly beaten in the snow, and structures sitting quite far apart and surrounded by a durable fence. One can only get into the compound through a gate guarded by the militia.

Having learned about the purpose of our visit, ward chief Frantishka Kamornik smiled wearily:

"So, they have managed to write to you, too. There is no argument—this is fast. Incidentally, they stopped their hunger strike yesterday. The chief physician had a conversation with them."

I will admit that this detail discouraged me somewhat. For some reason, I recalled a line from the letter: "...Difficult as it may be, we will be on a hunger strike until our last breath." Could the conversation with the chief physician have resolved all issues overnight?

The ward chief observed in a mundane manner: "After all, this was not the first case of a hunger strike here. You get to hear all kinds of things when you visit here."

Perhaps, the main difference between this hospital and others is "coded" in the following two words—"closed-type." Tuberculosis sufferers from the entire republic are subjected to forced treatment here. The contingent is very mixed: persons without specific domiciles [bomzhi], chronic alcoholics, and a lot of people with criminal records. However, there are also those who have agreed to come here voluntarily. To be sure, they are a minority. Naturally, as is the case in any other establishment, the life of this small community of physicians and patients consists of their small joys and chagrins. What prevails? It is hard to give an unambiguous answer. And yet...

Nurses and doctors observed during our conversations: "We cannot work normally." The point is that a handful of villains have all the patients in their power. They have established their own unwritten laws here, as if in the labor camp zone, and they live by these laws. Those who initially fail to obey are cruelly beaten.

The register of violations of hospital procedures reads as follows:

"Patients S. and V. used profanities during a morning inspection of the patients by a nurse on duty."

"Zh. refused to take medication in the presence of a nurse. He responded to a reminder with profanities."

"V. and B. entered Room 6 and threatened patients running a fever with reprisals if they ate."

"S. kicked a tray with food out of the hands of a hospital attendant."

"S. threatened to smash in the face of a patient for going to see a doctor."

Hospital employees said: "An elite consisting of five to seven people calls the shots. Those who have suffered in melees are afraid of reprisals and refuse to file complaints. They smoke in the rooms, 'get high,' and spit, but we cannot do anything about this."

It appeared that a scandal could not be avoided right before New Year's Day, when they found home-brewed beer in one of the rooms. However, it blew over. A month later, a nurse's purse and warm scarf disappeared.

Head Nurse Yelena Mazuro said: "Things like this have not happened before in the 23 years I have worked here. We went through the rooms several times and asked about it. We thought that somebody did this in jest. Everybody was silent. We called in the militiamen and began a sweep. There was shouting and cursing in response. In Room 8, we found two three-liter jars with home-brewed beer."

...Complaints from the patients went out to various echelons once again. Here is a response to one of them from the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health.

"Your (A. Stoma's—author) letter was reviewed by employees of the Institute of Pulmonary Diseases and Phthiology of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health who visited the hospital. Indeed, warm outerwear has been confiscated from the patients in order to prevent their unauthorized departures. However, one or more sweaters are available in all rooms which may be used for going to other buildings. On 13 December 1990, you left the hospital without authorization, and were returned, intoxicated, by the militia... Other patients made no complaints about medical services in the course of a room inspection."

I am certain that this was not the last visit, and that conflicts will again occur many times. One of the patients blurted out this phrase toward the very end of our conversation: "It is ridiculous to be surrounded by this and not to fight." Initially, an avalanche of resentment and rebukes came down on the medical personnel.

"They feel at home here because of us. They do next to nothing but get paid on schedule. The letter says it all correctly. They..."

I listened to their arguments, their stories of shattered lives, and tried to imagine the path all of them had travelled before they ended up here. It took a lot of hopes, disappointments, and shocks for all of them to tie the tight knot of hopelessness! An absolutely different life is close, just on the other side of the fence. Someone remarked in passing: "When it gets warmer I will run away again. I have run away three times now, and they have brought me back. I do not want to be treated here, I do not."

Indeed, this is the absence of freedom, perhaps, not to the degree it happens in the "zone," but the absence of freedom nonetheless, with monotonous, dull evenings and the forced idleness they hate. Everybody looks for an escape from this existence in his own manner. Some "get higher" than a kite, get "wrapped up" in playing cards, scheme against the medical personnel, or attempt to read books which have yellowed from old age. All of them must "serve out" their term. It is precisely a term, because the hospital belongs to two organizations at once: The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health and the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. This dual subordination conceals many contradictions. After all, a course of treatment lasts between three and five months at the maximum. But let us not forget that many people

are referred here for compulsory treatment by the courts, and the term for them is set clearly: It is one year. The two do not coincide in any way... This is why patients who are already cured have to languish for a lot more time, serving the remainder of the terms decreed by the courts.

Who invented this ridiculous rule? Since what time has it survived in our country? How much money has gone down the drain? Questions and more questions... Both the physicians and the patients asked them. They agreed on certain points, but they still failed to arrive at a mutual understanding on many points. The entire system of this kind of compulsory treatment is based on something running counter to common sense. Many complex economic and social problems, which have accumulated in our daily life, can be shown vividly using this hospital as an example.

We may examine every complaint point by point, and find out what is true and what is an exaggeration. But how can the thick wall of alienation and misunderstanding, which separates these people into two camps, be overcome? You cannot leap over this wall right away, hoping to get rid of all woes at once. After all, this wall is unlike the fence 20 meters away from the treatment building. Complaints to higher ups will continue to be written, and inspectors will be kept on the road as long as this wall remains...

Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Moldova

91US0416A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian No 44, 6 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by A. Boyko, employee of the Moldavian Department of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, under rubric: "Sociological Laboratory: Reality and Hope: Public Opinion Survey"]

[Text] The name of USSR People's Deputy T. Zaslavskaya is widely known throughout the country. Not too long ago the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion that she heads created in Moldova its own "Gallup Institute," that is, a branch of VTsIOM [All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion]. We offer to our readers for their attention the results of that department's first research.

The republic's socioeconomic and political pulse is extremely strained. The new placement of political forces has let itself be known and there has been a change in the nature of their fight for power. There has been no letup in the confrontation among the nationalities. Little has been done to improve people's lives. There is a crisis in the economy and in social and spiritual spheres of life.

"1990-1991: Reality and Expectation" is the topic of a sociological study carried out by the department of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion in Moldova and the republic's sociological association. The residents of Kishinev and Beltsy, and of Yedinetskiy, Orkheyskiy, and Vulkeneshtski rayons, took part in it.

A total of 1133 persons expressed their opinions. The total number of persons surveyed reflects the demographic, national, and social makeup of the republic's population. The population's general educational level and occupational employment rate were taken into consideration.

"The year 1990 has ended. How did that year compare with 1989 for you?" That question was used to evoke the respondent's comments. For 82 percent of those surveyed, it was more difficult that 1989. The response to that question was higher for the residents of rayon centers and settlements (85.4 percent), persons of Ukrainian (89.5 percent), Russian (88.5 percent), and Bulgarian (also 88.5 percent) nationality, and persons with a per-capita income of up to 75 rubles (84.6 percent). Those figures fully reflect the republic's political and economic state. For every seventh person surveyed, the year that has ended proved to be the same, and for only 43 persons was it easier than the previous year.

And what was people's opinion about how the year 1990 had been for the republic? The absolute majority (94 percent) was convinced that things were more difficult. That is a sign of the population's large attention to the events that occurred in the republic, and of the population's level of being informed, irrespective of people's place of residence, social status, nationality, or other peculiarities. Both the economic and political processes occurring in the country and in the republic captured the public's awareness. Practically every other person surveyed (46.2 percent) answered if he had known in 1985 what the changes that had begun in the country at that time would lead to, he would not have supported them. Only every fourth person proved to be on the side of the changes. The same number of respondents had difficulty answering that question. The ranks of the adherents of perestroika are becoming thinner under the pressure of the daily problems. But what is distressing people most of all? Here the public opinion was polarized depending upon the respondent's nationality. For example, whereas, for the republic's indigenous population, the most important factor is the rise in prices, the decrease in the standard of living (58.3 percent) and the next important factor is the aggravation of the interethnic relations (41.5 percent), for the Russian-speaking population the problem that is most alarming is the latter one (71 percent), then followed by the former (45 percent). They are followed (irrespective of the respondent's nationality) by the disappearance in the market of the necessities of life (39.5 percent); the sharp decrease in discipline and law and order, and the loss of political stability (38.3 percent); the loss of confidence in what tomorrow will bring (30.6 percent); etc. In this question the opinions also differed depending on the population's per-capita income. Low-income respondents are especially worried about the problems of daily life, and highly paid respondents are especially worried about political questions.

In addition to their disappointments, last year the republic's population also had their joys. The most important joy was the rebirth of the national-spiritual life and

culture (42.1 percent). In addition to every other Moldavian who took part in the survey, that joy was shared by 15 percent of the Russians, 20.2 percent of the Ukrainians, 36.8 percent of the Gagauz, and 46.2 percent of the Bulgarians. Other factors that were most gratifying last year included: the reinforcement of the republic's sovereignty and economic independence (25.4 percent); the CPSU's voluntary rejection of the monopoly on power (21 percent); the increase in the republic's authority within the country and abroad (19.1 percent); the first experience of democratic elections (16.2 percent); etc.

What were the reasons for the difficulties that the republic's population had had in 1990, and what had they been unable to obtain in 1990? A total of 63.4 percent of the respondents indicated that they had not had enough necessities of life. The rural population suffered more from this, inasmuch as that answer was selected by 71.2 percent, whereas the figure among the urban population was 56.6 percent. A total of 40.4 respondents complain about the lack of well thought-out laws. The need for such laws is manifested to a slightly greater extent among the Russian-speaking population (48 percent) than among the indigenous population (37.8 percent).

Other things that people are in favor of are kindness and responsiveness, faith in the republic's leadership, patience and restraint...

Last year's events and phenomena engendered in the respondents new feelings that previously had not been typical of them. Among them, public opinion isolated such a factor as a sense of offense because of what was happening all around (44.4 percent). That opinion predominates among the residents of Beltsy and of Sloboziyskiy Rayon, and is less typical of the population in Vulkeneshtskiy Rayon. This also prevails among low-income citizens. Every third respondent stated that the people around them had displayed a stronger feeling of fear. That idea is shared most of all by the Gagauz (52.6 percent) and Bulgarians (50 percent). Then come the Ukrainians and Russians (43 percent). Every fourth Moldavian who was surveyed agreed with that. The mirror of public opinion reflected such feelings as: fatigue; indifference; cruelty and aggressiveness; and the striving by incompetent people to gain power. The decrease in morality in society and the increase in crime are also in the field of vision of public opinion. Among the persons surveyed, every fourth person had encountered the aggressiveness of nationalistic groupings; 67 persons were subjected to persecutions for their convictions and actions; and every ninth person had become involved in a conflict with his immediate leadership. That, generally speaking, is a real-life description of the year 1990 that has ended, as confirmed and rendered concrete by public opinion. What did the population think were the basic reasons for the difficulties we are having today?

Of the 24 versions of the answer, the opinion that dominates is the one that the blame for everything lies with the Mafia, with organized crime (60 percent). The respondents who are most convinced of this are the rural population, and, in particular, the population of Slobozyskiy Rayon (70.6 percent), Yedynetskiy Rayon (71.6 percent), and those are less convinced are the urban population (Beltsy, 45 percent). A logical continuation of the first half is the second: the shortage of honest, decent people. When people speak of the Mafia, they apparently have in mind a Mafia that had formed as early as the perestroika period. As for the shortage of honesty and decency, this is confirmed in the public awareness by examples taken from life, when, on the wave of the perestroika phenomena, anarchy and complete permissiveness reigned and a large number of people sprang up and began pursuing in this socially significant matter their own personal, selfish interests. Other factors cited were: the technical backwardness of the enterprises; stealing; the tremendous power wielded by the bureaucrats; and errors in the leadership of the republic. It must be noted that the last-mentioned cause found considerable reflection among the respondents in the Russian-speaking population (38 percent among Russians; as much as 50 percent among Bulgarians). That should be expected as a result of the national tension in the republic, with the sole exception that that reason was cited also by 16 percent of the respondents among the persons of the indigenous population.

The insignificant reasons cited by people for the difficulties we are having today included the departure from the principles of socialism; the policy of treating everyone completely equally; the suppression of people with initiative; and the heritage of Stalinism.

In a future issue we shall acquaint the readers with the attitude taken by the republic's population to other social problems, including the activities of state agencies, public organizations, and movements, the political figures in Moldova, and people's evaluation of the possible paths for achieving changes for the better.

Reasons Cited for Possible Ethnic German Emigration

91UN1285A Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by V. Dil, organization committee chairman and Republic of Kyrgyzstan people's deputy, under the rubric "Before the All-Union Congress of Soviet Germans": "...Then the Emigration Will Increase!"]

[Text] The organization committee of the republic has completed all its rayon and oblast conferences; they elected 51 delegates to the congress. The delegates represent every area of Kyrgyzstan.

We tried to consolidate our German population to the maximum, to make it possible for everyone to speak his mind. That was the only basis we used to design a joint

program of action which we are planning to outline at the congress on behalf of the Germans now living in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Meetings and conferences at various levels were conducted in the villages, cities, and rayons of our republic where most of the important issues, of current interest for every German, were discussed. Unfortunately, there is no one point of view concerning the future of the Soviet Germans. This factor can be explained by a number of social and personal reasons; it also depends on many conditions, among which are the place of residence, the atmosphere among workmates, the number of family members, links with relatives, etc.

What are these different points of view?

Some people want to stay where they live now.

Others want to go back to places where they were exiled from in 1941, as was the wish of the "leader of all nations."

Still others demand the restoration of their former republic in the Volga area.

But the majority of our German population insists on their immediate and unconditional departure for Germany. They explain it by their desire to protect their people from being assimilated, by their wish to ensure that at least their children might have a happy future. This point of view reflects the mood of those who have lost the last vestige of their belief in the possibility of restoring German statehood on USSR territory.

However, I think it is too early to give priority to any of these opinions. To remain indifferent to other points of view and other opinions means to ignore the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

But all the Soviet Germans are facing similar problems—they want to restore their native language and their ethnic culture, to rectify the mistakes caused by prolonged discrimination. All these problems have risen to the level at which the future of the people becomes seriously threatened.

It is imperative to restore the statehood of the USSR Germans in the shortest time possible. The language, the culture, the ethnic customs cannot be revived if the people are scattered in various places, without a single territory and a single economic base. It is easy to foretell what the result may be if there are more delays in resolving this problem...

If their autonomy is restored, the interests of the two million people will coincide with the interests of the country to the maximum. The country is losing tens of thousands of rubles due to mass emigration. Does it not lose its prestige also?

Mass emigration harms our republic too: The Germans always did and still do contribute considerably to the economy of Kyrgyzstan!

These are the problems that our delegates are taking to Moscow, to the first congress in the history of Soviet Germans.

We realize that there will be a battle of opinions there. But this congress is the last hope of the "Vozrozhdeniye" society; it is the last attempt at consolidation for the sake of our future.

Jehovah's Witnesses, Other Bodies Registered in RSFSR

*PM0504140591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1*

[From roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, POSTFACTUM, URAL-AKTSENT, REUTER, and UPI reports: "Jehovah's Witnesses' Are the First"]

[Text] Russian Federation Justice Minister N. Fedorov has signed an act registering the statutes of 25 religious associations. They include the statutes of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists of the USSR and the Russian Federation and their interregional centers, the Russian Union of Pentecostals, the church organization of USSR Seventh-Day Adventists, and others.

The first presentation of statute registration certificates took place at the Russian Ministry of Justice 28 March. Representatives of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" organization received one, INTERFAX has reported.

Mufti Sees Islamic Party as 'Illogical'

*PM0504163991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 1*

[Correspondent M. Alimov report: "The Mufti Knows What He Is Talking About"]

[Text] As the Uzbek newspaper PRAVDA VOSTOKA reported on 17 December 1990 and 12 January 1991, members of an association styling itself "Islamic Revival Party," appealed to Tashkent Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] for permission to hold a republican meeting to found this party.

What ends are the Islamic Party's founders pursuing? To overthrow the socialist system and to set up a theocratic regime. And here the clear link between religious extremism and other "radical" forces must be pointed out. An example of this is the Islamic Party's recent registration with Moscow's Oktyabrskiy Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee].

Mufti Mukhammad-Sodik Mukhammad-Yusuf described the idea of forming the Islamic Party as illogical, inasmuch as Islam is in itself a party, and the Koran its statute. And true believers among the muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan support this view entirely.

Tajik Decree on Religious Festivals

*LD0804195391 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT
8 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Nina Merezchnikova]

Dushanbe April 8 TASS—Tajikistan's President Kakhar Makhkamov has decreed that the religious holidays of Idi Ramazon and Idi Kurbon would be made days off work in the republic.

The presidential decree marked yet another step in a series of measures taken in response to request of muslim believers. During the past eighteen months more than 70 mosques were built in the republic and an Islamic institute was opened. Broad opportunities for exercising the rights of believers have been granted to them under the new law on the freedom of conscience and religious organisations, recently passed by the parliament.

One of the problems that remain to be solved is shifting the weekly day off from Sunday to Friday, the day when most believers converge on mosques for prayer.

Many representatives of the clergy and laymen have urged the government to take the step. But the solution is far from simple because changes of this kind are bound to affect the work of transport and communications not only in Tajikistan but the whole of the country, as Tajikistan is an integral part of the single Soviet economy.

The government of Tajikistan has decided to hold consultations on the problem with the other central asian republics and Kazakhstan, where most of the country's muslims live. The solution to the problems will probably be found within the boundaries of the entire region.

Implications of Autonomy for Higher Educational Institutions Viewed

*91US0429A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 91
Second Edition p 3*

[Article by Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Education Professor V. Shukshunov: "As Long As We Have a Passion for Freedom"]

[Text]

State Examination of the VUZ:

By an ukase of the USSR president, "On the Status of Higher Educational Institutions," VUZ's have been granted the right to the status of self-administered autonomous organizations operating on the basis of regulations developed in keeping with legislation of the USSR and the republics.

The first to gain complete independence was the Moscow State University [MGU] imeni M.V. Lomonosov. It seemed that one could only welcome the process that was beginning, but there are doubts about the path selected in this case.

The solutions to all the problems about the autonomy of MGU were reduced to granting it the rights of a ministry or branch. It was removed from the jurisdiction of the USSR State Committee for Education. Such a variant of autonomy is perhaps acceptable for our flagship of the higher school, taking into account MGU's uniqueness, size, and immense scholarly potential. But is this path to autonomy suitable for the rest of the VUZ's? Will they be able to find the forces and funds for high-quality support for the educational and scholarly processes while existing with the rank of a "separate ministry?" And how many of these ministries will appear in the near future?

It is no secret that we frequently conduct the same old reforms without proper development or prediction of their consequences. And this is why we frequently obtain results which are the opposite of the ones we had been counting on. We would not want the realization of the VUZ's right to autonomy, which is a significant issue of the day, to degenerate into just another campaign. Therefore, I consider it necessary to present my viewpoint regarding this issue.

The autonomy of the VUZ's makes the system for management of the higher school more democratic and efficient. Its essence consists in the following: Any VUZ has the right to resolve all of its internal problems if it clearly has the best possibilities of doing this.

In this case it is independent, democratically-based management of the training process, scholarly research, training and retraining of personnel, and economic activity—without intervention, dictatorship, prescriptions, or instructions from organs for management of the higher school, local authorities, and so forth.

This can be done, of course, only if the VUZ has sufficient financial and material-technical resources of its own. Yet the glaring poverty of the higher school, with the state budget being practically the only source of its sustenance, and the grave situation in the economy make it impossible even to dream about full autonomy of higher educational institutions. And they do not need it, this complete autonomy.

World practice shows that the autonomy of a VUZ cannot be absolute; it is always relative. For example, there is autonomy with respect to the federal government and local management organs (the private university in the United States), autonomy with respect to the USSR State Committee for Education (MGU in its new status), republic and branch organs for management of the higher school, and so forth.

By expanding the independence of the VUZ's and giving them autonomy, the state grants them the exclusive right to resolve two major problems: What to do in order to worthily perform the mission assigned to it by the society and how to do it. Herein lies the essence of the autonomy and independence of VUZ's.

Objectively, one can say that even today the VUZ's in our country have been granted considerable rights, and

their independence has been broadened. To one degree or another they have the right to develop their own training plans and programs; to determine the plan for admission of students and graduate students; to confer honorary degrees and titles; to establish the structure of the institution and the personnel organization table and set salaries; to form a unified wage fund for professor and teaching personnel, scientific and engineering-technical workers, and auxiliary teaching personnel; to combine financial, material-technical, and other resources; to rotate personnel and assign protectors; to conduct commercial and intermediary foreign economic activity and establish direct ties with foreign forms and universities, and so forth. Nonetheless, all this is merely a step along the path to solving the problem of the autonomy of educational institutions. It will take a certain amount of time for the VUZ's to perform the functions delegated to them and realize their independence in management.

It is also worth taking a serious look at the accompanying circumstances. Why, for example, has MGU attained a position in which it answers directly to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers (I emphasize, we are speaking actually about changing the jurisdiction of MGU and not about making it autonomous or increasing its resource support from the state budget). Because the USSR Government allots miserly amounts of money to the USSR State Committee for Education for the maintenance of the VUZ's under its jurisdiction. And, as we know, any kind of management is achieved with resources—personnel, financial, material, methodological, informational, and so forth. Under the conditions of democratization of the higher administrative organ, they cannot be poor and left without resources, since then all the management levers would be lost. It is not surprising that certain rectors are now raising this question: Why do we need organs for management of the higher school? The VUZ's wish to be independent of a poor branch, that is, public education, and they are fostering the hope of becoming richer by transferring to the direct administration of the president or prime minister of the country or the Union republics. As one rector put it, he is even ready to be under the housing maintenance office if it would give the VUZ more money than it is getting now.

This is a dangerous process. This could make it possible to ruin the state policy in the area of education which is practiced by the State Committee for Education and the republic and branch organs for management of the higher school.

In order to improve the quality of the training of specialists, it is exceptionally important to rank the VUZ's (establish their ratings), single out an elite group, and create more favorable conditions for them—financial, material-technical, legal, and so forth. This selection should be made not with the help of ukases by the president and decrees by the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR or the Union republics, but exclusively according to the results of the accreditation of the VUZ's

with the enlistment of extremely well qualified independent experts, preferably with the participation of foreign ones. The higher the rank of the VUZ, the smaller the part of its activity that should be supervised by state management organs, and the greater the opportunities it should have to obtain additional financial and material support. And the number of rights and responsibilities of each higher educational institution are the measure of its individual responsibility for the quality of the higher education and the level of scholarly research. Here lies an immense field for joint activity of Union and republic organs for administration of public education.

The unjustified haste in renaming VUZ's is alarming and annoying. It is being transformed into a campaign: In a matter of days or weeks the educational institutions become state technical universities or academies, essentially without changing either the content of the education or the profile or the quality of the training. Such a campaign only discredits the idea of acquiring an elite status.

In my view, there is one major criterion for including a VUZ among the elite: It should meet the international standard or approach it in terms of the quality of the training of specialists, scholarly research activity, the material base, and so forth.

It might turn out that only a few of the country's 900 VUZ's will meet world standards. This might also be

objective information, which should be considered in the Supreme Soviet and the governments of the USSR and Union republics, about the real state of affairs in the country's higher education system.

The autonomy and independence of higher educational institutions, the transition to a market economy, and, consequently, to the market of specialists, and the decentralization of our entire system objectively require an essential change in the role and functions of the Union organ for administration of public education. What should be the main thing in their activity? Above all, the development of educational standards that determine the level of quality of the training of specialists with a higher education; the provision of independent state expert evaluation, accreditation, and certification of VUZ's and the establishment of their ratings; a solution to the problem of equivalency and recertification of higher education documents both within the country and in relation to foreign universities and colleges, the formation and implementation of Unionwide joint programs in conjunction with the republics, and the development and coordination of the science of the higher school. Moreover, the USSR State Committee for Education and a part of the country's executive power must actively engage in legislation in the sphere of education and protect the interests of the higher school and the teachers and students.

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